Lenoir v. State

• Decision Date: 18 May 2017
• Docket Number: NO. 2016–KA–00226–SCT,2016–KA–00226–SCT
• Citation: 222 So.3d 273
• Parties: Laterrence LENOIR a/k/a Laterrence A. Lenoir a/k/a Laterrence Awson Lenoir a/k/a Laterrance Lenoir v. STATE of Mississippi
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

222 So.3d 273

Laterrence LENOIR a/k/a Laterrence A. Lenoir a/k/a Laterrence Awson Lenoir a/k/a Laterrance Lenoir

v.STATE of Mississippi

NO. 2016–KA–00226–SCT

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

May 18, 2017

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF THE STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER, BY: JUSTIN TAYLOR COOK, GEORGE T. HOLMES

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, BY: SCOTT STUART

EN BANC.

MAXWELL, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. This case involves Mississippi Rule of Evidence 701. Under this rule, when a fact issue exists about who is portrayed in a surveillance video, a witness with greater familiarity with the defendant than the jury could possess may offer an opinion that the defendant is the person in the video.¹ In this case, Laterrence Lenoir was claimed to be one of the armed robbers captured on surveillance video. So under Rule 701, the trial judge was within his discretion to admit testimony from witnesses familiar with Lenoir that, in their opinion, Lenoir was one of the robbers in the video. Thus, we find no error in the trial judge's admission of this testimony, nor do we find error in the judge's denial of Lenoir's motion for new trial. We therefore affirm Lenoir's convictions and sentences.

Background Facts and Procedural History

I. Armed Robbery

¶ 2. Surveillance video showed that, on the evening of September 7, 2013, a man approached the front door of the Dollar General in Brookhaven, Mississippi. He looked inside and then walked away. The man soon returned with a second man wearing a mask. After the two men entered the store, the first man pulled a mask over his face too. The first man was carrying a pistol. And the second man was carrying a sack.

¶ 3. There were two employees in the store that night, Shanti Freeman Nettles and Kaitlynn Calcotte. Their manager, Jessica Odum, had instructed Nettles to open the safe early, so she and Calcotte could go home. When the two robbers showed up, Nettles was in the office counting the money in the safe. Calcotte was at the register. When she saw the two masked men, she went into the office with Nettles.

¶ 4. The video showed the two men followed Calcotte to the office. The first man pointed his pistol at them, and Nettles and Calcotte handed over their personal money and their cell phones. Then, at the direction of the second man, they handed over the money from the safe.

II. Investigation

¶ 5. After the robbers left, Nettles and Calcotte called 911. Captain Byron Catchings with the Lincoln County Sheriff's Department was tasked with investigating the robbery. During his investigation, Lenoir had surfaced as a person of interest. So Catchings began surveilling him. Based on his personal observations of Lenoir, Catchings concluded Lenoir was the first man in the video. Lenoir was charged with two counts of armed robbery and one count of conspiracy to commit armed robbery.

III. Trial and Conviction

¶ 6. At trial, Catchings testified about his investigation and his identification of Lenoir as the first man in the video, which was played for the jury. The State also called two other witnesses familiar with Lenoir—Willie Bulter and Greta Mathis. Willie Butler's niece had dated Lenoir. At the time of trial, Butler testified he had known Lenoir for "possibly two years." Butler testified he recognized Lenoir as the man in the video based on "his body and his walk." He also testified he had seen Lenoir's face at the beginning of the surveillance video. Greta Mathis, like Butler, was related to Lenoir's girlfriend. She testified she also recognized Lenoir as the man in the video "just [by] the way he walk[ed]."

¶ 7. The State called a third witness familiar with Lenoir—Jeffery Thomas. Thomas went to church with Lenoir. Before trial, Thomas had given a statement identifying Lenoir as the man in the video. But at trial, he said he had given this statement under pressure. Thomas testified he did not know who it was in the video because it was too blurry make an identification. Odom, the Dollar General manager, testified on behalf of Lenoir. She said she had watched the surveillance video, and the man in the video was not Lenoir. Lenoir himself testified, denying any involvement in the robbery.

¶ 8. At the close of trial, the jury found Lenoir guilty of all three counts.

IV. Appeal

¶ 9. After his motion for a new trial was denied, Lenoir timely appealed. On appeal, he raises two issues:

(1) The trial court erred in admitting the nonspecific, nonsubstantive identification of Lenoir by Butler and Mathis based solely on the purported way Lenoir walked.

