Lee v. Goshen Rubber Co., Inc., 20A05-9307-CV-242
Decision Date | 13 June 1994 |
Docket Number | No. 20A05-9307-CV-242,20A05-9307-CV-242 |
Citation | 635 N.E.2d 214 |
Parties | Alexander J.R. LEE, Appellant-Defendant v. GOSHEN RUBBER COMPANY, INC., Appellee-Plaintiff. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
William J. Nye, Elkhart, for appellant.
Alan L. Weldy, Yoder Ainlay Ulmer & Buckingham, Goshen, for appellee.
Alexander J.R. Lee appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. We affirm. Lee raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as whether Lee had sufficient minimum contacts with the State of Indiana to permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Lee.
Goshen Rubber Company, Inc. (Goshen Rubber) is an Indiana corporation doing business in Goshen, Elkhart County, Indiana. At all times relevant herein, Lee was a resident of North Carolina. In late 1984, Lee responded to an advertisement that Goshen Rubber had placed in a Greensboro, North Carolina newspaper. Goshen Rubber hired Lee as a salesman and employed him from December 3, 1984, through October 17, 1990. Lee was in Goshen from December 3 through December 7, 1984, for his initial training. In addition, he was in Goshen from July 6 through July 9, 1988, for meetings and to assist during a strike. Lee regularly communicated by telephone with his superiors in Goshen regarding business matters and other issues related to his employment. Lee also regularly corresponded with Goshen Rubber by mail from his home in North Carolina, including the submission of sales materials, expense vouchers, and other claims which form the basis of Goshen Rubber's lawsuit against Lee.
Goshen Rubber filed a complaint against Lee on December 26, 1991, claiming that Lee had breached his contract of employment by not working exclusively for Goshen Rubber, had submitted fraudulent expense vouchers and claims for car payments and insurance, and had converted funds Goshen Rubber reimbursed to him. On February 7, 1992, Lee moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. On February 24, 1992, Lee moved for change of venue from the judge. On April 27, 1993, the trial court, acting with a new judge, denied Lee's motion to dismiss. On September 27, 1993, this court granted Lee's petition for interlocutory appeal.
A defendant may challenge the jurisdiction of the trial court over him either by affirmative defense as enumerated in Ind. Trial Rule 8(C) or by motion to dismiss pursuant to T.R. 12(B)(2). When a defendant attacks the jurisdiction over his person, he bears the burden of proof upon that issue by a preponderance of the evidence, unless the lack of jurisdiction is apparent upon the face of the complaint. Weenig v. Wood (1976), 169 Ind.App. 413, 349 N.E.2d 235, 240-41, trans. denied.
Lee argues that the trial court lacks personal jurisdiction over him, and that therefore, the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. Goshen Rubber argues that Lee had sufficient minimum contacts with the State so as to satisfy the requirements of Indiana's long-arm statute, which provides, in pertinent part:
"Any person or organization that is a nonresident of this state, a resident of this state who has left the state, or a person whose residence is unknown, submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any action arising from the following acts committed by him or his agent:
(1) doing any business in this state;
(2) causing personal injury or property damage by an act or omission done within this state;
(3) causing personal injury or property damage in this state by an occurrence, act or omission done outside this state if he regularly does or solicits business or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue or benefit from goods, materials, or services used, consumed, or rendered in this state;
(4) having supplied or contracted to supply services rendered or to be rendered or goods or materials furnished or to be furnished in this state; ..."
T.R. 4.4(A)(1), (2), (3), (4). We agree with Goshen Rubber.
In Tietloff v. Lift A-Loft Corp. (1982), Ind.App., 441 N.E.2d 986, this court summarized the factors to be considered in employing Indiana's long-arm statute:
The nature and quality of Lee's contacts with Indiana are significant. The affidavit of Robert Alexander, vice president of finance for Goshen Rubber, shows that Lee was acting as an employee of Goshen Rubber on the two occasions that he was...
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