Leger v. Kelley
| Decision Date | 19 July 1955 |
| Citation | 116 A.2d 429,142 Conn. 585 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Roger LEGER v. Charies F. KELLEY et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut |
Charles Suisman, New London, with whom, on the brief, was Max M. Shapiro, New London, for appellant (plaintiff).
Louis Weinstein, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was John J. Bracken, Atty. Gen., for appellee (named defendant).
Before INGLIS, C. J., and BALDWIN, O'SULLIVAN, WYNNE and DALY, JJ.
The complaint in this case was in two counts. In the first a cause of action against Charles F. Kelley was alleged; the second set forth a purported cause of action against the Stonington Auto Station. It is only with the first count that we are concerned on this appeal.
The allegations contained in the first count may be summarized as follows: On December 23, 1952, the defendant Charles F. Kelley, while he was the commissioner of motor vehicles, accepted an application for the registration of a 1938 Chrysler automobile owned by Albert J. Leger, the plaintiff's father, and permitted it to be registered for operation. This registration was renewed on February 28, 1953. The automobile, although manufactured after July 1, 1937, was not equipped with safety glass in its windshield. On May 15, 1953, while the plaintiff was riding as a passenger in the car, it was in collision with another motor vehicle in such a manner as to break the windshield into fragments, causing personal injuries to the plaintiff. The injuries 'were caused by the negligence of the defendant, Charles F. Kelley, by reason of his carelessness and negligence, the carelessness and negligence of his agents and servants * * * in that said Chrysler automobile was originally registered * * * although it was manufactured after July 1, 1937, and was not equipped in its windshield with approved safety glass as provided for in Section 2447 of the General Statutes.'
A demurrer to the complaint was sustained on three grounds: (1) this is a suit against the defendant in his official capacity and is, therefore, in effect a suit against the state to the bringing of which the state has not given its consent; (2) the duty imposed by § 2447 of the General Statutes is one owed to the public generally and not to the plaintiff individually; and (3) the complaint charges the defendant with liability for the negligence of his agents and servants, but a public officer is not personally liable for the acts of his subordinates unless he has specifically directed the doing of those acts.
After this ruling on the demurrer, the plaintiff amended his complaint by removing the allegation that his injuries were caused by the negligence of the defendant's agents and servants; he made no other change in his complaint. Inasmuch as the amendment did nothing to alter the situation with reference to the first two grounds on which the demurrer had been sustained, the court, upon the defendant's motion, rendered judgment for the defendant on demurrer sustained, and the plaintiff has appealed. The only assignment of error is that the court erred in granting the defendant's motion for judgment. Technically, this assignment is without merit, since the plaintiff's failure adequately to plead over after the sustaining of the demurrer left the court with no other course than to render judgment for the defendant. Cashman v. Meriden Hospital, 117 Conn. 585, 589, 169 A. 915. The case, however, has been presented by both parties in this court as though the assignment of error had been that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer, and we will consider the matter on that basis. If it is borne in mind that the amendment of the complaint removed the allegation that the defendant, in issuing the registration, was acting through his agents and servants, it becomes unnecessary for us to review the ruling of the court to the effect that the defendant was not liable for the negligence of his servants and agents. The plaintiff agrees that on that point the court was correct and now rests his case on the allegation that the defendant was personally negligent in issuing the registration.
The first ground on which the demurrer was sustained was that in reality this was a suit against the state brought without the state's consent. In this regard the court apparently misconstrued the writ and complaint. In the writ the defendant is named omerely as an individual and not as a state official. There is an allegation in the complaint that he was the commissioner of motor vehicles, but that fact is set forth merely as one of the facts introductory to the allegation that he personally was negligent. The writ and complaint when read together indicate that the cause of action stated is one against Charles F. Kelley individually and not as a state officer. Accordingly, the suit is in no sense one against the state. This ground for sustaining the demurrer was not well taken.
There is left, therefore, only the question whether the court was correct in its ruling that the statute upon which the plaintiff predicated his case did not impose upon the defendant a duty owed to the plaintiff to refuse registration of the automobile in which the plaintiff was riding when he was injured. The statute in question was § 2447 of the General Statutes as it had been amended, in a particular not pertinent to this case, by § 242a of the 1949 Supplement. Cum.Sup.1953, § 1033c. So far as relevant, it read as follows: 'The commissioner of motor vehicles shall not register any motor vehicle manufactured after July 1, 1937, unless the windshield, the doors, windows and glass partitions are equipped with safety glass of a type approved by him * * *.' The direction to the commissioner of motor vehicles to require some kind of safety glass as a prerequisite to registration left no room for the exercise of discretion by him. The duty imposed was ministerial. See Blake v. Mason, 82 Conn. 324, 327, 73 A. 782. It should be...
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Mulligan v. Rioux
...supra, 208 Conn. at 166-67, 544 A.2d 1185; Shore v. Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, 152, 444 A.2d 1379 (1982); Leger v. Kelley, 142 Conn. 585, 589-90, 116 A.2d 429 (1955).16 Specifically, the trial court relied on: Anderson v. Creighton, supra, 483 U.S. at 639, 107 S.Ct. at 3038; Harlow v. Fitzg......
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...E.g., Rich v. City of Mobile, supra; Trianon Park Condominium Ass'n v. City of Hialeah, 468 So.2d 912 (Fla.1985); Leger v. Kelley, 142 Conn. 585, 116 A.2d 429 (1955); Stigler v. City of Chicago, 48 Ill.2d 20, 268 N.E.2d 26 (1971); Grogan v. Commonwealth, supra; E. Eyring & Sons Co. v. City ......
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...This court subsequently adopted the public duty doctrine, which provided even more immunity to public officials. Leger v. Kelley, 142 Conn. 585, 589-90, 116 A.2d 429 (1955). Reaffirming the public duty doctrine in Shore v. Stonington, supra, 187 Conn. at 152, 444 A.2d 1379, we said: " '[I]f......
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...and those of a proprietary nature, where it carries on activities for the particular benefit of its inhabitants." In Leger v. Kelley, 142 Conn. 585, 590-91, 116 A.2d 429, 432 (1955), the court clarified that a duty is "private" in nature if its performance "will affect an individual in a ma......