State ex rel. Young v. Standard Oil Company
| Decision Date | 20 May 1910 |
| Docket Number | 16,303 - (2) |
| Citation | 126 N.W. 527,111 Minn. 85 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. EDWARD T. YOUNG v. STANDARD OIL COMPANY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Ramsey county by the attorney general, in the name of the state, to adjudge defendant guilty of unfair discrimination and unfair competition under Laws 1907, c. 269, and to cancel and annul the right, permit and license of defendant to do business in Minnesota, and for such further order in the premises as will give full force and effect to such cancelation.
The complaint, in addition to the allegations quoted in the opinion, alleged that defendant distributed and was still selling and distributing kerosene in the cities of St. Paul and Minneapolis at prices from one to three cents per gallon less than it had sold kerosene of the same grade, quality kind and test in various other localities of Minnesota to which the cost of transportation and distribution of said oil from the place of production and manufacture was the same as to the cities named, specifying certain non-competitive places where the higher prices were charged; "that in the cities of St. Paul and Minneapolis, a number of persons and corporations, competitors of defendant, keep and maintain storage tanks and tank wagons for the distribution and sale of kerosene in said cities, while in said other cities no competition exists, and the discriminations heretofore alleged have been made and are made, with the intent to destroy the business of such competitors and to create a monopoly in the business of distributing such kerosene; that the defendant by reason of its extensive system of carrying tanks, storage tanks and tank wagons extending in the distribution and sale of kerosene throughout the state of Minnesota and by reason of its unlawful discrimination in the price of kerosene between localities where there is competition and where there is not, has prevented and does prevent the investment of capital in said business and has prevented and does prevent legitimate competition in said business in the various portions of the state."
Defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and that Laws 1907, c. 269, was repugnant to section 1 of the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution, and to section 7, of article 1 and sections 27, 33 and 34 of article 4 of the state constitution. From an order, Bunn, J. sustaining defendant's demurrer to the complaint, the state appealed. Reversed.
Foreign corporation -- revocation of license.
The procedure allowed by chapter 269, Laws 1907, for revocation of the license of a foreign corporation, is not exclusive, and under the discretion vested in him the attorney general of the state may in the name of the state institute proceedings to have such license adjudged forfeited.
Title of act.
The fact that the title of an act is broader than the act itself does not render the enactment invalid under section 27, article 4, Const. (Minn.)
Sales of merchandise -- class restrictions.
The legislature may impose special restrictions regulating the sale and distribution of one class of commodities, unless beyond doubt no substantial conditions or usages of trade differentiate that class from others.
Sales of merchandise -- products of petroleum -- query.
Query, whether the legislature intended to include in chapter 269, Laws 1907, other than the primary products of petroleum by the use of the words "petroleum or any of its products."
Sales of merchandise -- by-products.
Assuming that by-products are included, it is doubtful if defendant, when charged with violating the act in respect to a primary product, can question the validity of the act as applied to by-products.
Sales of merchandise -- statute invalid in part.
The inclusion in a statute of articles not subject to classification with articles which are so subject does not render the enactment invalid as to the articles properly subject to classification.
Sales of merchandise -- discrimination in price -- statute valid.
Chapter 269, Laws 1907, forbidding discriminations in the prices charged for petroleum or any of its products, as relied upon in this action, wherein defendant is charged with discriminating in the selling price of kerosene oil, held to be a valid police regulation, and not unconstitutional.
