Lee v. Seed Pub. Charter Sch.
| Decision Date | 21 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 18-2786 (CKK) |
| Parties | CHANTE C. LEE, AS PARENT AND NEXT FRIEND OF M.L., A MINOR Plaintiff, v. SEED PUBLIC CHARTER SCHOOL OF WASHINGTON, DC, ET AL., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Upon consideration of the briefing, the relevant authorities, and the record,1 the Court GRANTS Defendant SEED Foundation's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint ("Defendant's Motion"), ECF No. 37. Accordingly, and for the reasons provided herein, the Court hereby DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Counts I, II, III, and IV of the Second Amended Complaint, as to Defendant SEED Foundation.
This case involves alleged instances of bullying and violence suffered by a young boy, M.L., while he was a student at the SEED Public Charter School (the "SEED School") in Washington, D.C. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 10. Plaintiff Chante Lee is M.L.'s natural and legal parent, and she now brings this action on her son's behalf against both the SEED School and the SEED Foundation, a corporation which allegedly manages the SEED School. Id. ¶¶ 1-10.
The facts of this case are saddening.2 M.L. is a child with autism. Id. ¶ 3. As Plaintiff explains, autism "is a pervasive developmental disability and is considered to be a neurological impairment characterized by significant deficits in verbal and non-verbal communication, a tendency to engage in repetitive and stereotypical movements, and unusual reactions to changes in routines or environments." Id. In addition to his autism, M.L. is also "socially delayed" because he "is younger than his peers by two years." Id. It is against this developmental backdrop, that Plaintiff presents the troubling acts of bullying directed at her son. Id. ¶¶ 11-24.
During the 2016 academic year, M.L. was a sixth-grade student at the SEED School. Id. ¶ 11. M.L. was ten-years old at the time, and, as a residential student, he lived on SEED campus housing during the school week. Id. ¶¶ 3, 11. According to Plaintiff, "M.L. was the victim of several instances of violence and bullying committed by other students at the Seed School" during the course of the 2016-17 school year. Id. ¶ 12. Specifically, "on or about September 26, 2016, two students at SEED assaulted minor M.L. on the SEED soccer field." Id. ¶ 13. "M.L. was stomped in the face, hit with rocks and suffered a concussion." Id. Later, on October 25, 2016, "SEED administration personnel acknowledged the constant bulling by some SEED students" and "promised to monitor the situation and take action to protect M.L. from violence and bullying." Id. ¶ 14.
The administration, however, was unable to make good on its promise. Id. In 2017, the bullying against M.L. only intensified, and Plaintiff alleges that school "administrators failed to document, investigate, [or] take immediate and appropriate action to investigate" the misconduct.Id. ¶ 18. On September 19, 2017, for example, "M.L. was attacked in the boys' gym locker room by other male students." Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiff, as M.L.'s parent, was notified of the attack, but was not provided with an incident report, as was required by the school's academic policies handbook. Id. ¶¶ 15-17. Moreover, "M.L. was labeled gay" and some students "circulated video of M.L. naked in the shower, pronouncing him gay." Id. ¶ 19. "M.L. was mentally devasted by the incident." Id. And, as a result of the constant bullying, M.L. "was afraid to leave his dormitory room to go to the bathroom at night." Id. ¶ 20.
Finally, "on September 27, 2017, after students [again] verbally assaulted and insulted M.L., teased him, called him gay, while in his dorm room, M.L. attempted suicide." Id. ¶ 21. Understandably, Plaintiff withdrew M.L. from the SEED School thereafter. Id. ¶¶ 22-23. Plaintiff further states, however, that in early 2018 another SEED student died as a result of an on-campus suicide. Id. ¶ 25. Following this heartbreaking event, more parents of SEED students came forward with complaints, id. ¶ 26, and media reports ensued, addressing purported shortcomings in the SEED School's ability to monitor and care for the safety of its residential students, id. ¶¶ 27-34. In particular, Plaintiff laments the failure of the SEED School to provide adequate supervision of residential areas, such as the student dormitory. Id. ¶¶ 37-40.
