Lee v. Howse
| Decision Date | 13 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 19-cv-30 |
| Parties | FLINT J. LEE, Plaintiff, v. NATALIE HOWSE, KIM FOXX, LEO P. SCHMITZ, EDDIE JOHNSON, LISA MADIGAN, and ARTHUR WILLIS, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Flint Lee ("Plaintiff") brings this Section 1983 suit against Assistant Cook County State's Attorney Natalie Howse ("Howse"); Cook County State's Attorney Kim Foxx ("Foxx"); former Director of the Illinois State Police Leo Schmitz ("Schmitz"); former Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department ("CPD") Eddie Johnson ("Johnson"); former Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan ("Madigan"); and former public defender Arthur Willis ("Willis") for alleged constitutional violations arising out of Plaintiff being required to register as a sex offender under Illinois' Sex Offender Registration Act, 730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. ("SORA"). All Defendants have filed motions to dismiss Plaintiff's governing amended complaint [51]. See [58], [59], [62], [89], and [91]. Plaintiff has also filed various motions. See [105], [110], [114]. For the reasons that follow, all of Defendants' motions to dismiss, [58], [59], [62], [89], and [91], are granted and Plaintiff's amended complaint is dismissed in its entirety. Plaintiff's request to amend complaint [105] and request for permission to start discovery [110] are both denied and Plaintiff's request for Defendants to admit [114] is stricken. However, Plaintiff is given until June 26, 2020 to file a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, to the extent he can do so consistent with this opinion and Rule 11. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. Plaintiff must attach to his motion the second amended complaint that he seeks to file. All documents must be served on Defendants in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.
Plaintiff filed his governing first amended complaint ("Complaint") [51] pro se. The Complaint is lacking in factual detail and difficult to follow. As best the Court can tell based on the Complaint, public records of which the Court may take judicial notice,2 Plaintiff's response brief [65], and Plaintiff's original complaint [1], Plaintiff complains about the following: In 1989, Plaintiff "was convicted by a jury of attempted murder, armed robbery, attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault, and aggravated battery" for attacking a real estate agent in a model home. People v. Lee, 584 N.E.2d 185, 186 (Ill. App. 1991). At trial, a witness for the state read a statement from Plaintiff in which he allegedly "confessed to being on cocaine during the incident, planned to take [the victim's] purse or camera, entered the model home, changed the light bulbs, choked her, intended to knock her out by striking her with a lamp, pulled her pants down to fulfill a sexual fantasy of rape, but stopped when he saw she had her period, took her keys, and removed [the victim's] purse from the drawer in the office." Id. at 187. Plaintiff was "sentenced to 30 years on the attempted murder conviction, 15 years on the sexual assault conviction, and 30 years on the armed robbery conviction, all to be served concurrently." Id. at 186. The conviction and sentencefor the attempted murder charge were reversed due to an error in instructing the jury. See id. at 187-88. On remand, the prosecutor dismissed the attempted murder charge.
After serving his prison sentence, Plaintiff was required to complete three years of mandatory supervised release. Upon completing supervised release, Plaintiff was required by SORA, 730 ILCS 150/3(c)(4), to register as a sex offender. See [65] at 3. He also must report to the CPD every ninety days for life. See [51] at 7.
In March 2012, Plaintiff was arrested and charged with failure to register as a sex offender as required by SORA. See [65] at 3. At the time of the offense, 730 ILCS 150/3(a) required that "[a] sex offender . . . within the time period prescribed in subsections (b) and (c), register in person and provide accurate information as required by the Department of State Police." Plaintiff was convicted of the charge. See [1] at 8. Plaintiff emphasizes that when he was convicted, the presiding judge "stated numerous times" that the charge was "based upon ... Plaintiff's 1989 conviction for attempt[ed] aggravated criminal sexual assault." Id. at 7-8.
