Lehman v. Heuston
| Decision Date | 23 April 1913 |
| Citation | 73 Wash. 154,131 P. 825 |
| Parties | LEHMAN v. HEUSTON et al. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 2. Appeal from Superior Court, Pierce County.
Action by Robert B. Lehman against May N. Heuston and others. From a judgment for less than the relief demanded, both parties appeal. Affirmed.
T. W Hammond and E. R. York, both of Tacoma, for plaintiff.
Fletcher & Evans, of Tacoma, and Fenley Bryan, of Seattle, for defendants.
This action was commenced by Robert B. Lehman against May N Heuston, Elizabeth Heuston Huston, and Catharine A. Heuston to recover certain tide lands in Pierce and King counties certain lots in the city of Tacoma, personal property consisting of office furniture and law books and to obtain an accounting. No findings of fact were made, but the trial court entered a decree, dismissing plaintiff's complaint as to the tide lands, awarding plaintiff certain lots in the city of Tacoma, together with the sum of $75, the net proceeds of lots theretofore sold by defendants after deducting disbursements made by defendants for taxes and improvements, and awarding plaintiff the office furniture and law books in dispute. Plaintiff has appealed from that portion of the decree by which his complaint was dismissed as to the tide lands. Defendants have appealed from the remainder of the decree.
As both parties have appealed, we will designate them as plaintiff and defendants. The record and printed briefs are voluminous, the transactions involved extending over a period of more than 10 years. To state the evidence, or completely detail the ultimate facts, which it tends to establish, would require an opinion of interminable length, and serve no good purpose. We have not the benefit of findings made by the trial judge, and now make our own findings.
Relative to the office furniture and law books, we do not think it necessary to make any statement of the evidence. After a careful consideration of the entire record, we conclude that they belonged and were properly awarded to the plaintiff.
Relative to the tide lands, we find the following facts: Prior to 1891, plaintiff, Robert B. Lehman, an attorney at law, was engaged in the practice of his profession in the city of Tacoma. In that year B. F. Heuston, now deceased, then a young attorney of limited means, entered plaintiff's law office, working of plaintiff upon a salary and perhaps for other compensation. From that time until Mr. Heuston's death, which occurred on May 6, 1907, plaintiff and Heuston were, and continued to be, intimate friends, sustaining the most cordial relations. In connection with his practice plaintiff purchased and equipped, at his own expense, an abstract plant, with title and trust features. After 1896, by a readjustment of their business relations, plaintiff devoted most of his time and energies to the abstract business, while Mr. Heuston continued the law business with an office in plaintiff's building, which he occupied without the payment of rent. During this period plaintiff and Mr. Heuston investigated tide lands then owned by the state, and on or about February 17, 1898, plaintiff filed with the land commissioner applications 2720, 2721, and 2722 for the purchase of large tracts of second-class tide lands in Pierce and King counties. On December 10, 1898, plaintiff presented to the land commissioner a further application, No. 2794, for certain tide lands which he and Heuston insisted were second-class tide lands, but which the land department insisted were first-class tide lands. All applications were made in the name of Mr. Lehman, Mr. Heuston acting as his attorney, but they appear to have been jointly and equally interested in the enterprise until December 23, 1899. The land commissioner rejected application 2794, whereupon plaintiff, through Mr. Heuston as his attorney, applied to this court for a writ of mandate, requiring the commissioner to allow its filing. The writ was granted on March 30, 1901 ( State ex rel. Lehman v. Bridges, 24 Wash. 363, 64 P. 518), but subsequent litigation hereinafter mentioned arose relative to the lands included in application 2794. For a number of years plaintiff continued the management of his abstract office, while Mr. Heuston continued the practice of law, their business, professional, and personal relations being intimate. On December 23, 1899, as shown by an executed written agreement, and other papers found to have been in the possession of Mr. Heuston at the date of his death, a settlement was had between the parties, upon which the defendants now rely. This agreement reads as follows: On the same day, December 23, 1899, Mr. Lehman executed written assignments of all the tide land applications to Mr. Heuston. These assignments recite that they were executed for the consideration of $1, and other valuable considerations. In these assignments, Mr. Lehman as party of the first part expressly stipulated and agreed to execute any further assignment or transfer of any such contract or interest at the request of the party of the second part, his heirs, or assigns. From this time until Mr. Heuston's death, the management, control, and sale of these tide lands appear to have been in the exclusive charge of Mr. Heuston, save and except that on several occasions he would request the plaintiff to execute contracts and deeds to third parties for lands involved in the pending litigation, which was being conducted in Mr. Lehman's name, and that plaintiff did execute such instruments. The litigation mentioned arose relative to tide lands near Seattle and Tacoma, which plaintiff and Heuston claimed were second-class lands, but which other parties to the litigation insisted were first class, and it was while this litigation was pending that a number of interested parties, desiring to quiet their titles, negotiated with Heuston for deeds and releases, many of which, at Heuston's request, were executed by Lehman, the party in whose name the litigation was pending. The consideration for these deeds paid by the third parties, which amounted to a very considerable figure, was received and retained by Heuston, with the exception of parhaps $150, which plaintiff concedes he at one time received. The assignments of the applications to Heuston, executed by Lehman, subsequent deeds from the state to Heuston, various deeds exeucted by Lehman and by Heuston to third parties, deeds for tide lands sold by Heuston after 1899, and also deeds executed by May N. Heuston, his widow and legatee, were from time to time filed and recorded in the offices of the auditors of King and Pierce counties. Mr. Heuston died testate on May 6, 1907, having devised to his widow the tide lands and the city lots, and having named her as his executrix. It may be noted, however, that none of the real estate was described in the will. The will was probated on May 20, 1907, at which time the plaintiff appeared in court and testified as a witness to its execution. The estate was settled, and final distribution of the tide lands and lots which had been returned in the inventory was made to the defendant May N. Heuston on May 1, 1909. At no time did Mr. Lehman present any claim to the estate. In this action plaintiff claims that all interests acquired by Mr. Heuston in the tide lands under the various assigned applications were obtained equally for Mr. Heuston and plaintiff; that such joint interest and ownership continued until Mr. Heuston's death, and at all times thereafter; that the assignments of the applications which plaintiff made on December 23, 1899, were made without other consideration than for the purpose of enabling Heuston as attorney for himself and plaintiff to handle the tide lands, raise funds to pay the purchase money to the state, to act at all times equally for himself and plaintiff; that plaintiff had no knowledge of the fact that Heuston was handling the tide lands as his own, or that he was receiving any money from their sale, or from settlements, further than was necessary to pay the state, and meet taxes and other necessary disbursements; that, in fact, B. F. Heuston during his lifetime and the defendant May N. Heuston, his widow, since his death, have realized upwards to $40,000 from settlements and sales in excess of such necessary disbursements; that the record title to tide lands, of the value of $40,000 or more, above mentioned, now stands in the name of the defendant May N. Heuston, who claims exclusive ownership; that the plaintiff did not discover these facts until after final settlement of the estate; that upon receiving his first intimation of these conditions he immediately entered upon an investigation, and that...
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