Lehmaier v. Interurban St. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 29 January 1904
• Citation: 177 N.Y. 296,69 N.E. 596
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. LEHMAIER v. INTERURBAN ST. RY. CO.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

177 N.Y. 296

69 N.E. 596

PEOPLE ex rel. LEHMAIER

v.INTERURBAN ST. RY. CO.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Jan. 29, 1904.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

Application by the people, on the relation of James S. Lehmaier, for a writ of mandamus to the Interurban Street Railway Company. From an order of the Appellate Division (83 N. Y. Supp. 622) affirming an order of the Special Term denying the writ, relator appeals. Dismissed.

Edward B. Whitney, Henry B. B. Stapler, J. Aspinwall Hodge, George W. Kirchway, and Julius Henry Cohen, for appellant.

Charles F. Brown, Charles A. Collin, Paul D. Cravath, William F. Sheehan, and Henry A. Robinson, for respondent.

O'BRIEN, J.

The relator in this case does not seem to have any grievance of his own, but, in behalf of the public, he applied for a peremptory writ of mandamus requiring the defendant to do certain things which he claimed it is by law bound to do. These things are (1) to carry for one single fare of five cents any passenger desiring to make one continuous trip in either direction between any point on the 8th avenue line owned by the Eighth Avenue Railroad Company, and any point on the 125th street line, owned by the Third Avenue Railroad Company; and (2) upon demand, and without extra charge, to give to each passenger upon either of said lines, paying one single fare, a transfer at the intersection of said lines, at the corner of Eighth avenue and 125th street, entitling such passenger to make a continuous trip from any point on one line to any other point on the other line. The court at Special Term denied the application for the writ, and the order to that effect was unanimously affirmed on appeal. There are two questions presented by the record: One is whether the defendant is under legal obligation to give the transfers specified, and this depends upon the construction of certain sections of the railroad law-particularly section 104 (Laws 1892, p. 1406, c. 676). The other question is, assuming that there is a statutory obligation on the part of the railroad company to give transfers to passengers, such as are specified in the application, whether that duty can be enforced by mandamus.

To state the case in another way, the question presented by this appeal is whether this court has the power to compel the courts below to enforce this statutory obligation, if it exists, by mandamus. That would be the plain effect of a decision of this court reversing the orders of the courts below, since these courts would be obliged to proceed upon the relator's motion and render such judgment as this court may determine should be given in the case. The writ of mandamus is issued only when there is a clear legal right to be enforced, and when there is no other adequate or legal remedy to obtain the relief sought. People ex rel. Gaslight Co. v. Common Council of Syracuse, 78 N. Y. 56;People ex rel. Millard v. Chapin, 104 N. Y. 96, 10 N. E. 141. If the right of the relator to the writ is not clear, or if there was some other adequate legal remedy more appropriate to the case, then the relator had no absolute right to the writ; and, if the courts below were of the opinion that it was inexpedient to grant it under the circumstances, then this court has no right to interfere. It should be observed here that decisions of this court are to be found, made prior to the enactment of the present Constitution, which hold, in effect, that in certain cases it would review an order of the courts below denying the application for a writ of mandamus, even where it was discretionary, or where the discretion of the court below had been abused. If these cases are carefully examined, it will doubtless be found that they were decided at a time when by statute and by the Constitution of the state the jurisdiction of this court was different from what it is now. Since the enactment of the present Constitution the jurisdiction of this court in such matters has been very much abridged. The right of review here of any judgment or order is limited to questions of law, and it has ordinarily nothing to do with questions of discretion or with questions of fact. There may be some cases where the peremptory writ of mandamus is given as a legal right, but obviously in this case the nature of the relief sought is such, and the other legal remedies available to the relator are such, that it would seem to be plain that mandamus is not the proper remedy.

In the first place, if it be true that the railroad company is violating the statute in refusing the transfers, then an action for a penalty of $50 will lie in favor of any individual who has been refused, and also an action to recover any damages which the individual may have sustained in consequence of the illegal...