Lees v. Wetmore
Decision Date | 21 April 1882 |
Citation | 12 N.W. 238,58 Iowa 170 |
Parties | LEES v. WETMORE |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Polk District Court.
ACTION to quiet the title to and recover the possession of certain real estate situated in Guthrie county. The cause was originally brought at law, but upon the filing of an amended and substituted petition, was transferred to the chancery docket; and upon a trial on the merits a decree was rendered granting the relief prayed for by plaintiff. Defendant appeals.
AFFIRMED.
St John & Williams, for appellant.
Wright Cummings & Wright, for appellee.
I.
The substituted petition sets out certain proceedings in the probate court and conveyances thereunder, upon which plaintiff's claim to recover the land is based, and prays that his title may be quieted and that the cloud thereon, by reason of the conveyances, under which plaintiff claims title, may be removed. After this pleading was filed the cause, upon application of plaintiff, was transferred to the equity docket and tried as an action in chancery. Defendant insists that this action was erroneous for the reason that he is in possession of the land, and that plaintiff's proper remedy is an action at law to recover the possession. We have held, however, that an action to quiet title may be prosecuted by one not in possession. Lewis v. Soule, 52 Iowa 11, 2 N.W. 400. And we know of no reason or principle of law which stands in the way of the plaintiff, in such a case, uniting a prayer to recover possession with the prayer that the cloud on his title be removed, as was done by the substituted petition in this case.
II. The land in controversy in this case, a half section, was entered by Samuel H. Walker and Almon White, jointly, both of whom have since departed this life, and defendant claims title thereto under a deed executed to him by Mary E. White, the sole heir of each of the patentees, being the daughter of White and granddaughter of Walker. Her heirship and conveyance to defendant are shown by the testimony, and defendant is entitled to the land unless his title is defeated by the proceedings and conveyances, which we will now proceed to consider.
The plaintiff claims under these proceedings the title and interest held by each patentee to the undivided moiety of the land. As each separate interest rests upon a title different from that under which the other is claimed, it becomes necessary to discuss the respective titles separately. We will first consider the title to the undivided half of the land acquired from the government by Samuel H. Walker, the grandfather of Mary E. White, under whom defendant claims the land.
1. In 1864 Walker died, leaving a will which disposes of all his property in the following language:
2. This will was admitted to probate in 1864, in Cheshire county, New Hampshire, where the testator lived and died. John B. Fisk alone qualified as executor. The other person named as executor in the will declined to qualify.
3. In 1865 the will was filed in the County Court of Polk county (the court of probate) and duly admitted to probate as a foreign testament, and John Mitchell was appointed and qualified as the executor for the State of Iowa.
4. The executor, Mitchell, filed in the Polk county probate court a petition, praying that an order be made for the sale of the testator's interest in the land in controversy, in accordance with the provisions of the will. This petition was filed August 15th, 1865, and by an order of the court was set down for hearing on the first Monday of September following, the first day of the next term of the court. It was further ordered that "notice of the hearing * * * * be served on the sole heir and legatee according to law."
5. A notice in proper form was issued addressed to the sole legatee, Mary E. White, and her guardian, Nathan White, which was returned with acceptance of service indorsed thereon and signed by both the legatee and guardian.
6. An answer to the petition for the sale of the land was filed by H. M. Bush, alleging that he had been appointed guardian ad litem, and denying the petition and calling for strict proof of its allegations. There is no record of an order of the court appointing a guardian ad litem.
7. Upon the day fixed for the hearing of the case the following record entry was made, showing the proceeding therein recited.
8. The appraisers after being duly qualified, made appraisement of the land and report thereof, which the court approved and confirmed.
9. In pursuance of the order of sale and the appraisement, the land was sold to plaintiff's grantors by the executor, who executed a deed therefor, which was returned to the court and duly approved by an order in the following language:
"The following deed having been this 28th day of August, A. D. 1867, returned into court for approval, and it appearing to the court that the said administrator has complied with all the requirements of the law and of this court in making such sale and conveyance, it is now therefore ordered, that the said sale and foregoing deed of conveyance be and the same are hereby approved."
III. Other facts disclosed by the evidence, as the execution of a deed by Fisk, the executor who had qualified in New Hampshire, and the filing of a copy of the will in the probate court of Guthrie county, both having been done after the commencement of this action, need not be here recited, as, in the view we take, they do not figure in the case. Having reached the conclusion that the sale of the land by Mitchell as executor is valid, we are relieved of the duty of considering defendant's objections to the other proceedings had afterwards. This branch of the case, involving the title to the interest in the land held by Walker, may be more satisfactorily disposed of by considering the objections to the proceedings under which the land was sold by Mitchell, urged by defendant's counsel.
IV. It is first insisted that "the power of sale, conferred by Walker's will upon the executors therein named, was a personal trust, calling for the exercise of their judgment and discretion, and could not be delegated by them to Mitchell." And it is also said that "the authority conferred by the will upon the executors was a power coupled with a trust in the proceeds of the land, and the county court had no jurisdiction over the subject of the trust."
Counsel do not, in these quotations, nor in other parts of their argument, assume that the persons named in the will as executors are to be regarded as testamentary trustees and are, therefore, not subject to the law prescribing the powers and duties of executors. Their position is simply, as they state it, that the executors are clothed by the terms of the will with certain duties and powers in the nature of a trust. This is quite true, and in all cases executors are charged with just such trusts, and are in some sense trustees. But, notwithstanding such trust duties, they are regarded as executors. If duties are imposed which are in the nature of trusts, and extend beyond the ordinary duties of executors, they become trustees. See 3 Redfield on Wills, p. 76, Sec. 20, and p. 70, Sec. 10.
In the case before us the will empowered the executors, at their discretion, to...
To continue reading
Request your trial