Leighton v. Sheldon

• Decision Date: 01 January 1871
• Citation: 16 Minn. 214
• Parties: SARAH F. LEIGHTON and Husband v. THEODORE B. SHELDON.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

16 Minn. 214

SARAH F. LEIGHTON and Husband

v. THEODORE B. SHELDON.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court, Goodhue county, denying a new trial.

Ives & Skillman, with J. W. Steel, for appellant.

W. Colvill, with J. C. McClure, for respondents.

BERRY, J.

This is an action in the nature of trover. The complaint alleges, in substance, that the plaintiffs are, and for more than 15 years last past have been, husband and wife; that at the time of the alleged conversion of the goods in controversy, and for more than six months prior thereto, the said Sarah was and had been the owner of said goods, and that she acquired the same by purchase after her marriage, but that the same were not by the terms of the purchase secured to her sole and separate use, nor did the instrument of conveyance thereof, nor any instrument of conveyance of any part thereof, contain a power of disposition, by deed, will, or otherwise, of the whole or any part thereof; but that the same, and every part thereof, was conveyed to and held by her subject to the marital rights of her husband; that on or about June 11, 1869, the said Sarah, being in possession of said goods, stored the same with the defendant, a warehouseman; that on the twelfth day of July, 1869, she demanded said goods of said defendant, at the same time tendering to him five dollars, being the price of the storage, as stated by defendant, and a full compensation therefor, and that defendant wrongfully refused to deliver said goods to said Sarah, in consequence of which she has been damaged to the value of said goods, etc.

The answer denies all the foregoing allegations, except that defendant is a warehouseman, and sets up the execution by said Sarah of a chattel mortgage upon the goods in favor of one Christina Rice; the default of said Sarah in performing the condition thereof; the taking of possession of said goods by said mortgagee under said mortgage; with other matters not important to be detailed.

The complaint is evidently framed with the idea that the goods in question are the property of the said Sarah, and her husband is joined with her as a formal party. The complaint does not stop with an averment of her ownership, but proceeds to show the origin of it, and the principal question in the case is whether in so doing the pleader has shown title in her or in her husband. If in the latter, we are of opinion that she has shown herself out of court; but if in herself, the complaint would appear to state a good cause of action. It is manifest, from the pleadings and other proceedings appearing in the paper book, that the plaintiff Sarah claims to be owner of the goods in question under the provisions of sections 2 and 3, c. 69, Gen. St., while the defendant contends that under the same sections the goods are the property of her husband.

These sections, so far as important to be considered, read as follows:

Sec. 2. "Any person capable in law of making a deed or will, including the husband, may convey, devise, or bequeath to any married woman any property or estate to be held by her, without the intervention of a trustee, to her sole and separate use, free from the control or interference of her husband, such conveyance containing a power of disposition by deed, will, or otherwise. * * *"

Sec. 3. "Whenever any property is secured to the sole and separate use of a married woman, or conveyed, devised, or bequeathed to her, pursuant to any of the foregoing provisions, she shall, in respect to all such property, and the rents, issues, and profits thereof, have the same rights and powers, and be entitled to the same remedies in her own name, and be subject to the same obligations, as a feme sole. She may convey or devise the same, except as provided in section 1, without the consent of her husband, and without joining with him in any deed of conveyance of such property," etc.

Section 1, referred to, relates to property owned by a woman before marriage, or acquired by her after marriage by descent; and there are other sections of the chapter recognizing and declaring other ways in which a married woman may acquire and hold property to her sole and separate use, free from any right in or over the same on the part of her husband.

But in this case we have no concern with any portion of the chapter except sections 2 and 3; for, as before remarked, the plaintiff Sarah claims under these only.

The inquiry, then, is whether, upon the statement contained in the complaint as to the manner in which she acquired her alleged title to the goods, (and it seems to be admitted by both parties that the truth of this statement was established upon the trial,) the goods are her property, or the property of her husband.

The cases of Williams v. McGrade, 13 Minn. 46, (Gil. 39,) and Strong v. Colter, Id. 82, (Gil. 77,) do not answer this question, for they were decided upon the statute in force prior to the adoption of the present General Statutes; and chapter 69, Gen. St., as will be seen upon examination, changed and superseded to a...