Lee v. Coughlin
| Citation | 26 F.Supp.2d 615 |
| Decision Date | 26 October 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 93 CIV. 8417(SS).,93 CIV. 8417(SS). |
| Parties | Raymond LEE, Plaintiff, v. Thomas A. COUGHLIN, III, Commissioner, James Mahoney, Hearing Officer, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
David C. Leven, Robert Selcov, Prisoners' Legal Services of New York, Poughkeepsie, NY, Daniel L. Greenberg, John Boston, The Legal Aid Society, Prisoner's Rights Project, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs.
Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General of the State of New York, New York, NY (Evan A. Gordon, David M. Monachino, Of Counsel), for Defendants.
In an Opinion and Order dated September 28, 1995, this Court granted plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment against defendant James Mahoney, holding that defendant Mahoney had violated plaintiff's due process rights in a prison disciplinary hearing and that the defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity for his actions. At the Court's invitation, the defendants moved for, and the Court granted, reconsideration of its decision based upon Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), which had been decided while the motions for summary judgment were sub judice. On the basis of the extensive factual record developed by experienced counsel representing both sides in this action, the Court now finds that plaintiffs 376-day segregated confinement constituted an "atypical and significant hardship" as that term was given meaning in Sandin.
Although the parties have amassed a voluminous record1 on the Sandin issue raised by this case, the material facts underlying this motion are not substantially in dispute.
The background of this action is more fully set forth in this Court's Opinion and Order dated September 28, 1995, familiarity with which is presumed. Lee v. Coughlin, 902 F.Supp. 424 (S.D.N.Y.1995) [hereinafter Lee I]. Repeated herein are only those facts pertinent to understanding the current issues before the Court.
On June 9, 1992, the plaintiff was issued a misbehavior report for allegedly assaulting another inmate and was confined to his cell at Sing Sing Correctional Facility ("Sing Sing"). After the conclusion of a Tier III superintendent's hearing on July 9, 1992, the plaintiff was found guilty, and sentenced to and placed in the Special Housing Unit ("SHU") at Sing Sing for a two-year term. Plaintiff remained in SHU at Sing Sing until his transfer to SHU at Southport Correctional Facility ("Southport") on July 23, 1992. Plaintiff filed an Article 78 petition in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Westchester County, on December 22, 1992. By Order dated May 21, 1993, Justice James R. Cowhey annulled the plaintiff's disciplinary disposition in all respects and ordered the defendants to expunge plaintiff's records based upon "the conflicting evidence coupled with denial of [the plaintiff's] right to meaningful assistance" with his defense. Lee I, 902 F.Supp. at 428 (). Plaintiff was ordered released from SHU and transferred from Southport to general population at Great Meadow Correctional Facility on June 21, 1993. Plaintiff had served 376 days in segregation confinement at the time of his release from Southport SHU: 14 days at Sing Sing and 362 days at Southport. Plaintiff, pro se, filed the instant civil rights complaint on December 8, 1993.
By Opinion and Order dated September 28, 1995, this Court granted plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment, finding that plaintiff had been deprived of an employee assistant to prepare for his Tier III superintendent's hearings in violation of his due process rights. See Lee I, 902 F.Supp. at 435. Because defendants had not moved to supplement the record after Sandin was decided, I assumed in Lee I that the 376-day segregation at Southport was an "atypical" hardship, but invited the defendants to move to reargue under Sandin, if grounds existed to do so. See Lee I, 902 F.Supp. at 431 n. 9.
The Court granted defendants' motion for reconsideration on January 2, 1996. Lee v. Coughlin, 914 F.Supp. 1004 (S.D.N.Y.1996) ("Lee II"). In the interim, pro bono counsel appeared for plaintiff and the Court permitted the parties to conduct extensive discovery on the Sandin issue. After the completion of discovery, defendants filed their renewed motion for summary judgment on September 11, 1996. Plaintiff and defendants responded to their respective submissions,2 and on May 19, 1997, the Court heard oral argument on defendants' renewed motion.
In order to analyze the facts concerning segregated confinement in correctional facilities in New York State, familiarity with the regulations governing the imposition of discipline for inmates in the New York State Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS") is necessary.
