Lenehan v. Travers
| Decision Date | 23 October 1934 |
| Citation | 288 Mass. 156 |
| Parties | FRANK E. LENEHAN v. JOHN J. TRAVERS. MARY E. LENEHAN v. SAME. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
October 2, 3, 1934.
Present: RUGG, C.
J., CROSBY, PIERCE FIELD, & DONAHUE, JJ.
Evidence, Opinion expert. Witness, Expert. Practice, Civil, Appellate division appeal.
At the trial of an action for damages resulting from a collision of an automobile operated by the plaintiff with an automobile operated by the defendant, there was evidence that the plaintiff's automobile, travelling at a certain speed approached that of the defendant from the rear as it was parked and that, when the plaintiff's automobile was within five or seven feet of the defendant's automobile, it suddenly, without warning, was backed and struck the plaintiff's automobile. A witness called by the plaintiff testified that he was in the automobile business and had been engaged in the business of repairing automobiles for fifteen to twenty years; that he had not attended any engineering or technical school, was not an engineer, had never made a study of forces or the action or reaction of forces; that his only experience had been as an automobile mechanic; and that he had examined and repaired the plaintiff's automobile after the collision. Subject to objection by the defendant, he was permitted to testify as an expert, giving his opinions as to what rates of speed of the plaintiff's automobile would be necessary to produce the damage which he observed, upon the hypothesis that the defendant's automobile was backing, and upon the hypothesis that it was stationary. Held, that
(1) The subject matter of the inquiry was proper for expert testimony; (2) The determination of the question, whether the witness was qualified to testify as an expert, was within the discretionary power of the trial judge;
(3) No error was shown.
A party appealing from an order of an appellate division dismissing a report of a judge of a district court is bound to see that the record includes all that is necessary to enable this court to determine whether rulings of which he complains were prejudicial to him.
No error was disclosed, upon the record of an appeal by a defendant from an order dismissing a report to an appellate division by a judge of a district court who heard together four actions of tort against that defendant, in a ruling permitting one of the plaintiffs to cross-examine another plaintiff who was neither hostile nor unfriendly to him, where there was nothing to show what questions were asked and what answers were given, or that the defendant was prejudiced thereby.
FOUR ACTIONS OF TORT, described in the opinion. Writs in the First District Court of Eastern Middlesex, the first two dated October 20, 1931, and the second two dated March 24, 1932.
In the District Court, the actions were heard together by Brooks, J. Material evidence is described in the opinion. There were findings for the plaintiffs, respectively, in the sums of $350, $2,500, $72, and $559. The judge reported the actions to the Appellate Division for the Northern District. The report was ordered dismissed. The defendant appealed.
J. G. Ashe, for the defendant.
R. T. Bushnell, (J.
J. McCarthy & J.
Lewiton with him,) for the plaintiffs.
These are four actions of tort in which the plaintiffs Nora Harrington and Mary E. Lenehan seek to recover for personal injuries; the plaintiff Frank E. Lenehan seeks to recover for expenses incurred for treatment of his wife, who was injured and the plaintiff Ann M. Harrington seeks to recover for property damage. The cause of action in each case is alleged to be the negligence of the defendant. The actions were brought and tried in the District Court, and there was a finding for the plaintiff in each case.
The plaintiffs offered evidence tending to show that the automobile in which the plaintiffs Nora Harrington and Mary E. Lenehan were riding at the time of the accident was being operated by Nora Harrington and was proceeding along the Revere Beach Boulevard at a speed of ten to fifteen miles an hour. Nora Harrington testified that she saw the defendant's automobile parked on the boulevard next to the curb some distance ahead; that when she was within five or seven feet of it, suddenly, and without warning, it backed at an angle, striking the right front fender and wheel of the one she was driving as it turned to avoid the collision. The testimony of the plaintiff Mary E. Lenehan was similar to that above set forth. Both these plaintiffs were injured and the automobile was damaged as a result of the collision.
John Melkonian, a witness called by the plaintiffs, testified that he was in the automobile business and had been engaged in the business of...
To continue reading
Request your trial