Lee v. Lee

• Decision Date: 18 January 1957
• Docket Number: No. 36945--6--7,36945--6--7
• Citation: 80 N.W.2d 529,67 A.L.R.2d 176,248 Minn. 496
• Parties: , 67 A.L.R.2d 176 Peter J. LEE, Lorna Lee, by Peter J. Lee, as father and natural guardian, and Esther M. Lee, Respondents, v. Haven LEE and Jerome Lee, Appellants.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 529

80 N.W.2d 529

248 Minn. 496, 67 A.L.R.2d 176

Peter J. LEE, Lorna Lee, by Peter J. Lee, as father and natural guardian, and Esther M. Lee, Respondents, v. Haven LEE and Jerome Lee, Appellants.

No. 36945--6--7.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Jan. 18, 1957.

As Modified Jan. 24, 1957.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. In passing upon the propriety of a directed verdict against the defendants on the issue of negligence and proximate cause, we must take the view of the entire evidence most favorable to the parties against whom the verdict was directed, and such directed verdict will be sustained only if, in the light of that view, it would clearly be the duty of the trial court to set aside a verdict to the contrary as being manifestly against the entire evidence or where a contrary verdict would be in contravention of the law applicable to the case.

2. An act or omission of a second tortfeasor (or actor), as a matter of law, cannot constitute an efficient intervening cause which breaks the chain of causation between the negligence of the original tortfeasor and the resulting accident or collision, when such act or omission occurs so near in time to the happening of the accident or collision that it cannot possibly, in the remaining time interval, have found expression either to stop or break the natural sequence and progression of the original tortfeasor's negligence as a proximate cause.

3. It is error to instruct the jury as to the impropriety of alleged acts of negligence in the absence of evidence justifying an inference that they were a proximate cause of the accident since to do so would permit the jury to speculate on a claim of negligence which is immaterial and without evidentiary support as to proximate cause.

4. A new trial will not be granted for refusal to give negative instructions where the substance of such instructions is included in the general charge which fairly and correctly states the applicable law.

5. Whether there should be a new trial for misconduct of counsel rests largely in the discretion of the trial court, and its action will not be reversed on appeal except for a clear abuse of that discretion.

Affirmed.

Ray G. Moonan, Minneapolis, John M. Fitzgerald, New Prague, for appellants.

F. J. O'Brien, Rochester, Warren D. Chamberlain, Faribault, for respondents.

MATSON, Judge.

In each of three separate actions for damages for personal injuries resulting from an automobile collision, consolidated for trial and for hearing upon appeal, we have an appeal from an order denying defendants' motion for a new trial. In each of two of the actions--one brought by Peter J. Lee for himself and one brought by him in behalf of his daughter, Lorna Lee--we have an appeal from an order denying a motion for a vacation of the verdict and for a granting of a new trial. In the third action, brought by Esther Lee, the appeal is from an order denying a blended motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial.

Issues arise as to: (1) Whether the trial court erred (a) in directing a verdict against the defendants, Jerome and Haven Lee, on the issues of negligence and proximate cause; (b) in refusing to instruct the jury as to the duty of a driver under M.S.A. § 169.61 to dim his lights; (c) and in refusing to withdraw from the jury any issue as to any permanent bladder injury to plaintiff driver; and, (2) a final issue as to alleged misconduct of counsel in arguing to the jury.

The head-on collision between the two automobiles occurred in Dodge County on May 3, 1954, at about 10 p.m., near the crest of a hill on a gravel and crushed-rock township road which runs at the scene of the accident generally east and west. The road is from 17 to 19 feet wide with a one foot wide grass shoulder on each side. The automobile traveling in a westerly direction was owned by defendant Haven Lee (hereinafter called Haven) and driven by his 16-year-old son, defendant Jerome Lee (hereinafter called Jerome). In the car with Jerome were three of his pals. The automobile traveling easterly was owned by plaintiff Peter J. Lee (herein called Peter) and driven by his wife, plaintiff Esther Lee (herein called Esther). Plaintiff Lorna, a minor daughter of Peter and Esther, and a girlfriend were riding in the front seat with Esther.

1. In passing upon the propriety of a directed verdict against the defendants on the issue of negligence and proximate cause, we must take the view of the entire evidence most favorable to the parties against whom the verdict was directed, and such directed verdict will be sustained only if, in the light of that view, it would clearly be the duty of the trial court to set aside a verdict to the contrary as being manifestly against the entire evidence or where a contrary verdict would be in contravention of the law applicable to the case. ¹

Defendant Jerome, driving westerly down the center of the road with his lights on high beam and at all times straddling the center of the road, came over the crest of a hill at a speed of 40 or 45 miles per hour. He collided with plaintiff's car at a point which he said was 40 to 45 feet beyond the crest. Plaintiff Esther, who was coming from the west, approached the hill crest at about 35 miles per hour with her lights on high beam. Neither driver saw the other car or its lights prior to the instant that the defendant Jerome came over the hill. Neither driver sounded a horn, dimmed the headlights, or slowed down prior to the actual impact. Defendant said that as he came over the crest he was blinded by plaintiff Esther's lights. Esther testified upon trial that the collision took place from 2 1/2 to 3 car lengths west of the crest, but, upon the taking of a pretrial deposition, she had testified the distance to be ten feet. Esther also testified that she had commenced to turn to her right side of the road when she was about 80 feet from the point of impact and that she was completely on her side when the cars collided. She also said that she did not see the lights of defendant's car until the moment it came over the hill crest and that it was then only about three car lengths away. The entire evidence reasonably leads to only one conclusion, namely, that the collision occurred about a second or less after defendant Jerome came over the crest.

2. Defendant Jerome unequivocally admitted that he approached and went over the hill crest in the middle of the road at undiminished speed and that he did nothing to avoid the collision. He in effect, however, takes the position that his admitted negligence was not, as a matter of law, a proximate cause of the accident since he contends that, if he had not been blinded by Esther's headlights, he would have had the opportunity and ability to take appropriate action to avoid the collision, and that therefore a jury question was...