On August 22, 2018, Plaintiff filed a complaint, on behalf of M.L., in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, raising negligence claims against the SEED School. See Not. of Removal, ECF No. 1, ¶ 1. On November 20, 2020, Plaintiff amended her complaint to include statutory claims under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 794) and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (20 U.S.C. § 1411, et. seq.). Id. ¶ 3-4. Invoking federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the SEED School subsequently removedPlaintiff's Amended Complaint to this Court on November 29, 2018. See generally id. The SEED School then moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint on multiple grounds. See Def.'s Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 5. This Court granted the SEED School's motion, in part, holding that Plaintiff had not properly exhausted her IDEA claim and that Plaintiff's Rehabilitation Act claim was time-barred, "insofar as it relies on events occurring before August 22, 2017." Lee as Next Friends of M.L. v. Seed Pub. Charter Sch. of Washington, D.C., No. CV 18-2786 (CKK), 2019 WL 4469285, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2019).
Following this partial dismissal, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint on January 6, 2020. See generally Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 26. This pleading again raised a Rehabilitation Act claim and claims of common law negligence against the SEED School. See id. ¶¶ 95-153. Of note, however, the Second Amended Complaint also raised such claims against a new party, Defendant SEED Foundation. See id. As alleged by Plaintiff, the SEED Foundation is a private corporation that acts as an "independent contractor" for the SEED School and, allegedly, "manages" the SEED School as well. Id. ¶¶ 9, 139-40. Plaintiff now asserts that the SEED Foundation, along with the SEED School, is liable for the injuries caused to M.L. Id. ¶¶ 95-153. The Second Amended Complaint raises five individual counts specifically against the SEED Foundation: (1) Violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, (2) Gross Negligence, (3) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, (4) Negligence, and (5) Punitive Damages. Id. ¶¶ 95-157. On February 13, 2020, the parties entered a joint stipulation dismissing Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages against the SEED Foundation, as well as Plaintiff's Rehabilitation Act claim against the SEED Foundation "insofar as it relies on events occurring before August 22, 2017." Order, ECF No. 36; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1).
Now before the Court is Defendant SEED Foundation's partial motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. Therein, the SEED Foundation raises challenges, both jurisdictional and on the merits, to the remaining Rehabilitation Act and negligence claims asserted against it in the Second Amended Complaint. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1), (6). Defendant's Motion has been fully briefed and is now ripe for review.
Defendant requests dismissal of Plaintiff's claims both for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted. These two grounds for dismissal are analyzed pursuant to different rules.
Motions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction are analyzed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). A court must dismiss a case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) when it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. In determining whether there is jurisdiction, "the court may consider the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts." Coal. For Underground Expansion v. Mineta, 333 F.3d 193, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Herbert v. Nat'l Acad. of Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "At the motion to dismiss stage, counseled complaints, as well as pro se complaints, are to be construed with sufficient liberality to afford all possible inferences favorable to the pleader on allegations of fact." Settles v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 429 F.3d 1098, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 2005). In spite of the favorable inferences that a plaintiff receives on a motion to dismiss, it is still true that the "[p]laintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence." Am. Farm Bureau v. EPA, 121 F. Supp. 2d 84, 90 (D.D.C. 2000). "Although a court must accept as true all factual allegations contained in the complaint when reviewing a motion todismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), [a] plaintiff['s] factual allegations in the complaint . . . will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion than in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim." Wright v. Foreign Serv. Grievance Bd., 503 F. Supp. 2d 163, 170 (D.D.C. 2007) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted are analyzed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). According to Rule 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a complaint on the grounds that it "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). "[A] complaint [does not] suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). Rather, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations that, if accepted as true, "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has...
To continue reading
Request your trial