Leggio v. Suffolk County Police Dept.

• Decision Date: 24 December 1997
• Citation: 666 N.Y.S.2d 815,245 A.D.2d 897
• Parties: , 1997 N.Y. Slip Op. 11,257 In the Matter of the Claim of Anne LEGGIO, Appellant, v. SUFFOLK COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT, Respondent. Workers' Compensation Board, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 815

666 N.Y.S.2d 815

245 A.D.2d 897, 1997 N.Y. Slip Op. 11,257

In the Matter of the Claim of Anne LEGGIO, Appellant, v. SUFFOLK COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT, Respondent Workers' Compensation Board, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Third Department.

Dec. 24, 1997.

Scheine, Fusco, Brandenstein & Rada (Joan S. O'Brien, of counsel), Woodbury, for appellant.

Cherry, Edson & Kelly (Henriette Frieder, of counsel), Hempstead, for Suffolk County Police Department, respondent.

Before MIKOLL, J.P., and MERCURE, CREW, YESAWICH and PETERS, JJ.

CREW, Justice.

Appeal from a decision of the Workers' Compensation Board, filed February 5, 1996, which, inter alia, ruled that claimant did not sustain an accidental injury in the course of her employment and denied her claim for workers' compensation benefits.

Claimant was employed by the Suffolk County Police Department (hereinafter the employer) as a 911 operator and, in conjunction therewith, was required to work rotating shifts. Although claimant apparently worked under such conditions without incident for a number of years, she began experiencing problems in 1985 and 1986, which eventually resulted in three separate psychiatric admissions. Claimant returned to her job following the first two hospitalizations but was unable to do so after her last admission and permanently left her employment in December 1986.

Claimant thereafter filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits contending that her departure from employment was caused by work-related stress, and the employer controverted the claim asserting that claimant's condition was due to her preexisting multiple sclerosis. Ultimately, the Workers' Compensation Board ruled, inter alia, that claimant did not sustain an accidental injury or suffer from an occupational disease within the meaning of the Workers' Compensation Law and, hence, denied her claim for benefits. This appeal by claimant ensued.

This court repeatedly has held that " '[m]ental injury precipitated solely by psychic trauma is compensable as a matter of law * * * when the circumstances constitute an "accident" within the meaning of the Workers' Compensation Law * * * ' " (Matter of Velazquez v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 156 A.D.2d 922, 923, 550 N.Y.S.2d 139, quoting Matter of Haydel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 106 A.D.2d 759, 760, 483 N.Y.S.2d 792; see, Matter of Smith v. Steuben County Highway Dept., 199 A.D.2d 590, 604 N.Y.S.2d 352; Matter of Greene v. Freihofer Baking Co., 180 A.D.2d 980, 580 N.Y.S.2d 808). In this regard, "a mental injury need not be caused by a discrete, identifiable psychic trauma, but can result from emotional stress extending over a period of months" (Matter of Velazquez v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., supra, at 923, 550 N.Y.S.2d 139; see, Matter of Rackley v. County of Rensselaer, 141 A.D.2d 232, 233, 535 N.Y.S.2d 137, lv. dismissed 74 N.Y.2d 791, 545 N.Y.S.2d 106, 543 N.E.2d 749) and may be found even in instances where the cause adversely affects the claimant due only to his or her particular sensitivities (see, Matter of Smith v. Steuben County Highway Dept., supra; Matter of Greene v. Freihofer Baking Co., supra).

Here, although acknowledging the uncontroverted medical evidence establishing a causal link between claimant's diagnosed depression and the conditions under which she was required to work, the Board nevertheless concluded that claimant did not sustain an accidental injury within the meaning of the Workers' Compensation Law because the stress to which claimant was exposed was no greater than that normally encountered in the workplace. Although we recognize that such an inquiry constitutes a factual issue for the Board to resolve (see, Matter of Kaliski v. Fairchild Republic Co., 151 A.D.2d 867, 542 N.Y.S.2d 841, affd. 76 N.Y.2d 1002, 564 N.Y.S.2d 714, 565 N.E.2d 1265), our review of the record compels us to conclude that the Board's findings in this regard simply are not supported by substantial evidence. Given claimant's clear and unequivocal testimony, and absent any testimony from claimant's co-workers or supervisors regarding their typical work environment, there was no basis for the Board to conclude that the stress encountered by claimant was no greater than that routinely occurring in the normal work environment (compare, Matter of Troy v....