Lee v. MACOMB COUNTY BD. OF COM'RS
| Decision Date | 17 July 2001 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. Calendar,Docket No. 114700,Docket No. 115259,Docket No. 4-5. |
| Citation | 464 Mich. 726,629 N.W.2d 900 |
| Parties | Michael LEE, Bryan Duncil, Mary Duncil on behalf of herself and Joseph Duncil, Bryan Duncil, Kenneth Duncil, and Jon Duncil, as their Next Friend, and the class of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellees, v. The MACOMB COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, and the County of Macomb, Defendant-Appellants. Dennis D. Walker, on behalf of himself and Dawnell J. Walker and Melanie Walker, their Next Friend, and Dwayne Steagall, Ernest Groce, Jerry Gray, Paul Eckley, Duane Gore, Kenneth Jones, Morris Bartolotta, and the class of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. The Wayne County Board of Commissioners and the County of Wayne, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Charfoos & Christensen, P.C. (by David R. Parker and J. Douglas Peters), Detroit, for the plaintiffs-appellees in Lee.
Frank Krycia, Mt. Clemens, for the defendants in Lee.
Edward Ewell, Jr., Corporation Counsel, and Ellen E. Mason, Assistant Corporation Counsel and Robert S. Gazall, Detroit, for Wayne County.
At issue in these two cases coming to us from Macomb and Wayne counties is whether these plaintiffs have standing to pursue actions to compel their respective county board of commissioners to levy a tax to establish a veterans' relief fund in accordance with the soldiers' relief fund act, M.C.L. § 35.21 et seq. It is uncontested that none of the plaintiffs actually had sought relief under the act. Because of this, the counties asserted that these litigants had suffered no injury and, accordingly, that plaintiffs (1) were without standing to sue and (2) had failed to exhaust statutory remedies. In Lee, the Macomb County case, the trial court granted summary disposition for the county on those grounds. In Walker, the Wayne County case, the trial court denied the county's motion for summary disposition, concluding that plaintiffs had standing and were not required to exhaust statutory remedies because they alleged a complete failure to comply with the act. The Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals and largely reversed in Lee and affirmed in Walker. 235 Mich.App. 323, 597 N.W.2d 545 (1999). It concluded that plaintiffs had standing to sue to compel implementation of the act and that mandamus was a proper remedy. We reverse.
In these actions, plaintiffs seek to compel the legislative branch of the county government, the board of commissioners, to levy a tax to establish a veterans' relief fund pursuant to the soldiers' relief fund act. MCL 35.21 provides in pertinent part:1
The county board of commissioners of each county shall annually levy, a tax not exceeding 1/10 of a mill on each dollar, to be levied and collected as provided by law, upon the taxable property of each township and city, for their respective counties, for the purpose of creating a fund for the relief of honorably discharged indigent members of the army, navy, air force, marine corps, coast guard, and women's auxiliaries of all wars or military expeditions in which the United States of America has been, is, or may hereafter be, a participant ... and the indigent spouses, minor children, and parents of each such indigent or deceased member.... If any money in the fund is not necessary for the purpose for which it was raised, the money shall remain in the treasury of the county as a soldiers' relief fund, and shall be considered in raising future sums therefor.
As can be seen, this section requires that the board of commissioners create a soldiers' relief fund by a tax levy. It also, however, requires the commissioners to consider the amount existing in the fund when determining the amount, if any, of the annual levy for the fund.2
Having thus established the funding mechanism, the act then continues by providing a procedure in M.C.L. § 35.23 for initiating and determining the amount of relief to be granted. This section states:
The supervisor of each township and ward in each of the counties of this state, and where there is no ward supervisor the aldermen of the several wards of every incorporated city in this state, shall, on or before the last Monday in September in each year, make and place in the hands of the soldiers' relief commission of the county, a list of all the persons entitled to relief under the provisions of this act, and the soldiers' relief commission, on the first Monday in October in each year, shall proceed to determine the amount necessary for aid and relief to be granted such persons under this act, which shall be then and there recorded in the books to be kept by the secretary of said soldiers' relief commission. The commission may determine not only the sum to be paid, but the manner of paying the same, and may discontinue the payment of such relief in their discretion. Appeal may be taken therefrom to the circuit court of such county, by certiorari by filing application therefor with the clerk within fifteen days following the making of such decision. The court shall hear the case de novo and its decision shall be final.
