Lee v. Electric Motor Division

• Decision Date: 18 June 1985
• Citation: 169 Cal.App.3d 375,215 Cal.Rptr. 195
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 10,639 Yong LEE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BUTCHER BOY, a corporation, et al., Defendants and Respondents. In Hak LEE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BUTCHER BOY, a corporation, et al., Defendants and Respondents. ** B006144.

Page 195

215 Cal.Rptr. 195

169 Cal.App.3d 375, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 10,639

Yong LEE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BUTCHER BOY, a corporation, et al., Defendants and Respondents.

In Hak LEE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BUTCHER BOY, a corporation, et al., Defendants and Respondents. ^**

B006144.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 7, California.

June 18, 1985.

Review Denied Aug. 29, 1985. ^*

Olan & Friedman, Los Angeles, and Richard A. Love, Santa Monica, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Murchison & Cumming, Dallas Sacher and Friedrich W. Seitz, Los Angeles, for defendants and respondents.

THOMPSON, Associate Justice.

Plaintiffs Yong Lee and In Hak Lee appeal the adverse summary judgment granted on their consolidated actions seeking to impose liability for personal injury and loss of consortium against defendant component part manufacturer, Electric Motor Division, an unincorporated division of Gould, Inc., ¹ who manufactured and supplied the motor installed in the machine that injured Yong Lee.

Plaintiffs purchased a market in Downey, California, and included in the assets purchased was a meat grinding machine ("machine") that was designed, manufactured and sold by Butcher Boy and Lasar Manufacturing Company ("Lasar"). Defendant designed, manufactured, and sold the electric motor to Lasar, who installed it in the machine.

Plaintiff Yong Lee was injured on January 15, 1979, while using the machine to grind meat. Her right hand was caught and crushed in the grinding mechanism, resulting in the amputation of her right hand and part of her forearm.

Plaintiffs filed their respective consolidated complaints for personal injury and loss of consortium based on theories of negligent design, manufacture and failure to warn, strict liability, and breach of warranty, against several parties, including defendant and Lasar.

Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted on August 30, 1983. Summary judgment was filed on September 16, 1983, and notice was duly served and filed. Plaintiffs appeal from the summary judgment.

We will conclude that no triable issue of fact exists, and affirm the summary judgment.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The summary judgment procedure, inasmuch as it denies the right of the adverse party to a trial, is drastic and should be used with caution. (Eagle Oil & Ref. Co. v. Prentice (1942) 19 Cal.2d 553, 556, 122 P.2d 264.) Summary judgment is properly granted only when the evidence in support of the moving party establishes that there is no issue of fact to be tried. (Code Civ.Proc., § 437c; Lipson v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 362, 374, 182 Cal.Rptr. 629, 644 P.2d 822.) The court may not pass upon the issue itself. (Slobojan v. Western Travelers Life Ins. Co. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 432, 436, 74 Cal.Rptr. 895, 450 P.2d 271.) "[I]f a single issue of fact is found, the trial court is powerless to proceed and must allow such issue to be tried." (Lynch v. Spilman (1967) 67 Cal.2d 251, 271, 62 Cal.Rptr. 12, 431 P.2d 636; Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Harnischfeger Corp. (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 842, 851-852, 175 Cal.Rptr. 67.)

"The moving party bears the burden of furnishing supporting documents that establish that the claims of the adverse party are entirely without merit on any legal theory." (Lipson v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 374, 182 Cal.Rptr. 629, 644 P.2d 822.) "In examining the sufficiency of the affidavits filed in connection with the motion, the affidavits of the moving party are strictly construed and those of his opponent liberally construed, and doubts as to the propriety of granting the motion should be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion." (Stationers Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 412, 417, 42 Cal.Rptr. 449, 398 P.2d 785.)