Plaintiff alleges that being required to register as a sex offender has caused him to be publicly labeled a sexual predator and fails to afford him the presumption of innocence or reasonable doubt in violation of the Due Process, Double Jeopardy, Ex Post Facto, and Equal Protection Clauses and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff alleges that all of the Defendants have enforced state laws requiring Plaintiff to register as a sex offender with "willful, malicious, deliberate indifference towards" Plaintiff, which has "caused adverse and damaging effects upon [his] liberty and freedom." [51] at 12. In particular, Plaintiff alleges that Howse, an Assistant Cook County States' Attorney, "intentionally misrepresented the law and possible prison time the Plaintiff could face to induce the Plaintiff to accept the two year offered by the Court." Id. (). Foxx (who is currently Cook County State's Attorney but was not in office when Plaintiff was convicted of failure to register in 2012) allegedly "has created an unconstitutional custom, policy and practice" by "allowing her subordinates to lie, make false arguments and misrepresent the facts in the prosecution of the Plaintiff by failing, refusing and insuring due process, fairness and truthfulness is being constitutionally enforced." Id. at 13. Johnson, CPD's former Superintendent, allegedly "allowed threats, abuse and threats of punishment, to deprive the plaintiff of his procedural due process rights by his subordinates" at the "35th Street Station Registry Department" in Chicago. Id. at 14. Madigan, the former Illinois Attorney General, allegedly "knew the Plaintiff was suffering abusive unconstitutional practice at the direct hands of the Illinois State Police." Id. at 15. Schmitz, the former Director of the Illinois State Police, allegedly "created or allowed a custom, policy and practice that forced the Plaintiff to abide the registry requirements out of abuse." Id. Finally, Willis—who was Plaintiff's public defender and is now a Cook County Circuit Judge—allegedly "conspire[ed] to deprive[] Plaintiff of his constitutional right to a trial and impartial trial or hearing." Id. at 16. Plaintiff brings all of his claims against all Defendants in both their official and individual capacities. Plaintiff seeks "removal from the sex offenders attachments and requirements" and a total of "$1.230 billion dollars" in monetary damages. Id. at 17-19.
Defendants' motions to dismiss are brought pursuant to Rules 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b)(5) is used to enforce rules governing service of process. The plaintiff has the burden to prove that the defendant was properly served such that the court obtained personal jurisdiction. Luxottica Group S.p.A. v. Partnerships & UnincorporatedAssociations Identified on Schedule "A", 391 F. Supp. 3d 816, 821 (N.D. Ill. 2019); see also Paulsen v. Abbott Labs., 368 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1163 (N.D. Ill. 2019). "If the Court determines that the plaintiff has not met that burden and lacks good cause for not perfecting service, the Court must either dismiss the suit or specify a time within which the plaintiff must serve the defendant." Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m)). This decision is "inherently discretionary" and can be made based on affidavits and other documentary evidence. Id.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint. For purposes of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court "'accept[s] as true all of the well-pleaded facts in the complaint and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.'" Calderon-Ramirez, 877 F.3d at 275 (quoting Kubiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 480-81 (7th Cir. 2016)). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff's complaint must allege facts which, when taken as true, "'plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a speculative level.'" Cochran v. Illinois State Toll Highway Auth., 828 F.3d 597, 599 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007)). The Court reads the Complaint and assesses its plausibility as a whole. See Atkins v. City of Chicago, 631 F.3d 823, 832 (7th Cir. 2011). It is also proper for the Court to "consider, in addition to the allegations set forth in the complaint itself, documents that are attached to the complaint, documents that are central to the complaint and are referred to in it, and information that is properly subject to judicial notice." Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir.2012)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c).
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. The Seventh Circuit has explained that a district court has "'a special responsibility to construe pro se complaints liberally and to allow ample opportunityfor amending the complaint when it appears that by so doing the pro se litigant would be able to state a meritorious claim.'" Kiebala v. Boris, 928 F.3d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Donald v. Cook County Sheriff's Dep't, 95 F.3d 548, 555 (7th Cir. 1996)). "In addition to viewing a 'pro se complaint with an understanding eye,' a district court may point a pro se litigant toward the correct procedure or 'take appropriate measures to permit the adjudication of pro se claims on the merits.'" Id. That said, the "court is...
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