Lemay v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
Decision Date | 06 December 2019 |
Docket Number | No. 2:18-CV-2272-DMC,2:18-CV-2272-DMC |
Parties | CHRISTINE LEMAY, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
Plaintiff, who is proceeding with retained counsel, brings this action for judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Pursuant to the written consent of all parties (ECF Nos. 6 and 7), this case is before the undersigned as the presiding judge for all purposes, including entry of final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Pending before the court are the parties' briefs on the merits (ECF Nos. 15 and 16).
The court reviews the Commissioner's final decision to determine whether it is: (1) based on proper legal standards; and (2) supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). "Substantial evidence" is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th Cir. 1996). It is ". . . such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971). The record as a whole, including both the evidence that supports and detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion, must be considered and weighed. See Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir. 1986); Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not affirm the Commissioner's decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. See Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a particular finding, the finding of the Commissioner is conclusive. See Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the Commissioner's decision, the decision must be affirmed, see Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002), and may be set aside only if an improper legal standard was applied in weighing the evidence, see Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988).
For the reasons discussed below, the Commissioner's final decision is affirmed.
To achieve uniformity of decisions, the Commissioner employs a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether a claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (a)-(f) and 416.920(a)-(f). The sequential evaluation proceeds as follows:
To qualify for benefits, the claimant must establish the inability to engage in substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which has lasted, or can be expected to last, a continuous period of not less than 12 months. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The claimant must provide evidence of a physical or mental impairment of such severity the claimant is unable to engage in previous work and cannot, considering the claimant's age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. See Quang Van Han v. Bower, 882 F.2d 1453, 1456 (9th Cir. 1989). The claimant has the initial burden of proving the existence of a disability. See Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1990).
The claimant establishes a prima facie case by showing that a physical or mental impairment prevents the claimant from engaging in previous work. See Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1984); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f) and 416.920(f). If the claimant establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show the claimant can perform other work existing in the national economy. See Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1988); Hoffman v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1986); Hammock v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1209, 1212-1213 (9th Cir. 1989).
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Plaintiff applied for social security benefits on November 4, 2014. See CAR 15.1 In the application, plaintiff claims disability began on November 5, 2012. See id. Plaintiff's claim was initially denied. Following denial of reconsideration, plaintiff requested an administrative hearing, which was held on April 3, 2017, before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Christopher C. Knowdell. In a July 18, 2017, decision, the ALJ concluded plaintiff is not disabled based on the following relevant findings:
After the Appeals Council declined review on June 9, 2018, this appeal followed.
In her opening brief, plaintiff argues: (1) the ALJ erred in rejecting her testimony as to the severity of her symptoms; (2) the ALJ ignored the requirements of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a in evaluating the severity of plaintiff's depression; and (3) the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the medical opinions from plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Sutter.
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To qualify for benefits, the plaintiff must have an impairment severe enough to significantly limit the physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c).2 In determining whether a claimant's alleged impairment is sufficiently severe to limit the ability to work, the Commissioner must consider the combined effect of all impairments on the ability to function, without regard to whether each impairment alone would be sufficiently severe. See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1289-90 (9th Cir. 1996); see also 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1523 and 416.923. An impairment, or combination of impairments, can only be found to be non-severe if the evidence establishes a slight abnormality that has no more than a minimal effect on an individual's ability to work. See Social Security Ruling (SSR) 85-28; see also Yuckert v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 303, 306 (9th Cir. 1988) (adopting SSR 85-28). The plaintiff has the burden of establishing the severity of the impairment by providing medical evidence consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1508, 416.908. The plaintiff's own statement of symptoms alone is insufficient. See id.
At Step 2, the ALJ determined that plaintiff's depression is a severe impairment. See CAR 17-18. Though plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to apply 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a, plaintiff concedes: "In this case, the ALJ did this [applied § 404.1520a(b)(1)] and found that Plaintiff suffers from depression." See ECF No. 15, pg. 11. According to plaintiff, the ALJ failed to "apply the special technique to evaluate the severity of Plaintiff's mental impairment. . . ." Id. According to plaintiff: "At step two in this case, the ALJ did not provide a narrative of his rationale. . . ." Id. at 12. Plaintiff argues the matter must be remanded.
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/ / / Plaintiff's argument is not persuasive. Though the ALJ did not provide a narrative discussion supporting his conclusion at Step 2 that plaintiff's depression is a severe impairment, the court finds no error given that the ALJ did in fact find the impairment to be severe. Plaintiff has not indicated how the lack of a narrative discussion at Step 2 resulted in any prejudice given that the ALJ rendered a favorable determination as to the severity of plaintiff's depression. While plaintiff references medical sources who concluded plaintiff's depression is extremely limiting, plaintiff confuses the standard applicable at Step 2 with the standard at Step 4 for determination of residual functional capacity. To what extent plaintiff's depression presents more than minimal limitations on her ability to work is not relevant at Step 2.3
"The ALJ must consider all medical opinion evidence." Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (citin...
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