LEE X v. Casey

• Decision Date: 08 July 1991
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 3:90CV00250.
• Citation: 771 F. Supp. 725
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
• Parties: Johnathan LEE X v. Doris R. CASEY, Clerk, et al.

771 F. Supp. 725

Johnathan LEE X v. Doris R. CASEY, Clerk, et al.

Civ. A. No. 3:90CV00250.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Richmond Division.

July 8, 1991.

Robert William Jaspen, U.S. Atty's. Office, Richmond, Va., for Doris R. Casey and David G. Lowe.

MEMORANDUM

MERHIGE, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Johnathan Lee X, a Virginia State prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this Bivens type complaint¹ on April 2, 1990. Plaintiff alleged that the defendants denied him access to the courts in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.² Specifically, he asserted that the defendants failed to docket and file a notice of appeal submitted by him for a previous action. He sought a declaratory judgment, monetary damages and such further relief as the Court deemed just and proper. Jurisdiction is appropriate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

By Order entered September 18, 1990, the motions to dismiss filed by defendants Lowe and Casey were granted. The claims against defendant Dohnal were also dismissed as frivolous. Plaintiff X appealed. On February 4, 1991, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of defendants Lowe and Casey. The dismissal of defendant Dohnal was vacated and the action was remanded for further disposition.

On May 6, 1991, defendant Dohnal filed a motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff responded on June 6, 1991. In addition, plaintiff filed a document entitled "Motion to Set Aside ...". Also pending is a motion to amend the complaint filed by X on June 4, 1991. The case is currently ripe for disposition. A statement of facts will follow. Thereafter, the Court will address plaintiff's motion to set aside, the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and lastly, the plaintiff's motion to amend.³

I. Statement of facts

The record reveals that on or about January 15, 1987, plaintiff X filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge the conditions of his confinement at the Mecklenburg Correctional Center. By Order entered November 24, 1987, the complaint was dismissed by The Honorable David G. Lowe, United States Magistrate Judge. See Johnathan Lee X v. Edward Murray, et. al., Civil Action No. 87-0317 and 87-0018-L (hereinafter referred to as "Lee X I").⁴

On November 30, 1987, X wrote a letter to Magistrate Judge Lowe in which he objected to the dismissal of his § 1983 complaint. He stated that he wished to either proceed with his supplemental complaint or appeal the November 24, 1987 Order.⁵ The envelope which contained the letter was addressed to "David G. Lowe Magistrate" and sent by certified mail, return receipt requested. It is important to note that this letter is the only document which reflects the plaintiff's desire to appeal. A separate notice of appeal is not contained in the file of Lee X I.

Defendant Dohnal is a Deputy Clerk for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia at Richmond. Dohnal states that on December 2, 1987, she collected the mail from the post office box designated for the Clerk of the Court.⁶ She signed the return receipt for the plaintiff's letter, sorted the mail and delivered the unopened letter to the Chambers of Magistrate Lowe on that date. The envelope was marked "Received" by the Magistrate's office on December 2, 1987. Sometime thereafter, the letter was placed on the left hand side of the file with other correspondences. It was not marked filed or docketed as a notice of appeal.

Defendant Dohnal has no personal knowledge of what happened to the letter after December 2, 1987. She surmises that it was returned to the Clerk's Office on December 8 because it was marked "Received" by that office on that date. She does not know why the letter was not docketed as a pleading or a notice of appeal. She concludes, however, that the letter was returned to the Clerk's Office without a note or any other instruction which would direct a deputy clerk to treat it as a pleading. The file for Lee X I was not transmitted to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for appeal, but was closed.

The plaintiff alleges that he did not learn that his "notice of appeal" was misfiled until on or about February 16, 1989. See Complaint at p. 6.⁷ As a result, he contends that he lost his opportunity to appeal. He, therefore, concludes that the defendant unlawfully denied him access to the court and deprived him of his First and Fifth Amendment Rights.

