Leland School District v. Brown

• Decision Date: 21 June 2022
• Docket Number: 2021-CA-00157-COA
• Citation: 342 So.3d 508
• Parties: LELAND SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant/Cross-Appellee v. Michell C. BROWN, Appellee/Cross-Appellant
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

342 So.3d 508

LELAND SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant/Cross-Appellee

v.Michell C. BROWN, Appellee/Cross-Appellant

NO. 2021-CA-00157-COA

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

June 21, 2022

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ROBERT F. STACY JR., Oxford

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: JAMIE FERGUSON JACKS, Cleveland

BEFORE WILSON, P.J., WESTBROOKS AND LAWRENCE, JJ.

WILSON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. The Leland School District appeals a decision of the Washington County Chancery Court holding that the District improperly terminated Michell Brown's employment days after Brown was hired as the District's special education director. Although the District's Board of Trustees found that Brown's contract was invalid and upheld her dismissal, the chancellor held that the Board's decision was not supported by substantial evidence and was arbitrary and capricious. The chancellor also rejected the District's argument that the court lacked jurisdiction because Brown did not request an administrative hearing or appeal her dismissal within statutory deadlines. The chancellor awarded Brown damages of $30,400 based on the difference between her salary under her contract with the District and what she ultimately earned as a teacher in other school districts.

¶2. On appeal, the District argues that the chancery court lacked jurisdiction to hear Brown's case and that there is substantial evidence to support the Board's decision upholding Brown's dismissal. On cross-appeal, Brown argues that the chancellor erred by reducing her award based on her mitigation of damages and by declining to award attorney's fees. However, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the chancery court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3. On June 8, 2015, the Board voted to employ Brown as the District's special education director for the 2015-2016 school year at an annual salary of $55,000. On June 15, Brown and then-superintendent Glenda Jackson signed Brown's employment contract. Brown's employment was to begin on July 1, 2015. However, on June 29, 2015, at a special meeting of the Board, the Board voted to "rescind" its decision to employ Brown. Malcolm Brown (Malcolm)—the District's incoming superintendent and Brown's ex-husband—notified Brown of the Board's decision by phone on June 29 or 30. However, the District did not provide Brown with any written notice of its decision or her statutory right to a hearing.

¶4. In January 2016, Brown's attorney wrote to the District's new superintendent,¹ alleging that the District breached Brown's contract. Brown stated that after the Board had "rescinded" her contract, she found employment as a teacher in another school district for the 2015-2016 school year but at a lower salary of $39,900. Brown stated that the District owed her the difference between her salary under her contract and her lower salary as a teacher plus interest and legal fees. Brown also asked to be reinstated as the District's special education director for the 2016-2017 school year.

¶5. In April 2016, Brown filed suit against the District in the County Court of Washington County. Brown's complaint alleged a breach of contract and sought damages. According to the District, the county court later dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction; however, the county court's order of dismissal is not in the record on appeal.

¶6. In January 2017, Brown filed suit against the District in the Washington County Chancery Court. Brown's complaint again alleged a breach of contract and sought damages. Brown also alleged that the District failed to notify her of her right to a hearing in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated sections 37-9-59 (Supp. 2014) and 37-9-111 (Rev. 2019).

¶7. The District filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the case should be dismissed with prejudice because Brown failed to appeal the Board's decision to rescind her employment within twenty days as required by Mississippi Code Annotated section 37-9-113 (Rev. 2019). In May 2017, the chancellor denied the District's motion and instead "referred" the "matter ... back to the ... District" for the District to comply with its statutory obligation to give Brown proper notice of the reasons for her termination and her right to a hearing. The District filed a petition for an interlocutory appeal, but a panel of the Supreme Court denied the petition. Leland Sch. Dist. v. Brown , No. 2017-M-00852-SCT (Miss. July 26, 2017) (panel order).

