Leibovitz v. New York City Transit Authority
| Decision Date | 05 May 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-CV-3860.,95-CV-3860. |
| Citation | 4 F.Supp.2d 144 |
| Parties | Diane LEIBOVITZ, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Steel Bellman Ritz & Clark by Merrick T. Rossein, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.
Martin B. Schnabel, New York City Transit Authority by Barbara Neale, Metropolitan Transportation Authority, Rhonda Moll, New York, NY, for Defendant.
Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 146
II. FACTS .............................................................. 146
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY ................................................. 147
IV. LAW ................................................................ 147
A. Standards of Review ............................................. 147
B. Hostile Work Environment ........................................ 148
1. Aggrieved Party .............................................. 148
a. As a Standing Limitation .................................. 148
b. As a Substantive Element .................................. 150
2. Evidence Supporting the Damages Award ........................ 153
3. Employer Liability ........................................... 153
V. CONCLUSION ........................................................... 154
I. INTRODUCTION
This is a pristine hostile work environment case. The plaintiff, herself a highly-regarded member of middle management, was always treated appropriately and with respect by her co-workers and by her employer. She was never discriminated against on the basis of sex, nor was she personally the target of inappropriate sexual behavior. There was, however, evidence of sexual harassment of other women in her shop that caused her emotional distress. Whether this was sufficient to create an actionable claim for hostile work environment appears to be an issue of first impression.
Plaintiff Diane Leibovitz sued the New York City Transit Authority and two of its officials, Joseph Hoffman and Monroe Easter, alleging sexual harassment and retaliation under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and parallel New York state statutory and constitutional provisions.
Plaintiff's constitutional claims were dismissed at the end of trial. The statutory claims were presented to a jury. Only the defendant Transit Authority was held liable on the claim that it violated plaintiff's rights by its "deliberate indifference to widespread discriminatory practices and sexual misconduct against others." The jury awarded $60,000 in damages.
The defendant made timely motions under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50(b), 59(a) and (e), and 54(d)(1) for a directed verdict, a new trial, and remittitur. These motions are denied. Judgment is entered for the plaintiff for $60,000 without costs or disbursements.
II. FACTS
Plaintiff is a Deputy Superintendent for the New York City Transit Authority. She joined the Authority in September of 1985 as a manager in Budget and Administration. At her own request, she was assigned to a car inspection and cleaning shop where the events in question took place.
There was no problem of a sexually harassing or gender-biased nature until approximately September of 1993. It was then that plaintiff learned that Velma Lorrick, a female car cleaner, was accusing Deputy Superintendent Russ Woodley of sexual harassment. Plaintiff questioned other female employees and was told that another woman, Joann Medina, who was allegedly harassed by Mr. Woodley, had been transferred. It was conceded that much of the alleged harassment did not occur in plaintiff's immediate vicinity and much of what she knew about the situation was second- or third-hand.
Plaintiff almost immediately spoke with Woodley; with Lenny Axelrod, Manager of Labor Relations, Division of Car Equipment, Department of Rapid Transit Operations; with Pat Davis, Director of the Car Equipment Personnel Department; and with Charles Velotta, Senior Labor Relations Director. There was evidence of a delay in the Authority's investigation of plaintiffs allegations. There was also testimony that the Assistant Chief Mechanical Officer for the North Division, Frank Raia, advised plaintiff that her complaints could be detrimental to her career.
The Authority presented proof of its procedural mechanisms for investigating and addressing harassment complaints. It did ultimately investigate the complaints and reach internal determinations on their merits.
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The parties agreed that a charge to the jury consolidating the federal and state claims was desirable. The charge addressed plaintiff's allegations that her place of employment was so permeated with sexual discrimination that it interfered with her personal right to a gender-bias-free environment.