II. Plaintiff's Rule 60(b) Motion

As previously stated, by Order entered September 18, 1990, the claims against defendants Lowe and Casey were dismissed. On May 28, 1991, X submitted a document entitled "Motion to Set Aside Memorandum and Order dated September 18, 1990". He essentially seeks to rejoin Lowe and Casey as defendants to this action by vacating the September 18 Order. The motion will be construed as a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b).

Relief from a judgment or order may be granted pursuant to Rule 60(b) on the basis of mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, or any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. Additionally, the movant must also "demonstrate the existence of a meritorious claim or defense" to the action. Square Construction Co. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 657 F.2d 68, 71 (4th Cir.1981). A Rule 60(b) motion is not authorized when it is nothing more than a request for the district court to change its mind. United States v. Williams, 674 F.2d 310, 313 (4th Cir.1982). The Court finds that the instant motion is wholly without merit and is essentially a request for the Court to change its mind.

Plaintiff asserts two grounds for relief in support of his motion. First, he alleges that there is "newly discovered evidence" of a conspiracy to deliberately suppress evidence in this case. Next, he claims that defendant Casey committed perjury by filing a false affidavit in support of her motion to dismiss. Plaintiff's motion is conclusory and without factual support. It is frivolous and requires only brief comment.

On May 6, 1991, defendant Dohnal filed a motion for summary judgment and attached a copy of the plaintiff's November 30, 1987 letter as an exhibit. She noted that the letter was contained in the record of Lee X I and was placed on the left hand side of the file. The plaintiff claims that the letter is newly discovered evidence. He essentially argues that the defendants deliberately suppressed the letter because it was not used as an exhibit or produced earlier in the litigation. He also contends that since the letter is in the subject file, defendant Casey falsely stated that she did not have knowledge of it.

Plaintiff's argument is unclear at best. The November 30, 1987 letter was written by X. It is the subject of this action. The defendants never denied its existence. Presumably plaintiff could have used it as his own exhibit at any time.⁸ The defendants certainly had no obligation to produce it. In fact, the plaintiff never filed a demand or motion for production of documents. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 34. Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that the letter was ever removed from its file, let alone suppressed.

Further, plaintiff's accusations against defendant Casey are baseless. She affirmed that she does not perform routine docketing functions. See Declaration of Casey at p. 1. Casey is the Clerk of the Court with offices at the Alexandria Division. Lee X I was litigated in the Richmond Division and the record was stored here. In addition, thousands of documents are filed with the Richmond Division each year. To suggest, therefore, that Casey had personal knowledge of an individual letter simply because it is contained in a file in this Court is wholly without merit. Accordingly, plaintiff's Rule 60(b) motion will be DENIED.

III. Motion for Summary Judgment

On May 6, 1991 defendant Dohnal filed a motion for summary judgment. As a result, the Court must determine two factors. First, whether there is any genuine dispute as to a material fact. And, if there is no dispute of fact, whether the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The defendant's burden is to show that there is no genuine dispute as to a material fact. However, she is not required to negate her opponent's entire case. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (Purpose of Rule 56 is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims). She need only disclose the absence of evidence to support that case. Id. Once the defendant has met this obligation, the burden shifts to the plaintiff. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). He must then demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact actually exists to prevent summary judgment. Id. "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position is not sufficient". Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512. Moreover, the plaintiff may not rely upon vague or conclusory allegations. He must show that there is concrete evidence sufficient to enable a reasonable jury to return a verdict for him. Id. at 252-54, 106 S.Ct. at 2512-13; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The Court may not weigh the evidence to determine its credibility, but must determine whether there is enough evidence to require submission to a jury. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252-53, 106 S.Ct. at 2512-13. Therefore, if the evidence is clearly one-sided or if it is merely colorable, summary judgment may be granted. Id. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-11.

Applying this standard to the record generated by the parties in this case, there is no question that summary judgment is appropriate for three reasons. First, there is no evidence whatsoever...