N.Y. Comp.Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7 [hereinafter 7 NYCRR] § 270.3 (1996) sets forth a three-"tier" system of prison discipline. Significant misbehavior results in significant punishment. Concomitantly, the amount and nature of the process the state affords is dependent upon the potential sentence the prisoner may receive.
Tier I violation hearings cannot result in sanctions of confinement; penalties are limited to loss of privileges or assignment of extra work for up to thirteen days. At a Tier I hearing, a prisoner may be present, may offer documentary evidence and may submit a written statement, but may not present witnesses. Appeals are to the Superintendent. Records of these proceedings are destroyed after fourteen days. See 7 NYCRR § 252.
Disposition of a Tier II disciplinary hearing may result in the same penalties available for a violation under Tier I; additionally, however, prisoners may be confined in a cell or room, or in a special housing unit for up to thirty days. A $5.00 automatic surcharge is collected upon a finding of guilt. At a Tier II hearing, a prisoner has the right to an employee assistant, to call witnesses, and to have the hearing electronically recorded. Appeals are to the Superintendent. See 7 NYCRR § 253.
A Tier III superintendent's hearing may result in the same penalties available for a violation under Tier II; in addition, a prisoner may be confined in a cell or room or in a special housing unit without limitation. See 7 NYCRR § 254 (emphasis supplied). Furthermore, prisoners may lose good time credit. Appeals are to the Commissioner of DOCS. See id.
Tier III superintendent's hearings are conducted by higher-ranking officials than Tier II hearings. See id. Appeals to the Commissioner are handled statewide by the Director of Special Housing, Donald Selsky, who exercises substantial discretion in reviewing both the determination of guilt and the propriety of the penalty. (Selsky Dep. at 8-9.) Of 25,661 Tier III reported hearings in 1994, Selsky reviewed 6899 on appeal. (Pl. Ex. 1.) The Director of Special Housing does not review Tier I or Tier II dispositions. (Selsky Dep. at 6.)
Three forms of punitive confinement exist in New York: placement in SHU, keeplock, which is confinement to the prisoner's cell, and cube, which is confinement to the prisoner's own bed in dormitory housing. (Selsky Dep. at 37.)
In addition to discipline, prisoners may be placed in SHU for the following reasons:
detention prior to a hearing or on receipt from another correctional facility if the inmate's record raises reasonable questions concerning willingness to adhere to prison rules, [NYCRR] § 301.3(a)(1)-(2); administrative segregation if the facility has determined that the "inmate['s] presence in general population would pose a threat to the safety and the security of the facility," id., § 301.4; protective custody, id., § 301.5; keeplock admissions for various reasons in minimum or medium security facilities, id., § 301.6; and for other reasons, id., § 301.7(a). The regulations direct prison officials to review a detention admission at least once every twenty-four hours. Id., § 301.3(c) Inmates placed in administrative segregation must have their status reviewed every seven days for the first two months and every thirty days thereafter by a three-person committee. Id., § 301.4(c). Inmates placed into involuntary protective custody receive a hearing within fourteen days and a review every thirty days thereafter. Id., § 330.3(b) Finally, an inmate admitted to the SHU for any other reason must be allowed a meeting with the Superintendent's designee concerning his or her placement. Id., § 301.7(a).
Both parties contest the atypicality of plaintiff's confinement in SHU for 376 days and argue that the undisputed statistical data submitted supports their respective positions.3 The defendants maintain that SHU confinements of significant duration are a common experience of prison life. As of June 26, 1995, 1,595 prisoners were serving SHU sentences of the following duration:
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Duration of SHU Sentence Number of Inmates Percentage of Confinements
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365 Days 629 40%
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(Annucci Aff. ¶ 12.) From these statistics, the defendants submit that the inmate population confined in disciplinary SHU in New York State for periods of more than six months is over 80% of the SHU population on any given day. Therefore, defendants argue, extensive confinement in segregated housing is a typical, ordinary and expected incident of prison life in New York State.
The plaintiff contends that this isolated "snapshot" view of the number of inmates in SHU on one day is misleading and not...
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