Leighton v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., Case No. 1:16-cv-20507-KMM

• Decision Date: 05 April 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:16-cv-20507-KMM
• Parties: BRIAN LEIGHTON, Plaintiff, v. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

BRIAN LEIGHTON, Plaintiff, v. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD., Defendant.

Case No. 1:16-cv-20507-KMM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

April 5, 2016

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant Royal Caribbean Cruises, LTD.'s ("Defendant" or "RCCL") Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration (ECF No. 7) and Plaintiff Brian Leighton's ("Plaintiff" or "Leighton") Motion for Remand (ECF No. 9) and related Responses (ECF Nos. 8; 16) and Replies (ECF Nos. 13; 17). The Motions are now ripe for review. UPON CONSIDERATION of the Motions, the pertinent portions of the record, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, for the reasons set forth below, the Court now GRANTS Defendant's Motion and DENIES Plaintiff's Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Brian Leighton is a Jamaican citizen and legal permanent resident of the United States who was formerly employed as a seaman by RCCL, a corporation with its principal place of business in Miami, Florida. Plaintiff served as a provision storekeeper aboard RCCL's vessel the Explorer of the Seas. The terms of Plaintiff's employment was governed by a Sign on Employment Agreement ("SOEA") between the parties that covers the relevant periods of this cause of action. See SOEA (ECF No. 7-2). The SOEA contains the following arbitration provision:

All grievances and any other dispute whatsoever, whether in contract, regulatory, statutory, common law, tort or otherwise relating to or in any way connected with the Seafarer's service for the Owners/Company under the present Agreement, including but not limited to claims for personal injury/disability or death, no matter how described, pleaded, or styled, and whether asserted against the Owners/Company, Master, Employer, Ship Owner, vessel or vessel operator, shall be referred to and resolved exclusively by mandatory binding arbitration pursuant to the United Nations Conventions on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York 1958), 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. ("The Convention") . . . .

Id. at p. 4, ¶ 1. The SOEA also dictated that any arbitration shall take place in Miami, Florida, Oslo, Norway, or in any location agreed by the Owners/Company and the Seafarer, with the procedural and substantive law of the proceeding being the law of Norway. Id. ¶ 3. Plaintiff signed the SOEA certifying that he had read, understood, and agreed to its terms. Id. at p. 5.

In December 2013, while working aboard the Explorer of the Seas, Plaintiff suffered severe injuries to his back while lifting a box of frozen meat. Compl. ¶ 13 (ECF No. 1-4). Plaintiff sued RCCL in the Circuit Court for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida for Jones Act negligence (Count I), unseaworthiness (Count II), failure to timely provide entire maintenance and cure (Count III), failure to treat (Count IV) and wages and penalties (Count V). RCCL removed the case to this Court, asserting federal question jurisdiction under the Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the "Convention"), codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 202-208 (the "Convention Act"). See Notice of Removal (ECF No. 1). RCCL now seeks to dismiss the case and compel arbitration, arguing that pursuant to the SOEA, Plaintiff must submit his claims to arbitration under Norwegian law. See Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 7). In response and in his Motion for Remand (ECF No. 9), Plaintiffargues the Convention is inapplicable because he and RCCL are both United States citizens and their legal relationship does not present an adequate nexus to a foreign state.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

It is well established that Congress, through the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), created a "strong federal policy in favor of arbitration." Picard v. Credit Solutions, Inc., 564 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2009); see also Musnick v. King Motor Co. of Fort Lauderdale, 325 F.3d 1255, 1258 (11th Cir. 2003). Therefore, "[q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration." Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991). Under this liberal policy, it is the duty of courts to "rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate." Klay v. All Defendants, 389 F.3d 1191, 1200 (11th Cir. 2004). Further, "[t]he New York Convention is incorporated into federal law by the FAA." Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434, 1440 (11th Cir. 1998).

