Lee v. Lee

• Decision Date: 07 February 1923
• Docket Number: (No. 390-3589.)<SMALL><SUP>*</SUP></SMALL&gt
• Citation: 247 S.W. 828
• Parties: LEE v. LEE.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

247 S.W. 828

LEE v. LEE.

(No. 390-3589.)^*

Commission of Appeals of Texas, Section A.

February 7, 1923.

Certified Questions from Court of Civil Appeals of First Supreme Judicial District.

Action by Anna Lee against Mary Lee and another. From a judgment for plaintiff, the defendant named appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, which certified a question to the Supreme Court. Question answered in favor of defendant.

Homer Stephenson, of Houston, and S. Burns, of Cameron, for appellant.

Woods, King & John, of Houston, for appellee.

GERMAN, J.

This case comes from the Court of Civil Appeals for the First District upon the following certificate:

"To the Honorable Supreme Court:

"This suit was brought by appellee, Anna Lee, against the Texas Company and appellant, Mary Lee, to recover the sum of $1,260, alleged to be due plaintiff by the Texas Company under a contract made by it with her deceased husband, Joseph H. Lee. Appellant, Mary Lee, was made a party defendant upon allegations that she was asserting a claim to the money for which plaintiff sued. No issue appears to have been made by the Texas Company as to its liability upon the contract with Joseph H. Lee declared upon in plaintiff's petition, nor as to the amount due by it under said contract. The only issue presented by the pleadings is whether the appellant, Mary Lee, is entitled to recover all or any portion of the amount due under said contract. The cause was tried in the court below upon the following agreed statement of facts:

"`I. Joseph H. Lee, late an employé of the Texas Company, defendant herein, died on or about March 27, 1919.

"`II. At the date of the said Joseph H. Lee's death, he was an employee of the refining department of defendant the Texas Company.

"`III. There was in force at the date of the death of the said Joseph H. Lee, a plan for employés covering, among other things, death and disability benefits promulgated by the said defendant, the Texas Company, for the benefit of its employés, a printed copy of such plan being attached hereto, marked Exhibit A and made a part hereof.

"`IV. That, under and by virtue of the said plan for employés, there accrued as a death benefit in favor of beneficiaries to be ascertained from the Texas Company the sum of $1,260, which said sum the Texas Company admits it is liable for, and which sum is properly payable to whomsoever the court may adjudge is entitled thereto under the evidence to be adduced in this case in connection with said plan for employés, and the other admitted facts in this case.

"`V. The said Joseph H. Lee and plaintiff herein, Anna Lee, were married in Acadia parish, La., on March 7, 1906, which said marriage has not been legally dissolved by any judgment of any court.

"`VI. That some time during the year 1913 plaintiff, Anna Lee, who was then living at Port Arthur with her husband, Joseph H. Lee, went to New Orleans, La., and remained there until July, 1919, when she returned to Port Arthur, Tex. During all of these years Joseph H. Lee's legal residence and place of work was Port Arthur, Tex.

"`VII. Defendant herein, Mary Lee, believing that Joseph H. Lee and Anna Lee had been divorced, on or about September 15, 1916, was married to defendant Joseph H. Lee at Port Arthur, Tex., and thereafter, under the belief that she was the lawful wife of the said Joseph H. Lee, lived with him as such wife and continued to believe she was the wife of the said Joseph H. Lee, and lived with him as such up until the date of his death, during which time she cared for him in his illness and otherwise conducted herself toward him as his wife, and that the said Joseph H. Lee died at her house, and was waited on by her in his last illness, and buried by her at his death.

"`VIII. Joseph H. Lee had no children.'

"The plans promulgated by the Texas Company providing a death and disability benefit, and which, when acted upon, became a contract with its employé, Joseph H. Lee, under which the death benefit of $1,260 in controversy in this suit accrued, contains the following provisions:

"`Death and Disability Benefits.

"`1. Death. Benefits will be paid, as hereinafter stated, upon the death of employés who at the date of death or the beginning of their last illness shall have been one year or longer in the active, continuous, and exclusive service of this company or its subsidiaries.

"`2. Total and Permanent Disability. Benefits will be paid also, as hereinafter stated, upon the total and permanent disability of employés who at the date of such disability shall have been one year or longer in this service, actively, continuously and exclusively.

