Lenard v. City of Cleveland, CASE NO. 1:17 CV 440
| Decision Date | 30 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:17 CV 440 |
| Parties | RICHARD LENARD, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CLEVELAND, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
OPINION AND ORDER
:
Pro se Plaintiff Richard Lenard filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Cleveland, the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor's Office, the Cuyahoga County Sheriff's Department and the Cuyahoga County Jail. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges he has been held in the Cuyahoga County Jail on a heightened security floor without telephone and mail privileges and without proper nutrition. He asserts claims for negligence, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, dereliction of duty and conversion. He seeks monetary and injunctive relief.
Plaintiff was charged in five separate indictments in 2015 and 2016. See State of Ohio v. Lenard, Nos. CR-15-602274, CR 15-599742, CR-15-602350, CR-15-597800, and CR-16- 602457 (Cuyahoga Cty Ct. Comm. Pleas). In Case Nos. CR-15-602274 and CR-15-602350, he was charged with Attempted Murder, four counts of Felonious Assault, two counts of Aggravated Robbery, three counts of Kidnaping, two counts of Disrupting Public Services and two counts of Criminal Damaging. In the remaining criminal cases, Plaintiff was charged with two counts of Securing Records by Deception, Identity Fraud, two counts of Tampering with Records, Aggravated Theft, Forging Identification Cards and two counts of Grand Theft. Bond was set in each of these criminal cases. He remained in the Cuyahoga County Jail unable to post the aggregate total bond of $1,400,000.00.
Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court Judge Maureen Clancy issued a pretrial order barring Plaintiff from having any contact with the victim in Case Nos. CR-15-602274 and CR-15-602350. These cases resulted from incidents of domestic violence that occurred on November 21, 2015 and October 7, 2015. On both dates, Plaintiff physically assaulted Kassandra Anne Hankins by repeatedly punching her, slamming her into the ground, stomping her, dragging her up and down stairs, kicking her and strangling her. When she began to bleed during the incident on November 21, 2015, Plaintiff stopped to put on latex gloves to keep from getting blood on himself. During the October incident, Hankins grabbed a knife to defend herself. Plaintiff took the knife from her and used it to cut her hair off. Despite the no contact order, Plaintiff called Hankins seventy-six times from December 21, 2015 to January 20, 2016, sometimes using the pin numbers of other inmates to get the call through. He also mailed letters to her. In these conversations, he told Hankins what she had to do to drop the charges against him and instructed her on how to answer questions posed to her by prosecutors. BecausePlaintiff continually violated the no contact order, his telephone and mail privileges were suspended and he was placed in a more secure area of the jail.
Plaintiff complains that while he was in segregation, he was not fed nutritious meals, was denied two hours of exercise a week, was denied participation in group religious services and was permitted to leave his cell only to shower. Even after he was moved from segregation, he was housed on a more restrictive floor and was prohibited from having telephone or mail privileges.
Plaintiff asserts four Counts for relief. In Count One, he contends the Defendants were negligent and denied him access to the courts when they failed to allow him to use the telephone to call his attorney or family, violated his First Amendment right to practice his religion, exposed him to cruel and unusual punishment by denying him two hours of exercise each week and denied him due process before confining him to a higher security floor of the jail. In Count Two, he contends the Defendants engaged in malicious prosecution and intentionally inflicted emotional distress. In Count Three, Plaintiff lists claims for conversion and negligence when they deprived him of real property in Garfield Heights, Ohio by incarcerating him and making it difficult for him to pay his mortgage. He also claims his collective bail is excessive. Finally, he claims in Count Four that the Defendants engaged in malicious prosecution and were negligent when they seized, opened and read a letter he had in his possession and used it as evidence against him when he was indicted by the grand jury. He also contends they failed to take proper care to treat him for lead poisoning or treat the water supply in the jail for lead. Plaintiff asks the Court to award him $ 12,000,000.00 in damages and issue injunctive relief.
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the Court is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). An action has no arguable basis in law when the Defendant is immune from suit or when the Plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or "wholly incredible." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992); Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199.
A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks "plausibility in the Complaint." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The factual allegations in the pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the Complaint are true. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. The Plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but must provide more than "an unadorned, the-Defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading standard. Id. In reviewing a Complaint, the Court must construe thepleading in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998).
As an initial matter, Plaintiff does not allege any wrong-doing by the City of Cleveland, or any of its employees. Plaintiff cannot establish the liability of any Defendant absent a clear showing that the Defendant was personally involved in the activities which form the basis of the alleged unconstitutional behavior. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976); Mullins v. Hainesworth, No. 95-3186, 1995 WL 559381 (6th Cir. Sept. 20, 1995). It is unclear from the Complaint how the City of Cleveland was involved in the events Plaintiff describes. He failed to state a claim against this Defendant.
Furthermore, the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor's Office, Sheriff's Office and Jail Corrections Center are not proper Defendants. They are not sui juris, meaning they are not independent legal entities capable of suing or being sued. They are merely subunits of Cuyahoga County. See Batchik v. Summit County Sheriff's Dept., No. 13783, 1989 WL 26084 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 15, 1989); Barrett v. Wallace, 107 F.Supp.2d 949, 954 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (); Johari v. City of Columbus Police Dept., 186 F.Supp.2d 821, 825 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (). Claims asserted against them are construed against Cuyahoga County.
Section 1983 does not permit a Plaintiff to sue a local government entity on the theory of respondeat superior. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692-94 (1978). A Plaintiff may only hold a local government entity liable under § 1983 for the entity's own wrongdoing. Id. A local government entity violates § 1983 where its official policy or custom actually serves to deprive an individual of his or her constitutional rights. Id. In addition, "there must be a direct causal link between the policy and the alleged constitutional violation such that the municipality's deliberate conduct can be deemed the moving force behind the violation." Id.
Here, Plaintiff does not identify a particular policy of Cuyahoga County that the Defendants were following, nor does he connect that policy to the violations he alleges. In fact, Plaintiff's placement in segregation was the direct result of Plaintiff's repeated violation of the trial court's no contact order. His claims against Cuyahoga County are dismissed.
To the extent Plaintiff was attempting to assert his claims against unnamed individual Defendants by suing the entire department, he failed to state a claim. Plaintiff cannot establish the liability of any Defendant absent a clear showing that the Defendant was personally involved in the activities which form the basis of the alleged unconstitutional behavior. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976); Mullins v. Hainesworth, No. 95-3186, 1995 WL 559381 (6th Cir. Sept. 20, 1995). Generalized allegations against an entire department are not sufficient to hold any individual within that department personally liable for damages.
Furthermore, even if Plaintiff had named individual...
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