Lee v. Dixon
| Decision Date | 21 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 5:21cv117-TKW-HTC |
| Parties | RONALD DEON LEE, Petitioner, v. RICKY D. DIXON,[1] Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Ronald Deon Lee, proceeding pro se, filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his conviction for burglary of an occupied dwelling with battery in Bay County Florida, case 2011-CF-1251. ECF Doc. 1. After considering the petition, the record, the State's response, ECF Doc. 8 and Petitioner's reply, ECF Doc. 17, the undersigned recommends the petition be DENIED without an evidentiary hearing.
On April 15, 2011, a female occupant of a motel room in Mexico Beach, Florida, awoke to find Petitioner, a man she did not know, on top of her, attempting to rape her. ECF Doc. 11-2 at 31. When she asked him what he was doing, he did not say anything except, “shh, shh, shh” when the female started stirring. Id. She awoke her boyfriend, who was sleeping in the bed next to her, and he and Petitioner fought until police, who had been called by the female victim, arrived.[2]Id. at 31-35. Petitioner told police he was staying in the next room at the motel with his girlfriend and her child, had gone to the store and, when he returned, had entered the wrong room, opening the victim's door using the key to his room. Id. at 145-46.
However, law enforcement did not find a key on Petitioner, id. at 164, and motel staff testified the key to one room could not have opened the victim's room. Id. at 187-88. Also, the evidence at trial showed the door to the victim's room and Petitioner's room were propped open. Id. at 176-78, 192. Additionally, the Petitioner's room did not look like the victim's room as the victim's room had two beds, and based on the testimony presented, the room was lit enough for Petitioner to see both beds. ECF Doc. 11-2 at 97, 148. Also, after obtaining consent to search Petitioner's room from Petitioner's girlfriend, law enforcement found the victim's boyfriend's truck keys and the victim and her boyfriend's cellphones. Id. at 140-41 & 149.
Petitioner was charged with burglary of a dwelling (by entering the motel room and stealing the phones and keys while the victims were out), burglary of an occupied structure with battery (by entering the motel room and attempting to rape the female occupant), and sexual battery. ECF Doc. 8-1 at 31. His first trial ended in a jury deadlock and mistrial on October 23, 2013. ECF Doc. 8-2 at 26.
At his second trial on January 24, 2014, Petitioner was convicted of burglary of an occupied dwelling with a battery on the male victim and sentenced to life imprisonment.[3]ECF Doc. 8-2 at 144.
Pursuant to the requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act Of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a petition must be filed within one-year of “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).[4] Additionally, the one-year time period is tolled for “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
Petitioner appealed his judgment to the First District Court of Appeals (“First DCA”), which affirmed per curiam without a written opinion on June 30, 2015. Lee v. State (1D14-747), 198 So.3d 634 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). He did not seek discretionary review in the Florida or United States Supreme Court, so the conviction became final after the 90-day period for seeking certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court expired, or on September 28, 2015.
The AEDPA one-year limit began running the next day and ran until October 19, 2015,[5](20 days), when Petitioner filed a Petition asserting ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. See ECF Doc. 8-9 at 2. The First DCA denied the Petition on the merits on November 13, 2015, ECF Doc. 8-10 at 2, and the First DCA denied a motion for rehearing on January 5, 2016. ECF Doc. 8-11 at 6; Case No.: 1D15-4838. The AEDPA time limit began running the next day and ran until Petitioner filed a Rule 3.850 motion through counsel on September 26, 2016 (264 days, for a total of 284 days). ECF Doc. 11-3 at 16. The post-conviction motion was continuously pending until February 2, 2021. ECF Doc. 8-13 at 2. The AEDPA time limit began running the next day, and ran for 51 days, for a total of 335 days, before the instant petition was filed on March 26, 2021, making the Petition timely.[6]
The AEDPA governs a state prisoner's petition for habeas corpus relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under the AEDPA, relief may only be granted on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court if the adjudication (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
This standard is both mandatory and difficult to meet. White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419 (2014). “Clearly established federal law” consists of the governing legal principles set forth in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court when the state court issued its decision. Id. A decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if the state court either: (1) applied a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by Supreme Court case law; or (2) reached a different result from the Supreme Court when faced with materially indistinguishable facts. Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1155 (11th Cir. 2010); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003).
A state court decision involves an “unreasonable application” of Supreme Court precedent if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle, but applies it to the facts of the petitioner's case in an objectively unreasonable manner, Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 134 (2005); Bottoson v. Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 531 (11th Cir. 2000), or “if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.” Bottoson, 234 F.3d at 531 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000)). “A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fair-minded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court's decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011).
An ineffective assistance of trial claim requires a showing that (1) counsel's performance during representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) prejudice resulted, i.e., that a reasonable probability exists that but for counsel's unprofessional conduct, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). The reasonableness of counsel's performance is to be evaluated from counsel's perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances, and the standard of review is highly deferential. Id. at 689. The Petitioner bears the burden of proving that counsel's performance was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and that the challenged action was not sound strategy. Id. at 688-89.
To show counsel's performance was unreasonable, a defendant must show “no competent counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did take.” Hollis v. United States, 958 F.3d 1120, 1122 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). It is difficult to establish ineffective assistance when counsel's overall performance indicates active and capable advocacy. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 111. To establish prejudice, a defendant must show, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Jenkins v. Comm'r, Ala. Dep't of Corr., 963 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 112). A petitioner must allege more than simply that counsel's conduct might have had “some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. A petitioner must show a reasonable probability exists that, “but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. Bare allegations of prejudice are not enough. Smith v. White, 815 F.2d 1401, 1406-07 (11th Cir. 1987).
Petitioner raises nine grounds for relief: two claims of trial court error, six claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel (“IATC”) and one claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel (“IAAC”). As discussed below, Petitioner is not entitled to relief because the claims are either procedurally barred or without merit.
During jury selection, the State exercised a peremptory strike on a juror, Mr. Gray, that Petitioner contends is a member of a racial minority, and defense counsel objected. ECF Doc. 1 at 3. The trial court found that the State's reasons were raceneutral and allowed the peremptory strike. Id. at 4. In Ground One, Petitioner argues the trial court erred in allowing Juror Gray to be stricken. ECF Doc. 1 at 4.
Petitioner is not entitled to...
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