Lee v. State
| Decision Date | 12 December 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 87715,87715 |
| Citation | 685 So.2d 1275 |
| Parties | 21 Fla. L. Weekly S541 Brian David LEE, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
John C. Harrison of John C. Harrison, P.A., Shalimar, FL, for Petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; and James W. Rogers, Tallahassee Bureau Chief, Criminal Appeals, and Giselle Lylen Rivera, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent.
We have for review a decision certifying two questions to be of great public importance:
DOES THE DECISION IN [CONEY V. STATE, 653 So.2d 1009 (Fla.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 315, 133 L.Ed.2d 218 (1995) ] APPLY TO "PIPELINE CASES," THAT IS, THOSE OF SIMILARLY SITUATED DEFENDANTS WHOSE CASES WERE PENDING ON DIRECT REVIEW OR NOT YET FINAL DURING THE TIME CONEY WAS UNDER CONSIDERATION BUT PRIOR TO THE ISSUANCE OF THE OPINION?
and
Lee v. State, 670 So.2d 169, 170 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
We answered the first question in Boyett v. State, No. 81,971, 21 Fla. L. Weekly S535, --- So.2d ---- (Fla. Dec. 5, 1996). We acknowledged there that we had incorrectly accepted the State's concession that not allowing Coney to be present at the immediate site of juror challenges was error. In Boyett we wrote, "In Coney, we held for the first time that a defendant has a right under [Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure] 3.180 to be physically present at the immediate site where challenges are exercised." Boyett, slip op. at 5, --- So.2d at ----. We therefore receded from that part of Coney where we applied the new definition of "presence" to Coney himself. The result of Coney remained unchanged, however, since we had found the error harmless. We went on to address prospective application:
In Coney, we expressly held that "our ruling today clarifying this issue is prospective only." Unless we explicitly state otherwise, a rule of law which is to be given prospective application does not apply to those cases which have been tried before the rule is announced. Because Boyett had already been tried when Coney issued, Coney does not apply.
Boyett, slip op. at 5, --- So.2d at ---- (citations omitted).
Accordingly, we answer this certified question in the negative.
We answered the second question in State v. Wilson, 680 So.2d 411 (Fla.1996), by holding that where a conviction for attempted felony murder has been vacated on the basis of our opinion in Gray, the proper remedy is retrial on any lesser included offense which was instructed on at trial. Here, Lee's conviction for third-degree attempted felony murder means he was effectually acquitted of the charged...
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