In deciding whether to compel arbitration under the Convention Act, courts must only engage in a "very limited inquiry." Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257, 1275 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2005)). This is "an inquiry colored by a strong preference for arbitration." Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1301; see also Escobar v. Celebration Cruise Operator, Inc., 805 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 2015) (noting that "a district court must be mindful that the Convention Act generally establishes a strong presumption in favor of arbitration of international commercial disputes") (internal quotation marks omitted).

Section 205 of the Convention Act provides federal courts with removal jurisdiction over actions relating "to an arbitration agreement . . . falling under the Convention." 9 U.S.C. § 205.An agreement is governed by the Convention when the following four jurisdictional requirements are met: (1) there is an agreement to arbitrate in writing; (2) the agreement provides for arbitration in the territory of a signatory to the Convention; (3) the agreement arises out of a commercial, legal relationship; and (4) a party to the agreement is not an American citizen, or where all parties to the agreement are American citizens and their commercial relationship "involves property located abroad, envisages performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with one or more foreign states." Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1294, n.7 (citation and quotation omitted); 9 U.S.C. § 202. Once these prerequisites are met a court must compel arbitration, unless one of the Convention's affirmative defenses applies. Lindo, 652 F.3d at 1276.

There is no dispute among the parties that the first three jurisdictional requirements are met. However, the parties disagree on matters involving both clauses of the fourth jurisdictional prerequisite. As to the first clause, Plaintiff contends his status as a legal permanent resident of the United States equates to citizenship for purposes of Section 202 of the Convention. Thus, Plaintiff argues that since he and RCCL are both United States citizens, the SOEA falls outside the Convention and this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to compel the case to arbitration. Regarding the second clause, Plaintiff argues that his employment relationship with RCCL lacks a sufficient foreign nexus to bring it within the confines of the Convention.

RCCL first argues that Plaintiff's status as a Jamaican citizen and legal permanent resident of the United States does meet the fourth jurisdictional prerequisite that one of the parties lack American citizenship. In support, RCCL relies on a definition from the United States Citizenship and Immigrations Services ("USCIS") website to distinguish citizenship from lawful permanent residency. Alternatively, assuming that the Court deems Plaintiff an Americancitizen, RCCL then argues that the SOEA "envisaged performance abroad" and this matter should be compelled to arbitration. In short, this issue boils down to whether the fourth jurisdictional requirement is met. As either clause of the fourth jurisdictional requirement is sufficient to compel a matter to arbitration under the Convention, the Court finds that the clearer path to resolution lies with holding that Plaintiff is not a "citizen" for purposes of Section 202.

1. Plaintiff's Citizenship Status

Plaintiff's "citizenship" argument relies on a case from the Eastern District of Missouri that determined the proper test for establishing citizenship under Section 202 was to apply the broad definition used in the federal diversity statute. N. Motors, Inc. v. Knudsen, No. 4:10-CV-1317 CEJ, 2011 WL 2552573, at *3 (E.D. Mo. June 27, 2011). Under that definition, "an alien admitted to the United States for permanent residence shall be deemed a citizen of the State in which such alien is domiciled." Id. However, this statutory language was eliminated in 2011 through the passage of the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-63, 125 Stat. 758 (the "Clarification Act"). See H.K. Huilin Int'l Trade Co. v. Kevin Multiline Polymer Inc., 907 F. Supp. 2d 284, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (discussing legislative history of the Clarification Act).

Moreover, the Court is unpersuaded by the logic Knudsen employed and notes that no other court has followed suit most likely because "citizen" has a plain and unambiguous meaning.¹ See Cox Enterprises, Inc. v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 666 F.3d 697, 704 (11th Cir. 2012) ("When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous we must apply thatmeaning."); Broward Gardens Tenants Ass'n v. U.S. E.P.A, 311 F.3d 1066, 1074 (11th Cir. 2002) ("When the import of the statute's language is clear, we need not resort to legislative history, and we never do so to undermine the plain meaning of clear statutory language."); Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 1997) ("When the words of a statute are unambiguous . . . judicial inquiry is complete."). This strong deference is necessary because "we must presume that Congress said what it meant and meant what it said." United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc).

Courts determine the plainness or ambiguity of statutory language "by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole."...