Lehman v. First National Bank In St. Louis
| Decision Date | 01 October 1934 |
| Docket Number | 4-3536 |
| Citation | 74 S.W.2d 773,189 Ark. 604 |
| Parties | LEHMAN v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK IN ST. LOUIS |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Lawrence Chancery Court, Eastern District; A. S. Irby Chancellor; affirmed.
Decree affirmed.
W. A Jackson and Tom W. Campbell, for appellants.
George H. Steimel, Frauenthal & Johnson and Walter L. Pope, for appellees.
On June 16, 1930, the Randolph State Bank borrowed $ 30,000 from the First National Bank in St. Louis, and as collateral therefor indorsed and delivered to the St. Louis Bank notes payable to the order of the Randolph State Bank for about twice that amount. Among the notes so indorsed and delivered was one executed by R. C. Lehman, which was secured by a deed of trust describing six lots owned by Lehman situated in the towns of Hoxie and Walnut Ridge. Lehman's note was not due at the time of its indorsement and delivery to the St Louis bank as collateral security.
Ben A. Brown, who is a brother-in-law of Lehman, was an active vice president of the Randolph State Bank, and was the trustee in the deed of trust which Lehman had executed. Dr. J. W. Brown, the president of the Randolph State Bank, testified that Ben A. Brown had made the loan to Lehman against the will of the board and the loan committee, and that the loan was not regarded as a satisfactory one.
Ben A. Brown took up with the president of the Randolph State Bank and with Judge J. L. Bledsoe, a director in and the attorney for that bank, the question of releasing from the deed of trust one of the lots described therein as lot 1, block 19, in the town of Hoxie, and in that connection made the following representations to the bank's president and attorney: That this lot 1 was vacant and unimproved, and that Lehman had an opportunity to make an advantageous lease of this lot for a filling station, but that the lease could not be made unless the lot was released from the deed of trust, but that, if it were released, the lease itself would be assigned to the bank, and a new deed of trust would be executed subordinate to the lease. As a matter of fact, lot 1 was not vacant but had a brick garage on it.
There is a conflict in the testimony as to these representations, but we think the testimony clearly established the facts as above stated.
There is a controversy also as to whether Ben A. Brown, in repeating these representations to the president of and the attorney for the bank was acting as Lehman's agent. We think he was if it is of any importance to decide that question, and the effect of the representations is the same as if Lehman himself had made them directly to the president of and attorney for the bank. "One is liable for his agent's fraud and misrepresentations within the apparent scope of his employment, whether he authorized or knew of them or not." DeCamp v. Graupner, 157 Ark. 578, 249 S.W. 6.
There was no other consideration for the release of this lot 1 from the deed of trust, and the president, thinking to improve the security of the bank, consented to the preparation of a release of the lot by the bank's attorney. The release was prepared and executed and later recorded. After the execution of the release a lease was executed by Lehman to O. K. Wing, as trustee, which lease was duly assigned by the lessee to the Phillips Petroleum Company. Thereafter Lehman conveyed this lot 1 to his wife, subject, of course, to the outstanding lease. Lehman and his wife testified that the consideration for the deed from him to her was the partial payment of a debt which Lehman owed his wife.
The Randolph State Bank became insolvent and closed its doors without repaying all of its loan to the St. Louis Bank. Upon the maturity of the Lehman note, payment thereof was demanded, and, upon refusal or failure by Lehman to pay, suit was brought by the St. Louis bank to foreclose the deed of trust given to secure Lehman's note.
There had been no notation upon the margin of the record where the deed of trust was recorded showing that the note which it secured had been transferred or assigned when the release deed was executed on September 13, 1930, but the note had been indorsed and delivered to the St. Louis Bank as above stated, and was in the possession of that bank as collateral when the release deed was executed. The St. Louis bank was not advised of and did not consent to the execution of the release.
Separate answers were filed by Lehman and his wife. He admitted the execution of the note, and did not question the amount due on it, but he alleged that the release had been executed without fraud or misrepresentation on his part, and that he had conveyed the lot for full value to his wife. Mrs. Lehman alleged that she was a subsequent purchaser of the lot within the meaning of § 7399, Crawford & Moses' Digest, and that she had accepted the deed from her husband in good faith in part payment of a debt due from him, and gave testimony to support those allegations.
The court held, in effect, that Mrs. Lehman was not a...
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Purcell v. Vincent
... ... 918, 39 S.W.2d ... [200 S.W.2d 972] ... Lehman v. First National Bank in St. Louis, ... 189 Ark. 604, 74 ... ...
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Robertson v. Robertson
...for valuable consideration'. The transfer of the note carried with it the security--i. e., the mortgage lien. Lehman v. First National Bank, 189 Ark. 604, 74 S.W.2d 773; Purcell v. Vincent, 211 Ark. 489, 200 S.W.2d 970. Thus plaintiff divested himself of ownership of the note and mortgage; ......
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Purcell v. Vincent, 4-8160.
...v. Storthz, 182 Ark. 751, 33 S.W.2d 714; Rockford Trust Co. v. Purtell, 183 Ark. 918, 39 S.W.2d 733; Lehman v. First National Bank in St. Louis, 189 Ark. 604, 74 S.W.2d 773. III. No representations, statements or declarations by appellee tending to mislead appellants were shown by the testi......