(2) Lenoir's convictions are against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.

Discussion

I. Admission of Identification Testimony

¶ 10. Lenoir first argues the trial court reversibly erred when it admitted Butler's and Mathis's testimony identifying Lenoir as one of the robbers in the video.

¶ 11. Before trial, Lenoir had filed a motion in limine to exclude Butler's and Mathis's identifications.² But the trial court overruled Lenoir's motion, finding the lay opinion testimony admissible under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 701. Rule 701 provides: "If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to one that is: (a) rationally based on the witness's perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness's testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702." Butler's and Mathis's opinions were based on their personal perception of how Lenoir walked. And due to the grainy quality of the video, the trial court determined their identifications were helpful to determining a fact in issue. So their testimony met the requirements of Rule 701.

¶ 12. While Lenoir now asserts the trial court reversibly erred, the admission of testimony is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Bishop v. State , 982 So.2d 371, 375 (Miss. 2008). And after review, we find no abuse of discretion in admitting this testimony.

¶ 13. While this Court has yet to address the admissibility of opinion testimony identifying a person in a video under Rule 701, the Mississippi Court of Appeals has. In Bennett v. State , 757 So.2d 1074, 1076 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000), the Court of Appeals looked to other jurisdictions that had addressed this issue, finding "a majority view has developed that, at least under certain circumstances, such opinion evidence may be admitted to aid the jury." Particularly instructive was the federal case United States v. Jackman , 48 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1995). In Jackman , the First Circuit "concluded that [opinion identification] evidence ought to be admitted in any circumstance where it can be demonstrated that the witness has a greater familiarity with the defendant's appearance than the jury could possess and the recorded likeness is not either (a) so unmistakably clear, or (b) so hopelessly obscured, that the witness is no better suited than the jury to draw a meaningful conclusion as to the identity of the person depicted." Bennett , 757 So.2d at 1076 (citing Jackman , 48 F.3d at 4–5 ).

¶ 14. Applying this principle to Bennett 's facts, the Court of Appeals held it was error for the trial court to exclude the defendant's mother's opinion testimony that her son was not the man selling drugs in a video the State had introduced. Id. at 1077. In that case, "there was a legitimate issue of identification of the [defendant] as the person carrying out the videotaped drug transaction." Id. And the court found "[t]hat is the very circumstance in which opinion evidence may properly be received from witnesses who, by their previous acquaintance with the [defendant], have some greater ability to identify him in a photograph or videotape than would a typical juror having no previous involvement with the [defendant]." Id. Because the defendant's theory was mistaken identity, the Court of Appeals held the defendant's mother should have been permitted to testify "she had viewed the videotape, and based upon her intimate familiarity with her son, was of the opinion that the person carrying out the drug transaction was not Cavaleer Bennett." Id.

¶ 15. We agree with the Court of Appeals. "When there is a genuine issue of fact as to who is actually portrayed in a photograph or videotape, it is that sort of lay opinion evidence that can prove ‘helpful’ to the jury within the meaning of Mississippi Rule of Evidence 701." Id. In this case, the video was neither "so unmistakably clear" that no identification testimony was needed nor "so hopelessly obscured, that the witness is no better suited than the jury to draw a meaningful conclusion as to the identity of the person depicted." Id. at 1076. So the trial court was within its discretion to admit testimony by "a witness [who] has greater familiarity with the defendant's appearance than the jury could possess." Id.

¶ 16. On appeal, Lenoir concedes "the law is fairly well settled that lay witnesses can offer opinions concerning the identity of someone on a video." Still, he insists Butler's and Mathis's opinions do not pass muster under Rule 701, because—in contrast with the mother in Bennett —they were not sufficiently familiar with Lenoir to offer such an opinion.³ But we find the level of familiarity with Lenoir goes to the weight and credibility of their opinion testimony, not its admissibility. Rule 701 requires lay opinion testimony to be "rationally based on the perception of the witness." M.R.E. 701. And both Butler and Mathis testified their opinions were grounded in their observation of how Lenoir walked. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's permitting Butler and Mathis to testify they had viewed the video and, based on their familiarity with how Lenoir walked, were of the opinion the first man in the video was Lenoir. Cf. id.

¶ 17. Nor do we find, as Lenoir contends, the probative value of this admissible evidence was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice....