Legg v. Legg, 15314

• Decision Date: 18 February 1997
• Docket Number: No. 15314,15314
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Linda LEGG, v. David W. LEGG.

Page 1354

688 A.2d 1354

44 Conn.App. 303

Linda LEGG, v. David W. LEGG.

No. 15314.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Submitted on Briefs Dec. 18, 1996.

Decided Feb. 18, 1997.

Richard S. Scalo and Ronald D. Japha, Bridgeport, filed a brief, for appellant (plaintiff).

David Legg, pro se, appellee (defendant), filed a brief.

Before DUPONT, C.J., and LAVERY and LANDAU, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This case arises out of a judgment rendered in connection with a motion for contempt filed after a judgment of dissolution of marriage. The issue presented is whether, when the parties have agreed in a stipulation incorporated into the judgment of dissolution that they will share the cost of their children's postsecondary education, including room and board, each is responsible for one half of the cost of room and board when the child lives at home with one party, rather than on the college campus. ¹ The trial court, Munro, J., held that the defendant was not responsible. On the basis of the stipulation that the parties executed, we conclude that the defendant is responsible for the costs in question and reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff and the defendant were married on February 3, 1973, and the judgment of dissolution was rendered on May 21, 1990, by the court, F. Freedman, J. There are two children of the marriage, Robert Legg and Timothy Legg, who were sixteen and fourteen years of age respectively at the date of judgment.

The defendant has a history of making untimely support payments and had appeared in the trial court many times since the dissolution judgment on numerous motions for contempt filed by the plaintiff. These contempt hearings were ongoing from 1991 to 1995. The plaintiff has alleged in these contempt motions the failure of the defendant to make both general child support payments and payments for the education expenses of both Robert and Timothy. ² This appeal concerns the education expenses of Timothy only.

The motion for contempt involved in this appeal alleged that the defendant had not paid his share of Timothy's tuition, books, and room and board at Quinnipiac College. Timothy entered Quinnipiac College in the fall of 1994 and lived at home with his mother to reduce expenses. The room and board claimed for one semester was $750. At the contempt hearing, the defendant argued that he should not have to split the cost of Timothy's living expenses with the plaintiff because Timothy was living at home instead of on the Quinnipiac campus. The trial court found that the expenses of living at home were not "room and board" within the spirit and intent of the parties' stipulation and, therefore, that the defendant should not be required to pay. Because we conclude that the intent of the parties is clear in the stipulation, intent is a matter of law, rather than a question of fact. See Zadravecz v. Zadravecz, 39 Conn.App. 28, 31, 664 A.2d 303 (1995). It was unnecessary for the trial court to look beyond the agreement to ascertain the intent of the parties. Furthermore, there was no evidence to indicate the intent and spirit of the stipulation.

An agreement between divorced parties regarding the postmajority education of their children that is incorporated into a dissolution decree should be regarded as a contract. Barnard v. Barnard, 214 Conn. 99, 109, 570 A.2d 690 (1990). "In interpreting contract items, we have repeatedly stated that the intent of the parties is to be ascertained by a fair and reasonable construction of the written words and that the language used must be accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the subject matter of the contract.... Where the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect according to its terms. A court will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity and words do not become ambiguous simply because lawyers or laymen contend for different meanings." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 110, 570 A.2d 690; see also Sanitary Services Corp. v. Greenfield Village Assn., Inc., 36 Conn.App. 395, 399, 651 A.2d 269 (1994).

The stipulation of the parties made clear their intention to pay for the room and board of their children when they attended college. These items have a dollar value, whether incurred on or off campus, and each party agreed to pay one half of that value. Nowhere in the agreement is there a specification that requires the child to live on campus for the parents to be responsible for room and board expenses. The defendant could have...