¶8. In August 2017, the District finally provided Brown with a written "explanation of the ... District's decision to rescind its recommendation to hire [her]." The District asserted that "Brown was not terminated because she had not started working and her contract was not to begin until July 1, 2015." The District further stated:

On June 29, 2015, the Leland School Board voted to rescind multiple staff recommendations, including the recommendation to employ Ms. Brown. These recommendations were rescinded because they were not the recommendations made by superintendent Glenda T. Jackson. Ms. Jackson's position as superintendent was to end on June 30, 2015. The recommendations were not made by Ms. Jackson, and it would be a better practice for the incoming superintendent to make the recommendations once he took office. In fact, Malcolm Brown took office as Interim Superintendent on July 1, 2015, and in a special board meeting, he made those same staff recommendations, with the exception of Michell Brown.

¶9. In September 2017, a public hearing was held before a hearing officer appointed by the Board. At the hearing, the District argued that Brown's contract was invalid because (1) she had not been recommended by then-superintendent Jackson, and (2) she was not qualified to serve as the special education director because she did not hold an administrator's license.² The District did not call any witnesses or present any evidence at the hearing, and Brown was the only witness who testified. The hearing officer subsequently issued a report concluding that Brown's contract was invalid for the two reasons given by the District. On November 15, 2017, the Board adopted the hearing officer's report and conclusions and reaffirmed the Board's June 2015 decision to rescind Brown's employment.

¶10. On December 4, 2017, Brown filed an appeal in the Washington County Chancery Court pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 37-9-113. On appeal, Brown argued that the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious and violated her statutory and constitutional rights. She further argued that there was no substantial evidence to support the Board's claim that her contract was invalid.

¶11. The District filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The District argued that the chancery court lacked jurisdiction because Brown failed to appeal the Board's original (June 2015) decision to rescind her employment within twenty days, as required by section 37-9-113. The District argued that Brown was aware of the Board's decision by June 29 or 30, 2015, when Malcolm called her and told her not to report for work. In March 2018, the chancellor entered an order denying the District's motion to dismiss.

¶12. In December 2020, following briefing on the merits, a new chancellor³ entered a final order and judgment holding that the District's actions and refusal to honor Brown's contract were not supported by substantial evidence, were arbitrary and capricious, and violated Brown's statutory and constitutional rights. The chancellor held that the District was liable to Brown for damages of $30,400—the difference between the salary that Brown would have earned had she been employed by the District during the 2015-2016 and 2016-2017 school years and her actual earnings as a teacher in other school districts during those years.

¶13. On appeal, the District argues that the chancery court lacked jurisdiction to consider Brown's complaint and subsequent appeal because Brown did not appeal the Board's 2015 decision to rescind her employment within twenty days, as required by statute. The District also argues that the Board's decision was based upon substantial evidence, was not arbitrary or capricious, and did not violate Brown's statutory or constitutional rights because Brown had not been recommended by the superintendent and was not qualified for the position. On cross-appeal, Brown argues that the chancellor should have awarded her additional damages and attorney's fees.

ANALYSIS

I. The chancery court had jurisdiction.

¶14. Before a licensed school employee may be dismissed, the employee must "be notified of the charges against him and ... advised that he is entitled to a public hearing upon said charges." Miss. Code Ann. § 37-9-59. If the employee requests a hearing, it must be held within thirty days before the school board or a hearing officer appointed by the board. Id. ; Miss. Code Ann. § 37-9-111. If the school board upholds the dismissal, the employee may seek judicial review by filing a petition and bond in chancery court "within twenty (20) days of the receipt of the final decision of the board." Id. § 37-9-113(1) - (2). Applying these statutes, this Court has held that the timely filing of a petition for appeal is jurisdictional and that the chancery court has only appellate jurisdiction with respect to the dismissal of a licensed school employee. LaCour v. Claiborne Cnty. Sch. Dist. , 119 So. 3d 1128, 1133-36 (¶¶24, 26-27, 30-31) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013). Therefore, in general, a chancery court lacks jurisdiction to hear a licensed school employee's "claim for breach of contract as an original action and not as an appellate action." Id. at 1135 (¶30). Thus, the District argues that the chancery court lacked jurisdiction and should have dismissed Brown's 2017 complaint and subsequent appeal with prejudice because Brown failed to appeal within twenty days of the Board's June 2015 decision to rescind her employment.

¶15. However, in Noxubee County School Board v. Cannon , 485 So. 2d 302 (Miss. 1986), the...