Lee v. Metropolitan Airport Com'n
| Decision Date | 30 August 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. C8-88-538,C8-88-538 |
| Citation | 428 N.W.2d 815 |
| Parties | 3 IER Cases 1152 Janet K. LEE, Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN AIRPORT COMMISSION, et al., and Kathy Foley, et al., Respondents, John Doe and/or Jane Does not yet identified, Defendants. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Statements made in good faith, upon a proper occasion, and from a proper motive, are privileged, and summary judgment is appropriate where no facts are presented which would show malice.
2. Summary judgment is proper when a statement is mere opinion and too imprecise to constitute a defamatory statement.
3. Even if a policy guide book constitutes a contract, summary judgment is proper for claims of breach of contract, interference with contractual rights, and negligent performance of a contract where no material facts exist which would show that the contract was breached.
4. As a matter of law, the provisions of Minn.Stat. § 181.75, illegal solicitation of a polygraph test, are waived by an employee's initial request for such a test.
5. Where there are no facts showing that office gossip was extreme and outrageous or that appellant was in a "zone of danger," summary judgment is proper for claims of negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Brad C. Eggen, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Donald W. Selzer, Jr., Jacqueline A. Shubatt, Oppenheimer, Wolff & Donnelly, St. Paul, for MAC and Anderson.
Clifford M. Greene, Julie A. Sweitzer, Popham, Haik, Schnobrich & Kaufman, Ltd., Minneapolis, for Foley and Johannes.
Heard, considered and decided by NORTON, P.J., and HUSPENI and KALITOWSKI, JJ.
Appellant Janet Lee appeals from the summary judgment granted in favor of all respondents on all counts. Appellant's complaint alleged defamation, breach of contract, negligent and intentional interference with contractual rights, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and illegal solicitation of a polygraph test. We affirm.
Janet Lee had been a dispatcher for nine years when she was hired by the Metropolitan Airport Commission (MAC), in October 1984. Respondents Kathy Foley and Eunice Johannes are also dispatchers with the MAC. Respondent Timothy Anderson is appellant's supervisor at the MAC. The dispatchers handle communications and coordinate emergency assistance among airport police, fire, maintenance, and other departments.
Prior to working for the MAC, appellant had been a dispatcher for the St. Louis Park Police. Lee took the job with the MAC, because she was informed that there were promotional opportunities with the MAC and that she had a good chance of advancing rapidly. However, when she was hired in October 1984, she was never promised by anyone at the MAC that she would get the job of supervisor. Many of the other dispatchers heard rumors shortly after Lee was hired that she would be taking over as supervisor.
In late 1984 or early 1985, the dispatchers were informed of an opening for the lead dispatcher position. Respondents Foley and Johannes and appellant applied for this job as did two other MAC dispatchers.
In late May 1985, respondent Tim Anderson informed Lee that she would be recommended for the lead dispatcher position, subject to approval by the executive director of the airport and authorization of the position by the MAC. Anderson did not state what the wage for the new position would be, nor give the exact job description. Lee was to begin as acting lead dispatcher immediately, until she was formally appointed to the permanent senior dispatcher position. On June 3, 1985, Anderson sent a memo to other dispatchers informing them of his decision to recommend Janet Lee for the new lead dispatcher position.
Late in the morning of June 4, 1985, Johannes was on duty with another dispatcher when she answered a phone call. A singsong female voice said, "I know something you don't know--ha, ha, ha, ha." The call was automatically recorded on the dispatch center recording equipment and was subsequently rerecorded by the dispatchers. The dispatchers immediately thought that the voice sounded like Janet Lee's.
On June 5, Lee worked her final shift before starting an out of town vacation. On June 6th, Anderson conducted the regularly scheduled monthly dispatchers meeting. A major concern at the meeting was Anderson's decision to recommend Lee for lead dispatcher. After Anderson had explained some of the reasons for the decision, one of the dispatchers asked Anderson to listen to the tape. He was not informed of whose voice was on the tape, or the content of the tape. Anderson said he immediately recognized the voice as Janet Lee's. After the tape was played, the dispatchers criticized Lee, stating that she made sexually explicit comments and was flirtatious. Anderson paid little attention to these comments and considered them to be "sour grapes."
