Lee v. Smith, 37314

• Decision Date: 15 August 1958
• Docket Number: No. 37314,37314
• Citation: 253 Minn. 401,92 N.W.2d 117
• Parties: Robert E. LEE, Respondent, v. Edward A. SMITH, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 117

92 N.W.2d 117

253 Minn. 401

Robert E. LEE, Respondent, v. Edward A. SMITH, Appellant.

No. 37314.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Aug. 15, 1958.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Where factual matters are involved, if sufficient evidence is introduced to sustain a jury's finding in accordance with a possible version thereof, a party is entitled to have any statute which may be relevant given to the jury, provided that in those instances where a statute may be relevant only upon a single interpretation of the facts, the trial court limits such statute in its application, either by specific instructions or by the entire tenor of its charge. Tollefson v. Ehlers, 252 Minn. 370, 90 N.W.2d 205, followed.

2. Children 7 and 8 years of age are persons within the purview of M.S.A. § 169.37, which prohibits the presence of more than three persons in the front seat of a vehicle where such presence obstructs the front or side view of the driver or interferes with the driver's control over the driving mechanism.

3. Where the record established that the front seat of a vehicle 48 inches in width was occupied by two adults and two boys 7 and 8 years of age, and where the jury could find from the evidence that at least two of the occupants had to change positions when the vehicle stopped to enter through highway and, after entering the highway, it was necessary to readjust positions of the occupants and there was some difficulty in closing the right door, evidence was sufficient to present question to the jury as to whether the presence of more than three persons in the front seat constituted a violation of § 169.37.

4. Where there was evidence in the record that the defendant had entered a highway and after traveling a distance of 750 feet appeared to have stopped or reduced his speed to a point where he appeared to be barely moving, there was no error in the court's instruction in which it read § 169.15, the so-called slow-speed statute, since the defendant had ample time after entering the highway to attain a speed which would not impede traffic and which would permit him to become a part of the normal flow of travel on the highway.

5. Where the record contained sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that the defendant had violated § 169.50 by failure to have proper rear warning signals functioning on his vehicle, there was no prejudicial error on the part of the trial court in reading § 169.50, subd. 2, which relates to the requirement of a light for the purpose of illuminating the rear registration plate, particularly in view of the fact that under the circumstances evidence of the defective license-plate light necessarily had a bearing on the question of whether the warning lights required by § 169.50 were properly functioning.

6. In examining the instructions of the court as a whole, there was no error in submitting various provisions of the Highway Traffic Regulation Act where the trial court by proper cautionary instructions informed the jury that the application of such statutes would depend upon what it decided were the facts from the evidence and that to count against the defendant a violation of a statute must constitute a proximate cause of the accident.

7. Where the evidence clearly established violation of § 169.50, subds. 1 and 3, in that neither the taillight nor reflectors were properly mounted on defendant's truck as required by statute, there was no error in the court instructing the jury in substance that, unless the evidence showed an excuse or justification for the violation, defendant was negligent as a matter of law.

8. Where there was evidence in the record that as plaintiff proceeded along country highway at a speed of 40 to 45 miles per hour on a rainy night and came upon a truck not having adequate rear warning lights as required by statute, which truck was either stopped on the highway or barely moving, there was no error on the part of the trial court in submitting to the jury the emergency rule for consideration in connection with the subject of plaintiff's contributory negligence.

9. It was a question for the jury whether the plaintiff, who on a rainy night drove his car into the rear of a truck not properly lighted, was guilty of contributory negligence.

10. A motion for a directed verdict, which by its very nature accepts the view of the entire evidence most favorable to the adverse party and admits the credibility (except in extreme cases) of the evidence in his favor and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, should be granted only in those unequivocal cases where, in the light of the evidence as a whole, it would clearly be the duty of the trial court to set aside a contrary verdict as being manifestly against the entire evidence, or where it would be contrary to the law applicable to the case.

