Legislative Research Com'n By and Through Prather v. Brown
| Decision Date | 19 January 1984 |
| Citation | 664 S.W.2d 907 |
| Parties | The LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION, By and Through Joseph W. PRATHER, Senator, and Bobby H. Richardson, Representative, Kentucky General Assembly, Individually and as Co-Chairmen of the Legislative Research Commission, Appellants, v. John Y. BROWN, Jr., Governor, Commonwealth of Kentucky, and Steven L. Beshear, Attorney General, Commonwealth of Kentucky, Appellees. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Gross C. Lindsay, Henderson, Kathleen L. Patterson, Frankfort, for appellants.
Bert T. Combs, Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, Sheryl G. Snyder, Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, Louisville, Edward F. Prichard, Jr., Prichard & Stallard, Rush Dozier, Jr., General Counsel, Robert L. Chenoweth, Asst. Deputy Atty. Gen., Frankfort, for appellees.
Jane V. Fitzpatrick, Brooks, Coffman & Fitzpatrick, Lexington, for amicus curiae, Kentucky Educ. Ass'n; John J. Slattery, Jr., General Counsel, Kentucky Educ. Ass'n, Louisville, of counsel.
On this appeal, we address the constitutionality of several acts of the Kentucky General Assembly passed by that body's 1982 regular session. This case has been trumpeted abroad as a test of the relative constitutional powers of the Governor of the Commonwealth as opposed to those of the General Assembly and has further been described as a power struggle between these two particular branches of our state government.
It is more accurately a case which deals with legislative enactments that confer certain powers on the Legislative Research Commission, 1 most of which are designed to be exercised by that body when the General Assembly is adjourned. The basic legal issues involved deal with the delegation of powers by the General Assembly to the LRC and the application of the historical doctrine of the separation of powers to the particular statutes in question. An answer to the questions posed by this litigation necessarily requires consideration of the nature and limitations of the LRC.
The LRC, acting by and through appellants Prather, President Pro Tem of the Senate, and Richardson, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Co-Chairmen of the LRC, filed this action in Franklin Circuit Court. The complaint sought a declaration of rights as to the validity of several statutes, following a challenge thereto by the Governor. The appellees, by counterclaim, impleaded certain additional statutes 2 in order to insure that all issues were litigated. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court rendered a written opinion and a judgment.
Based on agreements and stipulations of the parties, not all of the statutes in question were submitted to the trial court for judgment, and we will not, perforce, decide those issues. The general subject matters of the controverted statutes are as follows the power of the LRC to act in the stead of the General Assembly while it is adjourned; the power of the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tem of the Senate to make appointments to and to serve as members of certain boards and commissions; the power of the LRC to determine or to approve budget reductions when the General Assembly is adjourned; the power of the LRC to approve the action of the executive in applying for so-called Federal "Block Grants;" the power of the LRC to grant or withhold legal effect from any executive order promulgated by the Governor which reorganizes the administrative structure of the executive branch of government; and the power of the LRC to delay the legal effect of administrative regulations adopted by the Governor.
The trial court ruled that each and every questioned statute was constitutionally defective; in effect, ruling in favor of the appellees.
In summary, the court declared that the powers of the LRC were limited to "oversight" and that a statutory attempt to authorize the LRC to conduct the business of the General Assembly was a violation of Kentucky's separation of powers doctrine. The right of the appellants to make certain appointments to boards and commissions was declared invalid for the reason that the power of appointment was an executive function. The right of the LRC to veto executive decisions concerning the administration of the budget was held to be executive in nature and not the subject of proper delegation by the General Assembly. The legislative power of the LRC to approve an executive request for a Federal Block Grant was held to be void because such action constitutes "lawmaking after adjournment of the full General Assembly." The power of the LRC to, in effect, veto a Governor's reorganization plan was similarly held invalid as being the unconstitutional exercise of lawmaking authority following the adjournment of the General Assembly. Finally, the power given to the LRC to delay the effect of executive administrative regulations was declared to be a violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
Subsequent to the entry of the above judgment and following an appropriate motion, this Court, for obvious reasons, transferred this case from the trial court. CR 76.18.
In essence, the appellants, representing the LRC, argue that the LRC is a "legitimate arm" of the General Assembly, and that it may carry out any and all necessary functions of the General Assembly, following the adjournment of the General Assembly. In furtherance of this argument Appellants claim that even though some of the authority given to the LRC under the questioned statutes may be technically executive in nature, such incursion by the legislative branch into the powers of the executive is constitutionally permissible under a so-called "liberal" construction of the Kentucky constitutional provisions creating the separation of powers doctrine.
Predictably, appellees urge that the powers given to the LRC by the statutes constitute far more than mere "oversight" and actually constitute the power to legislate. Moreover, appellees argue that this Court has consistently ruled that the doctrine of the separation of powers in this Commonwealth must be strictly construed and that all such incursions by one branch of government into the sphere of influence of another branch are constitutionally prohibited.
Because the statutes in question grant the LRC much power, authority and responsibility, it will be helpful to discuss the nature of this organization, and to identify its role in the constitutional scheme of the organization of state government.
The parent of the present LRC, The Legislative Council, was given birth by the 1936 session of the General Assembly. 3 It was composed of fifteen members: five Senators appointed by the Lieutenant Governor, five Representatives appointed by the Speaker of the House, and five state officials appointed by the Governor. It was empowered solely to engage in fact-finding. In 1944, the Legislative Council's membership was enlarged to sixteen members, none of whom were appointed by the Governor. 4 The eight Senators and eight Representatives serving were appointed by the Lieutenant Governor and the Speaker of the House, respectively. The Council's powers were expanded to include organizational functions prior to each regular session of the General Assembly. In 1948, the Council was renamed the Legislative Research Commission, and its membership was reduced to seven: the Governor as Chairman, the President Pro Tem of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, and the majority and minority floor leaders of the Senate and the House. 5 Its powers were essentially unchanged. Subsequently, the Lieutenant Governor replaced the Governor as Chairman. 6 In 1974, the Lieutenant Governor was removed as a member and under the present statute all members of the LRC are members of the legislative branch of government. 7
It is patently clear that the LRC as it currently exists, and as it has existed since 1974, is as appellants concede, an "arm" of the General Assembly. It is beyond cavil that the primary role, if not the exclusive role, of the LRC has been historically that of a research, fact-finding, secretariat and general support agency for the General Assembly. Since the LRC's membership consists of a small percentage of the total membership of the two houses of the General Assembly, no one could argue that it has any powers not given to it by its parent, the General Assembly, and no one could argue that it can legislate. The legislative power lies solely within the province of the General Assembly and its entire, publicly elected membership. Our constitution makes that clear. Ky. Const. Sec. 29 states, "[T]he legislative power shall be vested in a House of Representatives and a Senate, which, together shall be styled the 'General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky'." Whatever else the LRC may constitutionally do, it may not legislate. 8
President George Washington, in his farewell address, described the problem which is addressed by the separation of powers doctrine when he said:
The spirit of encroachment [of one branch of government into the functions of another] tends to consolidate the powers of all the departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real despotism. XIII, Writings of George Washington, 277, 306 (Ford ed., N.Y., 1892).
Montesquieu, the father of the doctrine of separation of powers, articulated the concept by writing:
Here then is the fundamental constitution of the government we are treating of. The legislative body being composed of two parts, they check one another by the mutual privilege of rejecting. They are both restrained by the executive power, as the executive is by the legislative. 1 Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, Book XI, Chapter VI, 159 (1823).
The extent to which a country can successfully resolve the conflict among the three branches...
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