What is established, then, is a scheme whereby it is anticipated that the township supervisor or ward aldermen will annually prepare a list of persons eligible for relief and provide this list to the soldiers' relief commission.3 That commission then, in its discretion, determines the amount of relief, if any, to grant to the indigent, honorably discharged veteran or dependent applicant. Moreover, the statute provides that aggrieved applicants can appeal the commission's decision to the circuit court.
Here, without ever having sought relief under the act, plaintiffs filed suit to compel Macomb and Wayne Counties to levy the annual tax in order to create the fund of which the act speaks. Further, they, and presumably others, will soon seek damages for those years in which the counties allegedly failed to comply with the act.
Macomb County, in the Lee case, moved for summary disposition, claiming, inter alia, lack of standing and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In support, it provided the 1994 affidavit of its Department of Veterans Affairs Director, which indicated that the department had, through county budget appropriations, maintained a fund of $1,000 for veterans relief for several years and that no claims for such relief had been filed for the past ten years. The trial court granted Macomb County's motion for summary disposition, concluding that plaintiffs lacked standing and failed to exhaust administrative remedies because they had not requested relief from the local government.
Wayne County, in the Walker case, sought summary disposition on similar grounds. It provided documentary evidence indicating that, in 1994, the Wayne County Commission approved an appropriation of $1,146,042 for Veterans' Affairs expenditures and that the Wayne County Soldiers Relief Program had been operational since February 1995. In this case, however, the trial court denied Wayne County's motion for summary disposition, concluding that plaintiffs had standing because they were in the class intended to be benefitted by the act and had been harmed by noncompliance with it and that they were not required to exhaust administrative remedies to challenge a wholesale failure to comply with the act.
These two cases were consolidated in the Court of Appeals, which largely reversed in Lee and affirmed in Walker.4 The Court of Appeals majority concluded that plaintiffs had standing because they are "members of the class for whose benefit the Act was enacted" and because they are "detrimentally affected in a manner different from the public generally." 235 Mich.App at 332, 597 N.W.2d 545. The panel held that mandamus was an appropriate remedy here because plaintiffs were seeking compliance with the act, not the levy of a particular amount or the grant of particular benefits. Id. at 333-334, 597 N.W.2d 545. Finally, it concluded that plaintiffs' actions could not be dismissed on the basis of failure to exhaust statutory remedies because they were alleging a wholesale failure to implement and comply with the act. Id. at 335, 597 N.W.2d 545.
In dissent, former Justice John Fitzgerald, sitting by assignment, disagreed with the majority regarding standing:
[P]laintiffs have not alleged any specific injury as a result of defendants' failure to establish a mechanism for evaluation of a claim for benefits or of defendants' underfunding of their respective veterans' relief funds. [Id. at 337, 597 N.W.2d 545.]
Explaining further he said:
[P]laintiffs have not alleged a distinct and palpable injury resulting from defendants' failure to fully comply with the statute, and consequently their claims cannot be differentiated from those of any other citizen. As a prudential matter, courts must exercise their jurisdiction to address tangible, personal, threatened interests, not generalized grievances. I am not persuaded that plaintiffs, as private citizens whose individual rights under the statute have not been abridged, have standing.... [Id. (citations omitted).]
Regarding mandamus, he stated that it was inappropriate, assuming standing existed, because plaintiffs were "seeking to compel defendants' exercise of discretion in a particular manner" that is beyond the scope of mandamus. Id. at 338-339, 597 N.W.2d 545.
This Court granted leave to appeal. 462 Mich. 912, 613 N.W.2d 727 (2000).
Whether a party has standing is a question of law. This Court reviews questions of law de novo. Stitt v. Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich. 591, 595, 614 N.W.2d 88 (2000).
It is important, initially, to recognize that in Michigan, as in the federal system, standing is of great consequence so that neglect of it would imperil the constitutional architecture whereby governmental powers are divided between the...
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