Lee v. Guettler
| Decision Date | 14 June 1965 |
| Docket Number | No. 50944,No. 1,50944,1 |
| Citation | 391 S.W.2d 311 |
| Parties | Olive M. LEE, Appellant, v. Roy A. GUETTLER, Jr., Respondent. Paul F. LEE, Appellant, v. Roy A. GUETTLER, Jr., Respondent |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
James L. Muller, Kansas City, for appellants.
Charles Shangler, Kansas City, for respondent.
These are separate actions for damages for personal injuries by a husband and wife, asking $10,000.00 for husband and $15,000.00 for wife with a count for $10,000.00 for loss of wife's services pursuant to Sec. 23-205, General Statutes of Kansas 1949. The injuries were sustained in a collision of automobiles in Kansas. Defendant's motion to dismiss these causes, combined for hearing thereon, was sustained and plaintiffs have appealed from the judgments of dismissal entered.
The ground alleged in the motion to dismiss was a prior final adjudication of plaintiffs' causes of action in a suit between the same parties. The adjudication relied on was in an action filed by plaintiffs jointly against defendant in the magistrate court of Jackson County for $350.00 for damages to the automobile owned by them in which they were riding at the time of the collision. Plaintiffs had judgment for $350.00 which was satisfied in open court before these suits were filed. Defendant's contention, which the trial court sustained, is that the magistrate court judgment is res judicata of all issues between the parties and that to permit plaintiffs to maintain these actions for personal injuries after the adjudication of their property damage claim in the magistrate court would permit them to split their causes of action.
Plaintiffs' contention is that the present claims of each of them individually are not on the same cause of action determined in the magistrate court because that claim was a joint claim for damage to the car owned by them jointly. On reason and authority, as hereinafter discussed, our conclusion is that plaintiffs' contention must be sustained.
The cases on which defendant relies are cases concerning two claims arising out of a single occurrence separately commenced by the same single plaintiff. Stoops v. Stoops, 363 Mo. 1075, 256 S.W.2d 799; Grue v. Hensley, 357 Mo. 592, 210 S.W.2d 7; Dunn v. Pickard, Mo.App., 284 S.W.2d 6; Coy v. St. Louis and S. F. R. Co., 186 Mo.App. 408, 172 S.W. 446. They have no application to the situation here. In General Exchange Insurance Corporation v. Young 357 Mo. 1099, 212 S.W.2d 396, 400, also cited by defendant, we said: We pointed out therein how there could be recovery in two separate suits, one for personal injuries and one for property damages, resulting from a single act of negligence, where under the circumstances of that case two separate parties were real parties in interest as to each of these claims.
The majority rule, which we follow as defendant states, is that bringing separate suits for personal injuries and for property damages is splitting a cause of action and will not be permitted. General Exchange Ins. Corp. v. Young, supra; Chamberlain v. Mo.-Ark. Coach Lines, 354 Mo. 461, 189 S.W.2d 538, 161 A.L.R. 204; A.L.I. Restatement of Judgments, Sec. 62; 1 Am.Jur. 494, Actions, Sec. 113; 1 C.J.S. Actions Sec. 104d, p. 1334. However, as we said in Chamberlain (189 S.W.2d l. c. 539): In that case, we held that the same plaintiff could bring separate suits for his own personal injuries and the wrongful death of his wife resulting from the same occurrence, because they were different causes of action. In this case, a husband and wife sustained personal injuries in the same collision, for which they each have a separate cause of action, as well as the right under Kansas law for the husband's loss of his wife's services. As to claims for personal injuries of a husband and wife being separate causes of action, see Watkins v. City of El Dorado, 183 Kan. 363, 327 P.2d 877, 881; Fields v. Anderson Cattle Co., 193 Kan. 558, 396 P.2d 276, 279; see also Adams v. Stockton, Mo.App., 133 S.W.2d 687, 688. As hereinafter shown, plaintiffs did not have separate causes of action for the damage to their car.
'The rule against splitting a cause of action applies only where the several causes of action are between the same parties.' 1 C.J.S. Actions, Sec. 102, p. 1312; see also Restatement of Judgments, Comment b, Sec. 62, saying that the rule it states against splitting 'presupposes a claim and judgment of a single plaintiff against a single defendant.' That is not the situation here. The claims of Mrs. Lee and Mr. Lee are each separate claims against a single defendant. Neither has any interest in the claim of the other for his or her personal injuries; and neither is a necessary or proper party to the other's action. However, that is not true of the suit in the magistrate court for damages to their jointly owned automobile. 'Joint owners of a chattel cannot, over the objection of the adverse party, separately sue the wrongdoer for an injury to or to recover the possession of the chattel, but all must join as parties plaintiff.' 39 Am.Jur. 896, Sec. 32; see also Civil Rule 52.04(a); Restatement of Judgments, Sec. 103. This joint action of a husband and wife for damage to their jointly owned property is a separate and distinct action from the separate action each has a right to maintain for his or her own personal injuries.
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... ... Actions § 102, p. 1312. 'The rule against splitting a cause of action applies only where the several actions are between the same parties.' See also Lee v. Guettler, Mo.,391 S.W.2d 311, 313(4--6) (1965), quoting C.J.S., and 'Restatement of Judgments, Comment b, Sec. 62, saying that the rule it states against splitting 'presupposes a claim and judgment of a single plaintiff against a single defendant. '"' Here respondent's original claim was not only against ... ...
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