Lee v. Stanziale
Decision Date | 01 December 2015 |
Docket Number | No. 36519.,36519. |
Citation | 128 A.3d 579,161 Conn.App. 525 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | Peter LEE v. Richard H. STANZIALE. |
Robert Shluger, Glastonbury, for the appellant (defendant).
Adam J, Teller, East Hartford, for the appellee (plaintiff).
GRUENDEL, LAVINE and BISHOP, Js.
In this landlord-tenant case, the defendant, Richard H. Stanziale, appeals from the judgment of the trial court awarding the plaintiff, Peter Lee, a total of $18,122.50 in attorney's fees and costs pursuant to General Statutes § 52–251a. The defendant contends that the court abused its discretion in so doing. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
In its memorandum of decision, the court found the following facts. The defendant is the owner of residential rental property known as 56 Brace Road in West Hartford (property). In April, 2010, the plaintiff entered into a written agreement to lease the property from the defendant from May 1, 2010, to April 30, 2011, at a rate of $2500 per month. At that time, the plaintiff paid a $5000 security deposit to the defendant.
During his tenancy, the plaintiff notified the defendant of various problems he claimed to have encountered with the property. Those problems included inadequate heat on the third floor of the residence, electrical wiring issues, and an asbestos wrapped furnace.
In early September, 2010, the plaintiff informed the defendant of his intention to vacate the property before the lease expired. The parties thereafter discussed the termination of the lease agreement. On November 12, 2010, the defendant listed the property with a realtor, and soon received multiple offers from prospective tenants. On December 15, 2010, the defendant entered into a lease agreement with a new tenant for a term of two years commencing on January 1, 2011, at a monthly rate of $2500.
Although he paid rent to the defendant through December 31, 2010, the plaintiff vacated the property on December 19, 2010. On that date, he completed a walk-through of the property with the defendant's realtor, who found the property to be in clean condition.1 At the defendant's request, the plaintiff topped off the oil tank and returned the keys to the property.
On December 20, 2010, the plaintiff requested the return of his $5000 security deposit. In early January, 2011, the defendant sent the plaintiff a "preliminary deposit accounting" alleging that, beyond exhausting that security deposit, the plaintiff owed him $1518.50. Nine days later, the defendant sent the plaintiff a second accounting, claiming that the plaintiff owed him $2405.57 due to, inter alia, certain repairs for damages to the property allegedly caused by the plaintiff, a $5000 realtor fee incurred by the defendant in renting the property to new tenants, and $720 in legal fees for an initial consultation with the defendant's attorney.
A small claims action ensued. On May 19, 2011, the plaintiff, who at the time was self-represented, commenced this action in the small claims session of the Superior Court to recover his security deposit. The small claims writ and notice of suit filed by the plaintiff specified that the amount claimed was $10,000.2 It further alleged:
The defendant, through his legal counsel, responded by filing a motion to transfer the matter to the regular docket of the Superior Court pursuant to Practice Book § 24–21. The plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion, in which he argued that the substance of the controversy between the parties properly was within the purview of the small claims court. The plaintiff also represented that "[i]t would be a financial burden to pursue this case in regular civil court, as I planned to represent myself in small claims court, and most likely will not be able to do so in regular civil court." Despite that opposition, the matter was transferred to the regular docket of the Superior Court. The notice of that transfer provided to the parties by the court stated in relevant part that "[i]f the plaintiff hires a lawyer and the court rules in his or her favor after a case has been transferred to the regular civil docket at the request of a defendant, the court may allow the plaintiff a reasonable lawyer's fee as part of the costs to be paid by the defendant."
The defendant then filed a counterclaim predicated on the plaintiff's anticipatory breach of the lease agreement, which sought a setoff of $7468.07 in damages.3 In response, the plaintiff retained an attorney and filed his answer to the defendant's counterclaim, as well as an amended complaint. As the court noted in a subsequent articulation of its decision,
In its August 9, 2013 memorandum of decision, the court found in relevant part that At the same time, the court found that the defendant was entitled to a setoff of $1320.78 for certain damages sustained as a result of the plaintiff's breach of the lease agreement. The court thus rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $4788.01, as well as an award of "reasonable attorney's fees and costs, pending the submission of the plaintiff's affidavit." The defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied on December 13, 2013.
At the court's behest, the plaintiff's counsel filed a sworn affidavit stating that her hourly rate for services rendered in the case was $250 and that she had spent approximately sixty-three hours on the matter over the course of more than twenty-five months. She thus averred that the attorney's fees and costs expended in the matter totaled $15,975. Following an objection by the defendant, the court, on January 17, 2014, awarded the plaintiff $14,750 in attorney's fees and costs pursuant to § 52–251a.
On February 6, 2014, the defendant appealed to this court. His appeal form indicated that he was appealing from not only the court's January 17, 2014 judgment awarding attorney's fees to the plaintiff, but also from the court's August 9, 2013 judgment on the merits of the underlying litigation and its December 13, 2013 judgment denying his motion for reconsideration. In response, the plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal in part as untimely. By order dated April 10, 2014, this court granted the motion to dismiss the defendant's appeal
Approximately one month later, the plaintiff, pursuant to § 52–251a, filed with the trial court a motion "for an award of additional attorney's fees as the ‘prevailing party’ in connection with the successful defense of the defendant's untimely appeal of the judgment of August 9, 2013, in this matter." Appended to that motion was an affidavit of attorney's fees, in which the plaintiff's appellate counsel, Attorney Adam J. Teller, averred that the "total expense related to obtaining dismissal of the appeal as to the August 2013 judgment" was $3372.50. Following a hearing, the court granted that motion. The defendant thereafter amended his appeal with this court to include a challenge to that additional award of attorney's fees.
On April 30, 2014, the defendant filed with this court a motion for review, in which he sought, inter alia, an order that the trial court articulate the basis of its determination that the plaintiff was the prevailing party in this action and what portion of the $14,750 in attorney's fees and costs originally awarded to the plaintiff was for work expended on successful claims. This court granted that motion by order dated June 25, 2014. One month later, the trial court issued a memorandum articulating the basis of its decision. The court first noted that it had found in favor of the plaintiff on his action to recover his security deposit. As it explained: With regard to the apportionment of legal fees awarded for what this court in its order had termed "successful" versus "unsuccessful" claims, the trial court stated that it was "unaware of any authority requiring the court to...
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