Lee v. Licking Valley Coal Digger Co.
Decision Date | 19 June 1925 |
Citation | 209 Ky. 780 |
Parties | Lee, etc. v. Licking Valley Coal Digger Company. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Appeal from Kenton Circuit Court.
RICHARD G. WILLIAMS and JOHN D. CARROLL for appellant.
MYERS & HOWARD for appellee.
Affirming.
Willis Lee, husband of appellant, Marie Lee, was drowned in the Ohio river, near the city of Cincinnati, Ohio, while in the line of duty as an employe of the Licking Valley Coal Digger Company, a corporation which, with all its employes, including the deceased, Lee, had accepted the terms of the workmen's compensation law of this state, and were operating under it. Lee was working on coal barges which were being unloaded at the time by a coal digger, a kind of steam shovel. In attempting to pass from one barge to another he, by accident, fell into the river and thus came to his death.
The digger was located on a boat or barge which operated only on water, and moved up, down and across the river at the pleasure of those in charge. Appellant, Marie Lee, the only dependant of the deceased, filed claim for compensation with the board of compensation of the state, and was awarded the maximum, $4,000.00, allowed by law in such cases for death. From this award the company appealed to the Kenton circuit court where it was held that the employment in which deceased, Lee, was engaged at the time of his death, was maritime and not cognizable by the board of workmen's compensation, and any cause of action arising out of his accidental death was cognizable exclusively in admiralty, in accordance with the provisions of section 2 of article 3 of the Constitution of the United States, and laws enacted pursuant thereto. From that judgment this appeal is prosecuted.
The question presented is one of jurisdiction. Had the board of compensation jurisdiction to hear and determine and make an award in a case which admittedly before the passage of the act creating the board, was cognizable only in admiralty?
"Maritime," says Bouvier,
Admiralty is a tribunal exercising jurisdiction over all maritime contracts, torts, injuries or offenses, and extends to navigable rivers, whether tidal or not, in the United States.
The court of original admiralty jurisdiction in the United States is the United States district court. From this court causes could formerly be removed, in certain cases, to the circuit and ultimately to the supreme court.
Appellee insists that appellant's remedy is confined to the admiralty jurisdiction as fixed by the federal Constitution and the laws making same effective as enacted by the federal Congress. This jurisdictional question depends for its solution upon whether or not the Kentucky legislature, by its enactment of the workmen's compensation law, can divest the federal courts of jurisdiction of a subject which is and was well established, well defined and about which there was no question in the courts until the enactment of this law in Kentucky and other states of the Union.
Appellant argues that as our compensation law is elective and not compulsory, it is not in conflict with the admiralty laws, as only compulsory compensation laws have been held obnoxious to maritime laws by the Supreme Court of the United States. In this it appears to be in error as we shall later see.
In making its award the board of compensation, through its then chairman, Hon. Clyde Levy, delivered a written opinion, which because of its splendid diction and attractive reasoning, we would like to embrace in this opinion, but its length forbids, and we content ourselves with copying only the following paragraphs:
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