George T. Simpson, Attorney General, and George W. Peterson, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
Chapter 269, Laws 1907, is general in its application to all those engaged in the production, manufacture and distribution of petroleum and its products. By petroleum and its products the legislature had in mind kerosene oil, gasolene and such oils as are distributed for commercial purposes by the tank car, storage tank and tank wagon system. It did not have in mind products of petroleum such as vaseline and chewing gum. The facts and circumstances surrounding the business of dealers in petroleum and the products of petroleum are such that the legislature in its discretion may determine the necessities of the case and legislate against unfair competition and unfair discrimination in such business, and such legislation is not arbitrary. Chapter 269 is not class legislation and is not in violation of sections 33 and 34 of article 4 of the constitution of Minnesota. It includes all of the class. The statute in question is an amplification of the subject-matter of trusts and monopolies as defined in R.L. 1905, §§ 5168, 5169. General words are to be given limited meaning to conform to legislative intent and legislative purposes. Petri v. Commercial Nat. Bank of Chicago, 142 U.S. 644, 650; McKee v. United States, 164 U.S. 287; United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U.S. 320. It is submitted in conclusion that the primary products of petroleum, being those which do have a relation to the peculiarly competitive conditions in the petroleum industry, are within the purview of the statute, and not those by-products which bear no such relation. That is the legislative intent, it is the common and approved usage, and it is common sense. General words in a statute are inclusive, within the legislative intent; particular words are exclusive of those not expressed, hence the language of the statute.
Stringer & Seymour, Alfred D. Eddy and Robert W. Stewart, for respondent.
This action is an action of ouster. Will an action of ouster lie before conviction, before revocation by the secretary of state of the permit to do business in the state and the continuance of business after such revocation? In other words, has not this action been prematurely brought, independent of the constitutionality of chapter 269?
The defendant is a corporation created under the laws of the state of Indiana and was duly licensed to do business in the state of Minnesota. Unless there are provisions of law other than those contained in chapter 269, in order to state a cause of action the conditions precedent enumerated in the act must be alleged. The contention of appellant is, that the attorney general is authorized, independently of chapter 269, to maintain this action, and quotes sections 5168, 5169, 4544, 3174 and 58 of the Revised Laws of 1905, as constituting such authority. We submit that these sections contain no such authority as claimed by appellant. By no logical deduction can it be made to appear that the authority conferred upon the attorney general under sections 5168 and 5169 would warrant or authorize him to commence an action of ouster under chapter 269. Section 58 constitutes his authority to bring an action of ouster after the secretary of state has revoked the license and defendant has continued to do business. The other sections are not in point.
To vacate the charter of a foreign corporation, and adjudge it to be dissolved is beyond the jurisdiction of the courts of this state. It is within the power of the state, without question, to vacate and annul the permit or license to do business within the state and to punish infractions of the law of the state by such foreign corporation; but the courts of the state cannot vacate a foreign corporation's charter, nor can it adjudge such charter to be dissolved. Recognizing this limitation, in all acts concerning foreign corporations, the legislature has provided for a revocation of the permit or license to do business in the state. We submit, therefore, that an action of ouster cannot be maintained until after conviction and revocation of the permit to do business by the secretary of state.
Chapter 269 is in contravention of the provisions of the constitution of the state of Minnesota and is unconstitutional and void. Horwich v. Walker-Gordon, 205 Ill. 497; State v. Wagener, 77 Minn. 483; Nichols v. Walter, 37 Minn. 264; Johnson v. St. Paul & Duluth R. Co., 43 Minn. 222; State v. Sheriff of Ramsey County, 48 Minn. 236; State v. Cooley, 56 Minn. 540; State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 68 Minn. 381; State v. Ritt, 76 Minn. 531; Murray v. Board of Co. Commrs. of Ramsey County, 81 Minn. 359; Duluth Banking Co. v. Koon, 81 Minn. 486; State v. Walker, 83 Minn. 295; State v. Justus, 90 Minn. 474; Thomas v. City of St. Cloud, 90 Minn. 477; Webb v. Downes, 93 Minn. 457; authorities in State v. Brown, 97 Minn. 402; State v. Cudahy, 33 Mont. 179; Bedford Quarries Co. v. Bough, 168 Ind. 671, and authorities cited; Kellyville v. Harrier, 207 Ill. 624; Brown v. Jacobs, 115 Ga. 429; Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco Co., 125 F. 454; State v. Haun, 61 Kan. 146; Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. City of Hot Springs, 85 Ark. 509.
The act is in contravention of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States. Barbier v Connolly, 113 U.S. 27; Gulf C. & S.F. Ry....
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