Lenoir Car Works v. Hill

• Decision Date: 21 December 1931
• Citation: 44 S.W.2d 321
• Parties: LENOIR CAR WORKS v. HILL.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 321

44 S.W.2d 321

LENOIR CAR WORKS v. HILL.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

December 21, 1931.

Error to Circuit Court, Loudon County; Pat Quinn, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Mrs. Ira L. Hill for the death of her husband, claimant, opposed by the Lenoir Car Works, employer. To review an award to claimant, the employer brings error.

Affirmed.

J. H. Hodges, of Knoxville, for plaintiff in error.

R. R. Kramer, of Maryville, and W. B. Green, of Lenoir City, for defendant in error.

CHAMBLISS, J.

This appeal is from an award of compensation to Mrs. Hill on the death of her husband. It is conceded that the deceased was a regular employee of the car works, and that he was accidentally injured quite seriously in the course of his employment. Three complaints are made of the judgment: (1) That the death was not the result of the accident; (2) that an autopsy was refused following a demand reasonably and seasonably made; and (3) that the allowance made for a dependent child was not justified.

An examination of the record satisfies us that there is material evidence to sustain the finding of the trial judge that the death was the result of, or was at least substantially contributed to by, the injury. This is all that is required to support compensation. See Gilcrest Lumber Co. v. Rengler, 109 Neb. 246, 190 N. W. 578, and notes in 28 A. L. R. 200. While this injury was to the arm only, it appears to have been a very serious double fracture which it was apparently impossible to treat successfully, despite one or more operations by the car works' surgeons. It also appears that infection set in following these treatments and that the general health of the deceased was seriously impaired so that he gradually lost weight and strength until finally, on the advice of local physicians, he was carried to Atlanta by a representative of the insuring company for examination and treatment by an expert there. It is apparent that he had become exceedingly weak, and while there is some testimony that this weakened condition was the result of physical impairment existing prior to the accident, the facts touching this matter are controverted and on this particular point there is evidence that his general health was reasonably good until the happening of this very serious and debilitating injury. He died suddenly while in charge of the agent of the insuring company and while en route from the office of the doctor in Atlanta, to whom he had been taken for examination. It is insisted that the exact cause of his death is not shown, but two physicians give testimony expressing the opinion in more or less positive form that the death apparently and probably was the result of blood disturbances, specifically embolism obstructions, which might be attributed to the blood condition resulting from the accident and its ineffectual surgical and medical treatment. Taking the testimony as a whole, we are satisfied, as before stated, that there is material evidence to sustain the finding of the trial judge on this question.

With respect to the matter of autopsy we think it doubtful on this record that a demand is shown to have been made and refused in a clear and definite form. While representatives of the insurance company and the car works did visit the widow before the burial and expressed a desire for an autopsy, this request was not in such form as to constitute that definite demand under the statute which the law apparently contemplates, and the alleged refusal of the widow does not appear to have been a definite and final refusal, so much as an expression of an indisposition, or lack of wish, given out under circumstances of distress. It does not appear that the matter was pressed on her attention, or insisted upon as a right secured by law.

Moreover, while the statute does provide for an autopsy when required by an interested party, when the cause of death is obscure or is disputed, there is no provision in the statute making a refusal a bar to a recovery of compensation. The pertinent paragraph of section 25 of the act (Pub. Acts 1919, c. 123) reads as follows:

"In all death claims where the cause of death is obscure or is disputed, any interested party may require an autopsy, the cost of which is to be borne by the party demanding the same."

It is to be observed that the right to compensation is denied by the express terms of the act: (1) Where the death is due to willful misconduct, intentional self-inflicted injury, intoxication, or willful refusal to perform a duty required by law (section 10); and (2) where there is a failure to give notice within 30 days (section 22); (3) or where...