"`3. Payments. The amounts payable will be the same whether the employé dies or becomes totally and permanently disabled. In either event the company will pay, in monthly installments corresponding to the salary or wages received by the employé at the date of death or such disability, four months' full pay in cases where the term of service is one year, and one month's full pay for each complete six months of additional service; but in no case shall the amount exceed twelve months' full pay or exceed a total of $5,000.00.

"`4. Beneficiaries. Employés should immediately file with the company written designations of the beneficiary or beneficiaries to whom death benefits are to be paid. The employés will have the privilege of revoking such designation or changing it at discretion by filing a written revocation or new designation. If an employé files no such designation, death benefits will be payable according to the laws of Texas then in force applicable to the estates of deceased persons: Provided, however, that, in the absence of designation by the employé, and, if there shall survive no wife, husband, child, father, nor mother, the death benefit shall lapse. Disability benefits will be paid directly to the employé.'

"Joseph, Anna, and Mary Lee are all negroes. There was no designation by Joseph Lee of a beneficiary of the death benefit which accrued to him under the provisions of his contract with the Texas Company, and it is not shown that either of his wives had any knowledge of the existence of his death benefit until after his death.

"Upon these facts the trial court held that all of the $1,260 belonged to Anna Lee, the lawful wife, and rendered judgment accordingly. Upon consideration of the questions raised by this appeal the majority of the court reached the conclusion that the appellant, Mary Lee, the putative wife, was entitled to one-half of the sum in controversy. Justice Lane dissents from this view, and is of opinion that the legal wife was entitled to all of the fund. Copies of the majority and dissenting opinions are sent up with this certificate and made a part thereof. The case is now pending before us on motion for rehearing. Because of the importance of the question involved, we deem it advisable to certify for your determination the following question: Upon the facts stated, is the appellant Mary Lee entitled to the money due the deceased, Joseph H. Lee, under his contract with the Texas Company, or any part thereof?"

Texas, with just a few other states of the Union, has adopted as the basis of its laws relating to estates held by husband and wife the principles of the civil law, and our statutory enactments are in large measure declaratory of these principles. This is particularly true with reference to the laws relating to community property. Under the principles of this law, as recognized by numerous decisions of our courts, Mary Lee was the putative wife of Joseph H. Lee, and possessed all the rights and privileges of a lawful wife, to the extent of being entitled to an equal interest with Joseph H. Lee in all community property. The Court of Civil Appeals was not divided on this question, and it is so well settled that discussion of that issue is not necessary. As the putative wife of Joseph H. Lee appellant Mary Lee was entitled at his death to a one-half interest in all community property acquired during the existence of the putative marriage. Barkley v. Dumke, 99 Tex. 150, 87 S. W. 1147; Lee v. Smith, 18 Tex. 142; Hammond v. Hammond, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 482, 108 S. W. 1024; (writ denied); Morgan v. Morgan, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 315, 21 S. W. 154.

The question upon which the judges of the Court of Civil Appeals were divided, and which is the controlling question in the case, is whether the death benefits payable to Joseph H. Lee by the Texas Company under the plan adopted for its employés is to be considered community property, as that term is known to our law, or was it the separate estate of Joseph H. Lee. This question, upon first impression, presents some difficulty, but we think that difficulty is removed when the provisions of our statutes are considered in the light of the development of our laws pertaining to marital estates.

The uncertainty surrounding the question arises out of a consideration of the character of the fund held by the Texas Company for the beneficiary of Joseph H. Lee, in connection with his failure to designate a beneficiary to take such benefit. Counsel for appellee base their contentions and argument upon the proposition that the plan adopted by the Texas Company under which this benefit was created was a plan of life insurance, and the accrued benefit was to be paid as under the terms of an ordinary life insurance policy. They rely upon the case of Martin v. McAllister, 94 Tex. 567, 63 S. W. 624, 56 L. R. A. 585, and Rowlett v. Mitchell, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 589, 114 S. W. 845. However, we are unable to find anything in the agreed statement of facts or the provisions copied from the plan adopted by the Texas Company which would lead to the conclusion that such plan was one of life insurance for its employés, with the possible exception of the use of the words "death benefits." But the word "benefits" may very properly be applied to various things accruing to a person other than the...