Following the meeting, Anderson decided to rescind his recommendation for Lee's promotion, based on his conclusion that Lee made the telephone call. A memorandum was prepared by Anderson's secretary and left in a sealed envelope in Lee's mailbox. Anderson also prepared a memorandum for the deputy executive director, Jeff Hamiel, and the executive director, Claude Schmidt, requesting that Lee's promotion be rescinded. Because Anderson would be gone until July, he arranged for Lee to deal with Hamiel in his absence. In the meantime, Lee's promotion was placed on hold pending an inquiry into the matter. At this time, the position of lead dispatcher had still not been authorized by the commission.
Lee heard rumors concerning the dispatchers' statements as soon as she returned from her vacation. Subsequently, Lee met with Hamiel and denied that she had made the telephone call. She requested to take a polygraph examination to prove her innocence.
Lee took a polygraph examination before an examiner of her choice. The MAC sent a letter to Lee stating that they would not consider the polygraph test unless it was given by an approved examiner. Lee refused to take a second polygraph examination with an examiner acceptable to the MAC.
A tape recording was made of Lee's voice for submission to the FBI for a voice comparison analysis with the tape of the telephone call. A letter was also sent to the FBI concerning a threatening phone call made to an employee at home, and concerning the harassing telephone call received by the dispatcher at work. This letter requested the FBI's assistance in identifying the person or persons involved in the telephone calls. The letter did not specify Janet Lee by name. The FBI's analysis was inconclusive as to identification of the two voices, although aural similarities were noted.
Lee filed a grievance with the MAC requesting that she receive her expected promotion and raise. On October 11, 1985, Schmidt informed Lee that she would be offered the promotion to lead dispatcher. Lee did not accept the promotion at this time, because she believed that she was entitled to a greater raise and to compensation for the rumors and the delay in obtaining the promotion. Lee finally accepted the promotion in March 1986 and received full back pay at the increased salary from June 17, 1985, the date the position was officially authorized by the commission. Appellant's employment record contains no reference to the harassing phone call or any of the other derogatory comments made by her fellow employees.
Janet Lee served this law suit in 1986 after she had received the position as lead dispatcher. She moved to amend her complaint in July 1987 to add another defendant, fellow dispatcher Sue McKechnie, and to add punitive damages to her complaint. At this time, all respondents moved for summary judgment on all counts, which was granted by the trial court. The trial court also denied appellant's motion to amend the complaint. Janet Lee appeals all aspects of the trial court's decision.
Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment on all claims made by appellant?
On appeal from summary judgment the appellate court determines whether any genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the trial court erred in its application of the law. Betlach v. Wayzata Condominium, 281 N.W.2d 328, 330 (Minn.1979).
Appellant claims that she was defamed in numerous ways by the employees of MAC. She claims that she was slandered when the employees told her supervisor, Tim Anderson, at an office meeting that she had made a harassing phone call to them. She claims that further defamation occurred when Anderson sent a letter to her and to his supervisors stating that appellant had made this harassing phone call. Appellant further alleges that she was defamed when fellow employees made comments at a meeting and in personal conversations which occurred in the office, regarding alleged sexual affairs, the manner in which she got her job, and other comments regarding her character.
In order for a statement to be considered defamatory, it must be communicated to someone other than the plaintiff, it must be false, and it must tend to harm the plaintiff's reputation and to lower her estimation in the community. Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Company, 297 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn.1980). Slanders affecting a person in her business, trade, profession, office or calling are slanderous per se and actionable without any proof of actual damages. Id.
However, certain statements made in a business setting may not be actionable because of a qualified privilege. The following have been the elements and effects of conditional privilege in Minnesota:
The law is that a communication, to be privileged, must be made upon a proper occasion, from a proper motive, and must be based upon reasonable or probable cause. When so made in good faith, the law does not imply malice from the communication itself, as in the ordinary case of libel. Actual malice must be proved, before there can be a recovery, and...
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