Lein v. Czaplinski

Decision Date06 December 1984
Citation106 A.D.2d 723,484 N.Y.S.2d 154
PartiesJacqueline E. LEIN, as Administratrix of the Estate of David Lein, Deceased, Respondent, v. John CZAPLINSKI et al., Appellants.
CourtNew York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Mazza, Williamson & Clune, Ithaca (Robert J. Clune, Ithaca, of counsel), for appellants.

Kehoe, Merzig & Schebaum, Oneonta (Joseph F. Kehoe, Oneonta, of counsel), for respondent.

Before KANE, J.P., and MAIN, YESAWICH, LEVINE and HARVEY, JJ.

MEMORANDUM DECISION.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of plaintiff, entered November 3, 1983 in Otsego County, upon a verdict rendered at Trial Term.

Plaintiff brought this action following the death of her 21-year-old son who died as the result of a fire in a house in the City of Oneonta where he resided with four other young men. Defendants were the owners of the building. Testimony at the trial disclosed that effective August 1, 1982, approximately three months before decedent's death, the City of Oneonta had passed a municipal ordinance which required that "all dwelling units except single family residences, shall have smoke detectors installed by the owners". Some three weeks before the fire in question, defendant Helina Czaplinski delivered a smoke detector to the house. However, she did not have it installed, but left it on the bannister. Decedent's cotenants tested the device and ascertained that it worked but, due to the lack of proper tools, did not install it, leaving it in its box at the foot of the stairs.

The Fire Chief for the City of Oneonta testified that the fire had started in a downstairs front room and that smoke and carbon monoxide had filled that room and then traveled up the stairway to the second floor where decedent's body was found in his bedroom, partially off the foot of the bed. He also testified about smoke detectors in general, stating that to be effective, they should be positioned on a wall, 6 to 12 inches from the ceiling, outside a sleeping area. When properly positioned, they will give the occupants a three to five-minute warning of fire. They are not effective when placed on the floor because of the propensity of smoke and gas to rise.

The coroner's testimony confirmed the position of decedent's body, and stated that the cause of death was carbon monoxide poisoning. He further testified that decedent was legally intoxicated at the time of death, having a blood alcohol content of 0.14%.

The jury ultimately rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $25,000, which they diminished by $12,500 due to their finding that decedent's own negligence had contributed 50% to his death. This appeal by defendants ensued.

Initially, we note that the violation of an ordinance which causes injury to any person has been found to be prima facie evidence of negligence and, unless its probative force is overcome, it becomes conclusive and fixes liability (Coe v. New York, 238 App.Div. 453, 265 N.Y.S. 10; 41 N.Y.Jur., Negligence, § 41, p. 55). However, negligence may not be so established unless it is shown that compliance with the regulation or ordinance would have obviated the injury (see Sheehan v. City of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 496, 501, 387 N.Y.S.2d 92, 354 N.E.2d 832; Daggett v. Keshner, 284 App.Div. 733, 735, 134 N.Y.S.2d 524). Accordingly, the issue of proximate cause (i.e., whether defendant's failure to install a smoke detector was a substantial factor in causing decedent's death) is determinative of the instant matter. It is defendant's...

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8 cases
  • Barnes v. Stone-Quinn, STONE-QUINN
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • December 29, 1993
    ...Corp., 152 A.D.2d 151, 154, 546 N.Y.S.2d 1020, appeal dismissed 75 N.Y.2d 947, 555 N.Y.S.2d 693, 554 N.E.2d 1281; Lein v. Czaplinski, 106 A.D.2d 723, 724, 484 N.Y.S.2d 154). Whether an ordinance or a statute creates a standard of care depends upon the risks that reasonably may be anticipate......
  • Reynoso v. Bovis Lend Lease, LMB, Inc.
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court
    • May 10, 2013
    ...evidence of negligence and, unless its probative force is overcome, it becomes conclusive and fixes liability.” ( See Lein v. Czaplinski, 106 A.D.2d 723, 724 [3d Dept 1984] [citing Coe v. City of New York, 238 App.Div. 453 [2d Dept 1933].) “However, negligence may not be so established unle......
  • Carter v. Realty
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • April 5, 2011
    ...the fire earlier than she did and, thus, reduced the amount of time the infant plaintiff was exposed to smoke ( see Lein v. Czaplinski, 106 A.D.2d 723, 725, 484 N.Y.S.2d 154). The defendants' remaining contentions are without...
  • Taylor v. New York City Hous. Auth.
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court
    • March 8, 2012
    ...inferences are possible, the question of proximate cause should be left for the jury's determination” ( Lein v. Czaplinski, 106 A.D.2d 723, 725, 484 N.Y.S.2d 154 [1984][citations omitted] ). Based on the foregoing testimony, there is an issue as to whether the lack of a functioning smoke de......
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