Leedom v. State, No. 1999-KA-01754-SCT.
| Decision Date | 27 September 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 1999-KA-01754-SCT. |
| Citation | 796 So.2d 1010 |
| Parties | Linda LEEDOM v. STATE of Mississippi. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
William D. Massey, Lorna S. McClusky, Steven W. Pittman, Memphis, TN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Office of the Attorney General by Charles W. Maris, Jr., Attorneys for Appellee.
Before BANKS, P.J., MILLS and DIAZ, JJ.
¶ 1. The original opinion is withdrawn, and this opinion is substituted therefor.
¶ 2. Linda Leedom appeals her convictions for conspiracy to commit murder and the capital murder of Lula Young. Because we find the errors assigned by Leedom are not reversible, we affirm the convictions.
¶ 3. Lula Young was asleep in her house on December 19, 1994, between 5:50 and 6:00 a.m., when a neighbor heard two explosive sounds coming from her house, and shortly thereafter saw the house enveloped in flames. Young died in the fire. Fire-fighters called to the scene found a propane tank and several oxygen bottles. Upon closer inspection, it appeared the tank's release valve was vented out and opened one fourth of the way. Investigators initially attributed the cause and intensity of the fire to the combination of propane and oxygen in the house. At trial, an expert testified that the fire was intentionally started and caused by propane leaking from the tank.
¶ 4. Linda Leedom met Charles Wayne Dunn shortly after moving in with her daughter and son-in-law in December of 1993. At trial, Dunn testified Leedom approached him with the idea to kill Young, explaining that Young was her best friend and was dying of cancer. Leedom said Young asked her to kill her, but she did not have the heart to do it so she offered Dunn $5,000 to do it for her. He agreed. To kill Young, Dunn said he suggested they use an electrical heater to start a fire and purchased the heater with funds given to him by Leedom. He could not recall, however, who purchased the propane tank. Another witness, however, testified that on the day of the incident, Leedom said she purchased a grill for her daughter and son-in-law for Christmas and stored the propane tank in Young's home.
¶ 5. On the night before the fire, Dunn parked his car in Young's driveway and entered the house. He retrieved the heater from his truck, crushed some newspaper nearby, opened the valve on the propane tank, turned on the heater, and left the house. He testified the next day he went to Leedom's home and collected $1,000 from her with the balance to be paid in smaller amounts over time. A confidential informant later told the police that Dunn had been talking about the fire. The police picked him up for questioning, and he confessed to the murder and to conspiring with Leedom.
¶ 6. In a search of Leedom's home in March of 1997, two life insurance policies on Young's life in the amounts of $75,000 and $500,000, designating Leedom as the primary beneficiary, were discovered along with a third policy designating Leedom's husband as the beneficiary in the amount of $200,000. A partnership agreement was also discovered between Leedom and Young with a power of attorney granted to Leedom from Young.
¶ 7. At trial, insurance agents testified Leedom made inquiries in 1992 about making a claim on her "sister's" insurance, whom she said was Lula Young. Leedom listed herself as the owner of the $75,000 policy and her address as Young's address. One insurance agent, Greg Paylor, testified that he even saw a family tree displayed openly at Leedom's home depicting Young as her sister. Another agent testified that Leedom made a request for an additional $200,000 policy and when he went to Leedom's home to issue the policy, Leedom introduced herself as Lula Young. On this policy, Gary Leedom, the defendant's husband, was listed as Young's brother-in-law and Linda Leedom as her sister.
¶ 8. A third agent, Brenda Driver, with Nationwide Insurance was contacted by Leedom to write an insurance policy and a buy/sell agreement for she and her "sister" and "business partner", Lula Young. When Agent Driver arrived at the Leedom's home, Leedom introduced herself as Lula Young, and this time named "Linda Leedom" as the beneficiary and the sister of the proposed insured, Young. Driver then wrote a policy for $500,000 for Young along with a $200,000 accidental death rider. Leedom signed the application as Lula Young. Later, Agent Driver heard that Young was killed in a fire and attempted to call Young. Leedom answered the phone and announced that her sister had died. Driver later saw the person she knew as Lula Young, however, at a local Wal-Mart. She immediately informed her superiors and the authorities.
¶ 9. In a search of Leedom's home during the investigation, life insurance policies were also found on Robert Stovall, who is unrelated to Leedom by blood or marriage and was unaware of the insurance polices on his life. The following items were seized in the search:
¶ 10. An insurance agent, who had taken out a policy on Young for Leedom, testified that she had inquired about a policy she wished to take out on Robert Stovall and made an application for a $200,000 policy. The application listed Melanie Wright, Leedom's daughter, as beneficiary and the sister of Stovall. The application was never processed, however, because the company required that agents meet the proposed insured, and no such meeting was ever arranged for Stovall.
¶ 11. Another agent, Thomas Cooper, for Kansas City Life Insurance, testified that he also met with Leedom to issue a policy on Robert Stovall, who was listed this time on the application as Leedom's son-in-law. The face value of this policy was $250,000 with an additional $200,000 accidental death rider. Leedom was listed as the contingent beneficiary and her address as Stovall's address. Agent Cooper also testified that he was introduced to a person said to be Robert Stovall, but could not identify the real Stovall in court as the person he met.
¶ 12. When asked at trial about Stovall, Dunn testified that after Young's death Leedom approached him with a request that he kill Stovall. She did not give a reason for wanting him killed, he said, but offered him $10,000 to commit the murder, and he agreed. He then obtained a fraudulent identification card with Stovall's name and his (Dunn's) photograph. With money given to him by the defendant, he purchased a 1979 Toyota Celica to be used in a car wreck with Stovall and testified that the defendant took him to Stovall's hometown to commit the murder.
¶ 13. In March of 1997, Leedom was indicted in federal and state courts on multiple counts. The State elected to try Leedom for the conspiracy to commit capital murder and the capital murder of Young and prior to trial, moved to amend the indictment to charge Leedom as a habitual offender. The jury found the defendant guilty of conspiracy and murder and sentenced her to life without parole and twenty (20) years respectively. Aggrieved, Leedom appeals the convictions, assigning several errors.
¶ 14. Leedom's primary argument on appeal charges the lower court with error in admitting evidence that she engaged in a second conspiracy to kill Robert Stovall for insurance money. Prior to trial, she filed a motion in limine to preclude the prosecution from offering evidence regarding Stovall. It was denied, and over her objection Dunn testified that he and Leedom conspired to kill Stovall. All evidence of the Stovall Plan is inadmissible, Leedom contends, under Miss. R. Evid. 404(b), which contemplates prior not subsequent acts, like those here. ¶ 15. Leedom is mistaken. The general rule in criminal trials, with certain exceptions, is that proof of other criminal conduct by the accused is inadmissible. Tobias v. State, 472 So.2d 398, 400 (Miss. 1985); Donald v. State, 472 So.2d 370, 372 (Miss.1985); Mason v. State, 429 So.2d 569, 572 (Miss.1983). The sequence in which offenses are committed is immaterial in determining whether in a prosecution for one offense proof of the other offense is admissible, since "it is their integration into the incident, interwoven with similar provocation and purpose which makes it impractical to draw a curtain at the end of any particular act behind which the jury may not peer." Walker v. State, 201 Miss. 780, 782, 30 So.2d 239 (1947). Evidence of other bad acts is thus admissible regardless of whether they occur before or after the charged offense. Whether such proof is admissible depends, rather, upon whether it is introduced for one of the...
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