Lehr v. Sierra Ambulance Serv., Corp.
| Decision Date | 07 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:18-CV-831 AWI BAM |
| Parties | ERIN LEHR, Plaintiff v. SIERRA AMBULANCE SERVICE, a California corporation, and DOES 1-50, inclusive, Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND AND REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
This is an employment civil rights dispute between Plaintiff Erin Lehr ("Lehr") and her former employer, Sierra Ambulance Service ("SAS"). Lehr alleges that SAS committed wrongful termination in violation of public policy, violated four separate sections of California Government Code § 12940 et seq. (the Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA")), and violated California Business & Professions Code § 17000 et. seq. (the Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"). SAS removed this matter from the Madera County Superior Court on June 15, 2018 on the basis federal question jurisdiction through the "complete preemption" effect of 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA § 301"). Currently before the Court is Lehr's motion to remand and request for attorney's fees. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted, fees will be awarded, and this case will be remanded back to the Madera County Superior Court forthwith.
In 2009, Lehr began her employment with SAS as a part-time emergency medical technician.
In 2012, Lehr applied for but was denied a full time position. Although Lehr was the most qualified applicant, SAS retaliated against Lehr because her husband, who had also been an employee with SAS, had successfully appealed a termination in 2011.2 Later in 2012, the person hired for the full time position quit and SAS was forced to hire Lehr full time.
On August 29, 2016, Lehr was injured and required a temporary medical leave of absence. Lehr submitted the appropriate paperwork to SAS. Lehr had never received any written warnings or negative performance reviews and was a model employee. Despite this, SAS did not give Lehr the opportunity to return from her temporary disability and terminated her on August 9, 2017. The termination was retaliatory for Lehr taking a medical leave of absence. SAS terminated Lehr without engaging in an interactive process and without providing a reasonable accommodation.
Lehr's employment was governed by a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between Lehr's union and SAS. See Guzman Dec. ¶ 3. On August 16, 2017, Lehr filed a grievance in conformity with the CBA and grieved her termination "while being on a medical [leave of absence]." Id. at ¶ 5. Prior to her termination, SAS offered Lehr the opportunity to return to work, but without seniority pursuant to the CBA. See id. at ¶ 6. Lehr did not attend the hearing with respect to the first stage of the grievance procedure and later withdrew the grievance without prejudice and without accepting the offer to return to work. See id. at ¶ 7.
The removal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1441) is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Hansen v. Group Healthcare Coop., 902 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2018); Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010). It is presumed that a case liesoutside the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction. Geographic Expeditions, 599 F.3d at 1106-07; Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009). "The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction" means that "the court resolves all ambiguity in favor of remand to state court." Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1042; Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). That is, federal jurisdiction over a removed case "must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance." Geographic Expeditions, 599 F.3d at 1107; Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. "If at any time prior to judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Corona-Contreras v. Gruel, 857 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2017). Remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) "is mandatory, not discretionary," Bruns v. NCUA, 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997), so a district court "must remand if [it] lacks jurisdiction." Kelton Arms Condo. Owners Ass'n v. Homestead Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003).
"The presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the 'well-pleaded complaint rule,' which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Rainero v. Archcon Corp., 844 F.3d 832, 837 (9th Cir. 2016). Under the "well-pleaded complaint" rule, courts look to what "necessarily appears in the plaintiff's statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything in anticipation of avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose." California v. United States, 215 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000). "[A] case may not be removed on the basis of a federal defense . . . even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff's complaint and both parties concede that the federal defense is the only question truly at issue." Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); Wayne v. DHL Worldwide Express, 294 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2002). The "artful pleading doctrine" is a corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule, and prohibits a plaintiff from avoiding federal jurisdiction "by omitting from the complaint allegations of federal law that are essential to the establishment of his claim." Lippitt v. Raymond James Fin. Serv., 340 F.3d 1033, 1041 (9th Cir. 2003). "Complete preemption," which refers to federal laws that preempt state-law causes of action and substitutes an exclusive federalcause of action in its place, is the most common method of "artful pleading." Hansen., 902 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2018). A state law claim that is "completely preempted" is considered from its inception a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law. Valles v. Ivy Hill Corp., 410 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2005). Section 301 of the LMRA "completely preempts" state law claims. See Hansen, 902 F.3d at 1058; Valles, 410 F.3d at 1076.
Lehr argues that none of her claims provide a basis for removal under LMRA § 301. Rather, each of the claims arise from an independent state law. The FEHA protections are unwaivable, and what is alleged is a refusal to provide medical leave and retaliation for requesting it. The Ninth Circuit has recognized on numerous occasions that FEHA claims are not preempted by LMRA § 301. Because there is no reasonable basis for removable, remanded is required and Defendants should pay attorney's fees of $7,200.
In reply, Lehr argues that she is not complaining about or raising any issues regarding seniority. Rather, her claims are bout a wrongful termination and retaliation regarding disability/medical leave. As part of her reply, Lehr submitted a declaration in which she explains she filed a grievance with her union about the termination because she thought that all wrongful terminations were governed by the CBA, she did not grieve her seniority, and she merely included the 2012 failure to promote allegations to show a pattern of retaliation by SAS. See Lehr Dec. ¶¶ 2-4. Further, Lehr's opposition states that the Complaint's reference to the 2012 failure to promote is not an attempt to complain about the promotion, rather it is evidence to help show that a reasonable person in Lehr's position would not accept an offer of reinstatement.
SAS argues that each of Lehr's claims requires the interpretation of the CBA and thus, are completely preempted by LMRA § 301. Lehr's employment was governed by the CBA, which included a three part grievance procedure. Lehr exercised that procedure by submitting a grievance regarding her termination. However, Lehr withdrew her grievance and did not completethe process. Further, she refused an offer to return to work, but without seniority, as required by the CBA. Article 9 of the CBA contains specific provisions governing seniority, disability and personal leave, and licensing and qualifications. These aspects of the CBA are intertwined with Lehr's allegations. Lehr was offered a reasonable accommodation through the opportunity to return to work with the same benefits and pay, but without seniority. Lehr's claims cannot be adjudicated without application and interpretation of Article 9. Because the seniority policy in Article 9 is inextricably intertwined with each of Lehr's claims, this is not a case in which the CBA will merely be referenced. Further, even if the Court remands this matter, attorney's fees are not appropriate because there is an objectively reasonable basis for arguing that complete preemption applies.
Under § 301 of the LMRA, "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce . . . or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a); Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007). "Although the text of § 301 contains only a jurisdictional grant, the Supreme Court has interpreted it to compel the complete preemption of state law claims brought to enforce collective bargaining agreements . . . [as well as] cases the resolution of which 'is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of [a collective bargaining agreement].'" Valles v. Ivy Hill Corp., 410 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005). "The Supreme Court has held in a variety of contexts that § 301 acts to preempt state law claims that substantially depend on the [collective bargaining agreement], that are premised on negotiable or waivable state law duties the content of which have...
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