Lee v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.

• Decision Date: 24 July 1984
• Docket Number: No. 51745,51745
• Citation: 1984 OK 48,688 P.2d 1283
• Parties: Tom LEE, Appellee, v. VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA, INC., Volkswagen Werk, Inc., GMBH, a/k/a Volkswagen Werk Aktiengesellshift (A.G.), Appellants, and Marilyn W. Guffey, Appellee.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Page 1283

688 P.2d 1283

1984 OK 48

Tom LEE, Appellee, v. VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA, INC., Volkswagen Werk, Inc., GMBH a/k/a Volkswagen Werk Aktiengesellshift (A.G.), Appellants and Marilyn W. Guffey, Appellee.

No. 51745.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

July 24, 1984.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 1, 1984.

Appeal from the District Court, Oklahoma County, Joe Cannon, Trial judge.

Appeal from a jury verdict in favor of the Plaintiff. This case involves "second impact injuries" arising from an automobile accident.

AFFIRMED.

John W. Norman and Thomas A. Wallace, Norman, Hays, McNulty & Mayfield and Larry A. Tawwater, Lampkin, Wolfe, McCaffrey & Tawwater, Oklahoma City, for appellee, Tom Lee.

Ronald D. Fulkerson, Fulkerson, Morris, Gray & Dolle, Oklahoma City, Rhodes Hieronymus, Jones, Tucker & Gable, Bert M. Jones, Richard M. Eldridge, Tulsa, Holloway, Dobson, Hudson & Bachman, Russell B. Holloway, Oklahoma City, Herzfeld & Rubin, P.C., Michael Hoenig, Myron Shapiro, New York City, for appellants.

McKinney, Stringer & Webster, Oklahoma City, for appellee, Marilyn V. Guffey.

PER CURIAM:

I.

This suit arises from a collision between the station wagon driven by Marilyn Guffey and the 1964 Volkswagen "Beetle" driven by the plaintiff, Tom Lee.

Plaintiff's car was traveling north at approximately 15 miles per hour when it was struck on the right front side by Guffey's station wagon traveling west at a speed of approximately 35 miles per hour. Immediately prior to the impact, Guffey applied her brakes, causing the front of the station wagon to dip and strike plaintiff's car below its center of gravity, causing it to roll or tip to its right side. The much greater speed and weight of Guffey's car drove the plaintiff's car into a counter-clockwise rotation which resulted in the vehicles "side-slapping." At the end of the side-slap, the vehicles parted, with the Volkswagen being knocked forty feet west.

At a point somewhere between the first impact of the vehicles and the Volkswagen's final resting place, the right door came open and plaintiff and his brother, who was a passenger in the car, were ejected onto the street. As a result of the accident, the plaintiff sustained a cervical fracture, rendering him quadriplegic.

Plaintiff brought suit against Guffey on the basis of a traditional negligence theory. Plaintiff brought suit against Volkswagen on the basis of "manufacturers' products liability." The application of the latter theory was based on the contention that a defective door latch caused plaintiff's cervical fracture by allowing the door to come open, thus causing plaintiff to be thrown from the car.

The jury, in trial at the district court level, found in favor of plaintiff and awarded a judgment of 1.8 million dollars, plus interest and costs against both defendants.

Defendants Volkswagen of America, Inc. and Volkswagen Werk, Inc., GMBH (collectively referred to as Volkswagen) appeal.

II.

A.

The theory of manufacturers' products liability, as adopted in Kirkland v. General Motors, Okl., 521 P.2d 1353 (1974), provides the framework for this case.

Benita Kirkland brought action against the manufacturer of the automobile which she had been driving for injuries sustained in a collision which allegedly occurred when the driver's seat collapsed and she fell backwards. The district court ruled in favor of the defendant. This Court, while affirming the trial court's decision, also outlined the conceptual guides that govern a case when manufacturers' products liability is at issue.

Kirkland held that one who sells any product in a defective condition, that is unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer, is strictly liable for the physical harm to person or property caused by the defect. This liability is not predicated on either a negligence or warranty basis. Plaintiffs utilizing this theory must prove that the product was the cause of the injury, that the defect existed in the product at the time it left the control of the defendant and that the defect made the product unreasonably dangerous as defined by ordinary consumer expectations.