The jury was instructed that:
Plaintiff .... claims that she was the victim of sex discrimination adverse to herself in that the Transit Authority was deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment generally. The plaintiff must show that her workplace was so permeated with discriminatory sexual behavior that was so severe or pervasive that it altered the conditions of her own employment, and created an abusive working environment for her. To be pervasive, the incidents of discrimination must be repeated and substantially continue over a substantial period of time.
The jury answered "Yes" to the question on the verdict sheet: "Did defendant New York City Transit Authority violate plaintiff Diane Leibovitz's rights by its deliberate indifference to widespread discriminatory practices and sexual misconduct against others?" It awarded her $60,000 for "Damages to date." No damages were awarded for future injury.
IV. LAW
Defendant contends that the verdict reached by the jury was not supported by the evidence. Specifically, it argues that (1) plaintiff was not an aggrieved party within the protections of Title VII because she herself was not directly harassed; (2) the jury's verdict that there was an abusive working environment or that plaintiff was injured to the extent she claims was against the weight of the evidence; and (3) there was no proof that the Authority was deliberately indifferent to a violation of plaintiff's rights. Under Rules 50(b) and 59(a), defendant seeks a new trial, reduced judgment or a judgment in its favor.
Rule 50(b) authorizes a court, upon receiving a jury verdict and entering a judgment, to allow the judgment to stand, order a new trial, or direct entry of judgment as a matter of law contrary to the verdict. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b). Rule 59 permits a new trial to be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a). Rule 59 also authorizes remittitur. Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a).
Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate if there is "either an utter lack of evidence supporting the verdict, so that the jury's findings could only have resulted from pure guess-work, or the evidence is `so overwhelming that reasonable and fair-minded persons could only have reached the opposite result.'" Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Weible, 92 F.3d 108, 111-12 (2d Cir.1996) (quoting Baskin v. Hawley, 807 F.2d 1120, 1129 (2d Cir. 1986)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 767, 136 L.Ed.2d 713 (1997).
A new trial may be granted when the trial judge "is convinced that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice." Smith v. Lightning Bolt Prods., Inc., 861 F.2d 363, 370 (2d Cir.1988). "Where the resolution of the issues depended on assessment of the credibility of witnesses, it is proper for the court to refrain from setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial." Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 363 (2d Cir.1992). Defendant's contention that the award was excessive is dealt with in Part IV B 2, infra.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from discriminating "against any individual with respect to ... compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's ... sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). It makes unlawful sexual harassment on both "quid pro quo" and hostile work environment grounds. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986); Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 345 (2d Cir.1998). Quid pro quo harassment is based upon direct harassment —unwelcome sexual activities, advances, innuendos, and the like. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986); Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 345-46 (2d Cir. 1998). Sexual harassment through a hostile work environment is less direct but no less egregious; it exists where there is a work environment that is sexually intimidating, hostile or otherwise offensive. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986); Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 346-47 (2d Cir.1998).
Sexual harassment claims brought under Section 296 of the New York Executive Law — that state's Human Rights Law — are treated in a manner virtually identical to those brought under Title VII. See Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 344 (2d Cir. 1998); Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., 95 F.3d 1170, 1177 (2d Cir.1996); Tomka v. Seiler Corp. 66 F.3d 1295, 1304 n. 4 (2d Cir.1995). An analysis of plaintiff's Title VII claims is therefore sufficient under both the state and the federal statutes.
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Texas Commission on Human Rights Act : Procedures and Remedies
...at him or her, but which adversely affects his or her terms and conditions of employment. See Leibovitz v. N.Y.C. Trans. Auth. , 4 F. Supp.2d 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), rev’d , 252 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2001). Leibovitz sued her employer for sexual harassment on the ground that the employer’s deliber......
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Texas Commission on Human Rights Act: Procedures and Remedies
...directed at him or her, but which adversely affects his or her terms and conditions of employment. See Leibovitz v. N.Y.C. Trans. Auth., 4 F. Supp.2d 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), rev’d, 252 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2001). Leibovitz sued her employer for sexual harassment on the ground that the employer’s ......
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Texas commission on human rights act: procedures and remedies
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