11. Where the only evidence of intoxication of plaintiff was that he had three bottles of beer during the day and where two witnesses testified that immediately after the accident no evidence or odor of alcohol was detected, the court did not abuse its discretion in removing intoxication from consideration by the jury. Freeman, Peterson, Hoppe & Gaughan, Minneapolis, Thomas J. Burke, St. Paul, and Frank L. King, Long Prairie, for appellant.

Bradford & Kennedy, Wadena, for respondent.

MURPHY, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order denying defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial and from the judgment entered therein. The action was brought to recover for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by reason of the defendant's negligence. Plaintiff was injured as a result of an automobile accident in which the car he was driving collided with the rear end of defendant's truck.

From the record it appears that on May 28, 1956, at about 8 p.m., plaintiff was driving alone in his 1953 Buick automobile, proceeding in a southerly direction on Highway No. 10 about 6 miles south of Motley, Minnesota. At the time of the accident defendant was driving a 1951 Chevrolet livestock truck on the same highway in the same direction. The defendant was accompanied by one Mrs. Kutzler and her two sons, ages 7 and 8 years. Mrs. Kutzler occupied the passenger's seat near the right-hand door of the cab. One of the boys sat on his mother's lap while the other was seated between her and defendant.

At the time of the accident it was dark, and a drizzle or light rain was falling. Highway No. 10 has a blacktop surface, 24 feet wide, with a centerline marking two 12-foot lanes. The surface of the highway was not slippery. On both sides of the blacktop there are dirt or cinder shoulders 7 or 8 feet in width.

Immediately prior to the accident plaintiff had been traveling at a rate of speed of approximately 40 to 45 miles per hour. His car was in good mechanical condition, his windshield wipers were working properly, and due to the reduced visibility caused by the rain, plaintiff drove with his headlights on low beam. Plaintiff testified he could see approximately 100 to 125 feet ahead and estimated that he could stop within a distance of 90 to 100 feet. As he proceeded along the highway, the rear of defendant's truck suddenly appeared before him at a distance of about 60 to 70 feet. He applied the brakes and attempted to veer his vehicle to the right, but was unable to avoid the collision. The left front of his car struck the right rear portion of the platform and rack of the truck. There was extensive damage to the vehicles and plaintiff suffered severe physical injuries, which are the subject of this action.

The record indicates that plaintiff was rendered unconscious by the impact and does not remember anything that occurred from the time of the accident until he recovered consciousness in the hospital at Staples, Minnesota. He testified, however, that he observed no lights on the rear of the truck when he suddenly came upon it. The first person to arrive at the scene of the accident was one Cincoski, who testified that the only light which was burning on the rear of the truck after the collision was a small, dimly lit clearance light on the left rear corner of the platform. His testimony was corroborated by two highway patrol officers who also testified that the only light they saw was the clearance light on the left rear of the truck's platform. Both officers said that this clearance light was visible from a distance of 100 to 200 feet to the rear of the truck and that the back of the truck was covered with dirt, mud, and manure. One of the officers testified: 'If there were reflectors they were not reflecting because they were dirty.' Cincoski, who was driving north in the east lane of Highway No. 10, also testified he did not observe any clearance lights or marker lights burning on the front of the truck as he approached it from the south.

At the time defendant purchased the truck in March 1956 it had an 18-foot platform mounted on the frame. This platform was too long for defendant's purposes, so he shortened it 2 feet and added the stock rack. It is important to note that in the process of shortening the platform defendant disconnected and removed the rear clearance lights. Upon completion of the shortening of the platform and building the stock rack, defendant mounted and connected the clearance lights himself. The replacement of the clearance lights had been completed 'a day or so before' the accident, and the trip defendant was making when the accident occurred was the first after the rear clearance lights had been replaced. After defendant replaced and connected these lights, he did not have them inspected by a garage mechanic or other person familiar with truck lighting systems. The defendant testified he had been in the trucking business since 1935 and had always taken care of the lighting systems on trucks he operated.

At the time defendant purchased the truck and on the day of the accident, it was equipped with a...