"The defendant's supporting affidavits are responsive in nature and must necessarily be addressed to the issues raised by the complaint. [Citations.] [p] In determining whether triable issues are presented, the court may not consider the allegations of the complaint except to the extent they are not controverted by affidavits on either side. [Citations.] Before a defendant's motion can be granted, it must clearly appear that the action is without merit, and every reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the complaint. [Citations.] 'Thus a plaintiff who has pleaded a cause of action on either of two theories will not be subject to defeat by summary judgment because the defendant has established by an uncontradicted affidavit that one of the two theories (but not necessarily the other) cannot be established. The burden is upon defendant to rule out all possible merit....' [Citations.] [Italics in original.]" (Cox v. State of California (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 301, 309-310, 82 Cal.Rptr. 896.)

The placement of the burden of proof at trial does not affect the showing required for a summary judgment. (Security Pac. Nat. Bank v. Associated Motor Sales (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 171, 179, 165 Cal.Rptr. 38.) "There is nothing in the [summary judgment] statute which lessens the burden of moving party simply because at the trial the resisting party would have the burden of proof on the issue[s] on which the summary judgment is sought to be predicated. In such a case, on the motion for summary judgment, the moving party must generally negative the matters which the resisting party would have to prove at the trial." (Barnes v. Blue Haven Pools (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 123, 127, 81 Cal.Rptr. 444.)

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs contend that the defective design and manufacture of the motor and the lack of a warning proximately caused Yong Lee's injury because had the motor stopped immediately when turned off, her injuries would have been less severe. Plaintiffs concede that the accident itself would not have happened if the machine had been designed with a narrower throat or equipped with some type of safety device. Plaintiffs, however, allege that defendant is still liable because the motor could have been built to stop immediately by attaching a brake or clutch.

The issue before us is whether the facts shown here negate any possible proof of a cause of action against defendant for its design and manufacture of the motor and its failure to give a warning.

1. Defective Manufacture and Design.

"A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being." (Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 57, 62, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897.) Our Supreme Court "held in Cronin [Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp. (1972) 8 Cal.3d 121, 104 Cal.Rptr. 433, 501 P.2d 1153] that a plaintiff satisfies his burden of proof under Greenman, in both a 'manufacturing defect' and 'design defect' context, when he proves the existence of a 'defect' and that such defect was a proximate cause of his injuries." (Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 413, 427, 143 Cal.Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443.)

Although plaintiffs have phrased their complaints in terms of both defective manufacture and design, they have not properly alleged a cause of action based on a manufacturing defect. A manufacturing defect is readily identifiable in general, because the defective product is one that "comes off the assembly line in a substandard condition" in comparison with the other identical units. (Barker, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 429, 143 Cal.Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443.) Plaintiffs do not contend that the motor, as compared to the other identically manufactured motors, came off the assembly line in a substandard condition. Hence, we find that defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on the causes of action based on the allegation of defective manufacture.

Our Supreme Court, in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., supra, 20 Cal.3d 413, 429-430, 143 Cal.Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443, established two alternative tests for determining whether a product is defectively designed. Under the first test, "a product may be found defective in design if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner." Under the second test, "a product may be found defective in design even if it satisfies ordinary consumer expectations, if through hindsight the jury determines that the product's design embodies 'excessive preventable danger,' or, in other words, if the jury finds that the risk of danger inherent in the challenged design outweighs the benefits of such design."

"A component part manufacturer may be held liable for damages caused by a component part which was defective at the time it left the component part manufacturer's factory. [Citations.]" (Wiler v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 621, 629, 157 Cal.Rptr. 248.) In reliance on this rule, defendant claims it is insulated from liability for defects caused by Lasar's subsequent alleged negligence in the design and manufacture of the machine because there was no defect in the motor at the time the motor left defendant's plant. We agree.

Defendant has shown the following facts: William Lasar, a mechanical engineer and the manager of Lasar, was solely in charge of Lasar's design and manufacture since 1922. Mr. Lasar testified that he did not specifically recall buying motors from defendant that were custom built for this particular machine, although he did recall purchasing specially ordered motors for customers in states with lower voltage. He further stated that the motors he bought from defendant were ordinary, off-the-shelf motors, that were "standard items" and "nothing special."

Plaintiffs argue that an issue of fact exists because Mr. Lasar's deposition testimony created an inference that defendant helped him to design the machine. Plaintiffs rely on Mr. Lasar's testimony that he bought motors from defendant "right from the beginning," in 1922,...