Funk v. F & K Supply, Inc.

• Decision Date: 09 March 1999
• Docket Number: No. 95-CV-637.,No. 95-CV-1065.,95-CV-637.,95-CV-1065.
• Citation: 43 F.Supp.2d 205
• Parties: Shirleyanne FUNK, Plaintiff, v. F & K SUPPLY, INC., Fowler & Keith Supply Co., Fowler & Keith Supply Co., Inc., and Steve Aaron, Defendants. Linda Michetti, Plaintiff, v. F & K Supply, Inc., Fowler & Keith Supply Co., Fowler & Keith Supply Co., Inc., and Steve Aaron, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

43 F.Supp.2d 205

Shirleyanne FUNK, Plaintiff, v. F & K SUPPLY, INC., Fowler & Keith Supply Co., Fowler & Keith Supply Co., Inc., and Steve Aaron, Defendants.

Linda Michetti, Plaintiff, v. F & K Supply, Inc., Fowler & Keith Supply Co., Fowler & Keith Supply Co., Inc., and Steve Aaron, Defendants.

No. 95-CV-637.

No. 95-CV-1065.

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

March 9, 1999.

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Office of Jerold Slate, Poughkeepsie, NY (Jerold S. Slate, of counsel), for plaintiffs.

L'Abbate, Balkan, Colavita & Contini, L.L.P., Garden City, NY (Mercedes Colwin, of counsel), for defendants.

MEMORANDUM — DECISION & ORDER

McAVOY, Chief Judge.

Pending before the Court are plaintiffs' and defendants' post-trial motions in this sex discrimination case. Defendants move for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 50(b), or, alternatively, a new trial pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 59(a). Plaintiffs oppose defendants' motion, and move in their own right for attorneys' fees, expenses and costs.

For the reasons that follow, defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part, and plaintiffs' motion is granted as modified herein.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Shirleyanne Funk and Linda Michetti are former employees of defendant F & K Supply, Inc. ("F & K Supply")¹, a building supply business located in Kingston, New York. Each plaintiff alleges that while she was employed at F & K Supply, F & K's president and sole shareholder, defendant Steven Aaron ("Aaron"), sexually harassed her. After quitting F & K Supply, each brought a lawsuit in 1995, which the magistrate judge consolidated. Each Complaint presented claims against F & K Supply and Aaron under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), and the New York State Human Rights Law ("HRL"), codified at N.Y.EXEC.L. § 290 et seq., for hostile work environment sexual harassment and sex-based constructive discharge. Additionally, each Complaint pressed a common-law claim against Aaron for intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED").

A jury trial on plaintiffs' claims was held between April 13, 1998 and April 21, 1998 in Albany, New York. At the close of plaintiffs' proof, the court granted defendants' Rule 50(a) motion seeking dismissal of plaintiffs' claims against Aaron under Title VII. See Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2d Cir.1995). On April 21, 1998, the jury returned its verdict in favor of each plaintiff on the remaining Title VII, HRL and IIED claims. As compensatory damages, the jury awarded as follows: $885,000 to Funk, representing $850,000 for emotional pain and anguish and $35,000 for lost wages and benefits; and $465,000 to Michetti, representing $450,000 for emotional pain and anguish and $15,000 for lost wages and benefits. The jury also concluded that both Funk and Michetti were entitled to punitive damages against defendants. A punitive damage hearing was held in Albany, New York on June 6 and 7, 1998. The jury awarded each plaintiff the amounts of $50,000 and $1 against Aaron and F & K Supply, respectively.

Now before the Court are each sides' post-trial motions.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Defendants' Post-Trial motion

Defendants move for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 50(b), or, alternatively, a new trial pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 59(a).

With regard to their motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(b), defendants assert that they are entitled to dismissal of the following: (1) Michetti's claim under Title VII because she did not file a timely charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"); (2) Funk's and Michetti's claims under Title VII and the HRL because neither proved at trial that Aaron's conduct was sex-based; (3) Funk's and Michetti's claims of IIED because (i) an IIED claim is not cognizable in connection with claims under Title VII or the HRL; (ii) neither plaintiff sufficiently pleaded an IIED claim; (iii) neither plaintiff proved an IIED claim at trial; and (4) Michetti's claim of IIED because it is barred by the statute of limitations.

