Lee v. State
| Decision Date | 11 November 1910 |
| Docket Number | 2,858. |
| Citation | 69 S.E. 310,8 Ga.App. 413 |
| Parties | LEE v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
While the general rule is that proof of other crimes committed by the defendant is not admissible in a criminal prosecution still the general rule has many general exceptions.
Proof of other crimes is never admissible (except in cases where the defendant has himself put his character in issue) where its chief or only probative value consists in showing that the defendant is, by reason of his bad character (demonstrated through a criminal career), more likely to have committed the crime than he otherwise would have been. To admit such evidence, it must have relevancy and probative value from some other point of view.
Where knowledge, motive, intent, good or bad faith, and other matters dependent upon a person's state of mind are involved as a material element in a particular criminal offense for which a defendant is on trial, and the defendant has engaged in a course of conduct or done other acts at or about the same time the act in question was committed, and these other transactions are such as to illustrate the state of the defendant's mind on the subject involved, proof of them may be received, though one or more of the separate acts of which this collateral conduct consists may be criminal.
Where a practicing physician is charged with having prescribed cocaine for an habitual user of the drug, not in good faith believing it to be necessary for the proper treatment of the case, but in evasion of the act of August 22, 1907 (Laws Ga. 1907, p. 121), the prosecution may, in order to prove his state of mind at the time of the particular transaction charged in the indictment, show that during the same general period of time the defendant made a common practice of furnishing such prescriptions to other persons for whose treatment the drug was not deemed necessary, and that he furnished the prescriptions in such numbers and in such a way as to negative his good faith.
Though the defendant may have been tried for violating the law as to one or more of these transactions with other patients, and acquitted, the state may, nevertheless, prove the facts connected with them, for the purpose of illustrating the defendant's state of mind as to the transaction at bar.
Error from Superior Court, Chatham County; W. G. Charlton, Judge.
W. W Lee was convicted of prescribing, as a practitioner of medicine, cocaine for an habitual user thereof, not in good faith, and he brings error. Affirmed.
Twiggs & Gazan, for plaintiff in error.
W. C Hartridge, Sol. Gen., for the State.
Dr. Lee was convicted of violating the act of August 22, 1907 (Laws Ga. 1907, p. 121), regulating the sale of narcotic drugs. It was charged that he, being a practitioner of medicine, had prescribed cocaine for Frances Townsend, an habitual user of the drug, not in good faith, and not as a substance deemed necessary for the treatment of her (Frances Townsend) as a patient under his professional care, but had prescribed it for her in evasion of the act above cited. It is to be kept in mind that under the terms of the statute druggists cannot sell the drugs named therein, including cocaine, except upon specific prescriptions, conforming to a prescribed form issued by lawfully authorized practitioners. It is also made unlawful for any practitioner of medicine to prescribe the drugs for any habitual user, subject to the exception that an authorized practitioner may in good faith prescribe, for an habitual user who is under his professional care, such of these drugs as he may deem necessary for the treatment of the patient; but the giving of prescriptions in evasion of the provisions of the statute is made criminal.
At the trial it was shown that Dr. Lee had prescribed cocaine for Frances Townsend and that she was an habitual user of the drug. It was shown that she came to his office and asked for a prescription for cocaine. He inquired if she was an habitual user. She replied in the affirmative. He gave her the prescription, and she paid him 25 cents. After that she got several other prescriptions from him. In other words, there was direct proof as to all the elements of the case, except as to whether the defendant gave Frances Townsend the prescriptions in good faith, deeming the drug necessary for her treatment, or whether he was using his professional capacity and the issuance of the prescriptions as a device to evade the statute.
After proving the circumstances surrounding the giving of the prescriptions to Frances Townsend, the state showed that during the same general period the defendant had issued a large number of prescriptions for cocaine and morphine. There was testimony of witnesses that they would go to Dr. Lee and ask him for a prescription, and that without making any examination of them he would write out a prescription for cocaine and charge them 25 cents for it. One of the witnesses who testified to receiving several such prescriptions from him was a woman, Jennie Reise; and the defendant, it appears, had been acquitted on an indictment charging the illegal giving of prescriptions to her. From time to time, as this evidence showing the giving of prescriptions to other persons was being offered, the defendant entered his objections, and the overruling of these objections constitutes the ground of the various assignments of error in the record. It will not be necessary to recite these exceptions in detail, as what is about to be said will cover them in a general way.
While counsel for the plaintiff in error, in their very fair and able brief and argument, concede that to the general rule excluding evidence of the defendant's having committed crimes other than that for which he is being tried at the time, there are certain well-recognized exceptions, and that one of these exceptions ordinarily exists where it is necessary to show motive or intent, they say, however, that such evidence is admissible only in rebuttal, if the defendant seeks to show his good faith, that the evidence as to the other transactions is admitted only from necessity, and where other methods of proof are...
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