In Kirkland we also addressed the level of proof necessary to fulfill plaintiff's burdens. Circumstantial evidence, coupled with the proper inferences drawn from it, is clearly an acceptable minimal basis. Actual or absolute proof is not required because this type of proof may be within the possession or peculiar knowledge of the defendant.

B.

Our first task is to determine if the Kirkland mode of analysis can be applied to the facts of the immediate case. The factual difference between the two cases is commonly referred to by drawing a distinction between injuries received in the "first collision or impact" and "injuries received in the second collision or impact." Products are said to be involved in "first impact injuries" when the product causes the impact to occur. Products are involved in "second impact injuries" when they operate as a causative agent after the original impact. For instance, Ms. Kirkland argued that the defective seat caused the accident and resultant injuries, while in this case Mr. Lee contends that the door latch caused the contact with the street and the resultant cervical fracture. The contact with the street could not have occurred without the initial impact between Ms. Guffey's station wagon and Mr. Lee's Volkswagen. This distinction is important because we have not previously decided a case involving "injuries from second impact."

Early in the development of the "second impact injury" doctrine, there was considerable discussion as to whether manufacturers had a duty to consider "collision impact" when designing an automobile.

Larsen v. General Motors, 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir.1968), involved this issue, holding that manufacturers have a duty to consider the environment in which the product will be used. We agree with the Larsen holding that the manufacturer's liability for injuries proximately caused by latent defects should not be limited to collisions in which the defect caused the accident, but should extend to situations in which the defect caused injuries over and above that which would have occurred from the accident, but for the defective design.

"Second impact" cases present no unique problems in reference to the actual defect. Plaintiff has the same burden as in other products cases as to whether the product was in a defective condition that was unreasonably dangerous as defined by ordinary consumer expectations when it left the control of the manufacturer.

"Second impact" cases do require a slightly different perspective when discussing the plaintiff's causation burden. A review of the case law of other jurisdictions reveals that courts speak of the manufacturer's liability in second impact cases in terms of "enhancement" or "aggravation" of injuries. In other words, the manufacturer is liable for damages only if the plaintiff can prove that he suffered injuries as a result of the latent defect or "second impact" in addition to those suffered as a result of the accident or "first impact." Further, the manufacturer is liable for damages only for enhanced injuries attributable to the second impact, i.e., only for injuries resulting from the latent defect.

This "aggravation" or "enhancement" can occur in two ways: A plaintiff might suffer an increase in the severity of the injury as a result of the "second impact," e.g., a worsening of a back injury suffered in the first collision, or a plaintiff might suffer an entirely new injury as a result of the "second impact," e.g., a broken leg in addition to a broken arm. In either situation, the causation burden is the same as in all products cases. Plaintiff must offer sufficient proof to convince the jury that the defect was responsible for a new injury or enhancement of an injury sustained as a result of the first impact. Thus "aggravation" or "enhancement" are labels applied to second impact injuries to avoid confusion with injuries caused by the "first impact." However, the problem is that, except for the instance in which the injuries caused by the design defect are clearly distinguishable from those caused by the initial collision (e.g., burn injuries from the explosion of a defectively designed gas tank, as in Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir.1974)), the evidence will necessarily include a determination of what injuries might have happened in the collision absent the defect. Not only must the jury attempt to determine what injuries plaintiff would have suffered absent the design defect, i.e., in this case, if the door had not opened, but it must also determine what enhanced injuries plaintiff suffered by reason of the door opening. In this case, plaintiff claimed damages for one indivisible injury, a cervical fracture rendering him quadriplegic.

C.

We now turn to an evaluation of defendants' specific claim. Volkswagen contends that this case should not have been presented to the jury because there was insufficient evidence to meet the plaintiff's burden of proof in terms of causation. The trial court denied the motion for a directed verdict, and it is that decision we now consider.

The necessary assessment requires a standard to determine the sufficiency of the evidence. It is this standard-making process that has provided a point of controversy in the reported cases involving "second impact injuries."

One group of decisions requires the plaintiff to precisely and exactly prove those injuries that are attributable to the accident and those that are attributable to the alleged design defect. The case of Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3rd Cir.1976) is representative of this approach. In Huddell, plaintiff's decedent's head struck the head restraint after his car was hit in the rear. Plaintiff claimed that the head restraint had an unusually sharp edge, which caused decedent's death when it struck him on the rear of the head. At trial, plaintiff offered proof...