Alternatively, defendants seek, pursuant to Rule 59(a), a new trial on the grounds that: (1) plaintiffs improperly introduced evidence of insurance at trial; (2) the verdict sheet was defective; and (3) the jury's damage awards are grossly excessive.

1. The Standard under Rule 50(b)

The Second Circuit has established the standard for granting judgment as a matter of law. The court in Mattivi v. South African Marine Corp., 618 F.2d 163 (2d Cir.1980), stated that:

The trial court cannot assess the weight of conflicting evidence, pass on the credibility of the witnesses, or substitute its judgment for that of the jury. Rather, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party (giving the non-movant the benefit of all reasonable inferences), the trial court should grant a judgment n.o.v. only when (1) there is such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury's findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or (2) there is such an overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of the movant that reasonable and fair minded men could not arrive at a verdict against him. Id., at 167-68; see also Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 214 (2d Cir.1997); Samuels v. Air Transp. Local 504, 992 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir.1993); Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 717 F.2d 683, 688-89 (2d Cir.1983).² Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the procedure for granting judgment as a matter of law by motion made before the jury retires pursuant to Rule 50(a), or motion after the jury has spoken pursuant to Rule 50(b). FED.R.CIV.P. 50; see also Samuels, 992 F.2d at 14.

2. Title VII

(i) Did Michetti satisfy the EEOC filing requirements?

Defendants first contend that because Michetti did not file a timely administrative charge of discrimination with the EEOC, her claim under Title VII, along with her state law claims (i.e., her HRL and IIED claims), which rely upon supplemental jurisdiction, must be dismissed as a matter of law.

It is well established that Title VII requires a claimant who desires to bring a suit in federal court to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days "after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred," or within 300 days of the alleged discrimination if the claimant "has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief ... or to institute criminal proceedings." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Generally, a failure to file a timely charge with the EEOC requires dismissal of the Title VII claim as time-barred. See, e.g., Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982). However, this timely-filing requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but rather, a requirement that functions like a statute of limitations. Id.; Karen Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 80 F.3d 708, 712 (2d Cir.1996). Thus, it is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. Zipes, 455 U.S. at 393, 102 S.Ct. 1127; Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 765 (2d Cir.1998).

In the present case, Michetti filed a charge with the EEOC on April 26, 1995. Her charge alleged discriminatory conduct by defendants, the most recent of which occurred on June 4, 1994. Thus, her administrative charge was filed more than 300 days³ after the last alleged unlawful employment practice.

Nonetheless, Michetti's claim under Title VII is not time-barred for two independent reasons. First, as the statutory timely-filing requirement with the EEOC functions as a statute of limitations, see Quinn, 159 F.3d at 765, it follows that the defense is waived if not set forth in the responsive pleading. See FED.R.CIV.P. 8(c); Zipes, 455 U.S. at 393, 102 S.Ct. 1127 ("We hold that filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.") (emphasis added); Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb Inc., 967 F.2d 742, 751-52 (2d Cir.1992) ("A claim that a statute of limitations bars a suit is an affirmative defense, and, as such, it is waived if not raised in the answer to the complaint."); see also discussion infra at II(A)(4)(ii) and cases cited therein. As defendants did not affirmatively plead that Michetti failed to file a timely administrative charge with the EEOC, they have waived this defense.

Second, assuming arguendo that defendants have not waived the defense, the single filing (or piggybacking) rule excuses Michetti's failure to make a timely EEOC filing. The single filing rule, adopted by the Second Circuit in Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d 1094, 1100-01 (2d Cir.1986), allows, under certain circumstances, a non-filing or untimely-filing plaintiff to join the lawsuit of one who has filed a timely charge with the EEOC. As explained by this Circuit in Tolliver v. Xerox Corp., 918 F.2d 1052, 1056-58 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 983, 111 S.Ct. 1641, 113 L.Ed.2d 736 (1991), the standard to apply "for determining whether an administrative charge suffices to permit piggybacking by a subsequent plaintiff' depends on the size of the work unit. Under the "broader" test, which applies "[w]here the grievances arise in a work unit of modest size, ... mere similarity of the grievances within the same general time frame suffices to permit the `single filing rule.'" Id. at 1058. "However, where the grievances are alleged to arise throughout a large group," a narrower test applies requiring the administrative claim give notice that the discrimination "affects a group...