Lente v. Luci
| Decision Date | 24 June 1922 |
| Docket Number | 341 |
| Parties | Lente, Appellant, v. Luci |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued March 21, 1922
Appeal, No. 341, Jan. T., 1922, by plaintiff, from order of C.P. No. 1, Phila. Co., June T., 1921, No. 2719, sustaining decision of Workmen's Compensation Board, in case of Antonio Lente v. Frank Luci. Affirmed.
Appeal from decision of Workmen's Compensation Board, sustaining referee's findings. Before PATTERSON, P.J.
The facts appear by the opinion of the Supreme Court.
Decision affirmed. Plaintiff appealed.
Error assigned, inter alia, was order, quoting it.
The order or the court below is affirmed; costs to be paid by appellant.
John J McDevitt, Jr., with him Harry A. Gorson, for appellant. -- Plaintiff was entitled to compensation for total disability Combination Rubber Co. v. Essex County, 115 A. 138; Branconnier's Case, 223 Mass. 273; Kriegbaum v. Wire Works, 169 N.Y.S. 307; Fair v. Rubber Works, 111 A. 193; Hartz v. Hartford Faience Co., 90 Conn. 539; Brooks v. Peerless Oil Co., 83 So. 663; Wabash R.R. v. Commission, 286 Ill. 194; Whittle v. Chemical Co., 266 Pa. 356; Quinn v. Am. I. Shipbuilding Corp., 77 Pa.Super. 304; Pater v. Steel Co., 263 Pa. 244.
Richard A. Smith, with him Louis Wagner, for appellee, cited: Kerwin v. Am. Exp. Co., 273 Pa. 134; Kline v. Oliver Iron & Steel Co., 1 Mackey 147, 3 Dep. R. 888.
Before MOSCHZISKER, C.J., FRAZER, WALLING, SIMPSON, KEPHART, SADLER and SCHAFFER, JJ.
The claimant, employed by appellee, lost an eye from an injury in the course of employment. The sight of the other eye had been destroyed before his employment by appellee. The referee awarded compensation for the loss of one eye, fixed by section 306, paragraph (c), of the Compensation Act. The board and the court below sustained the referee's findings. It is now before us on appeal, and the sole question is whether compensation should be allowed, under paragraph (a) of section 306, for total disability, the last injury taking from him his remaining sight, producing total blindness and total incapacity for labor.
Section 306 provides three classifications for compensation, -- (a) "total disability," (b) "Partial disability" and (c) "all disability resulting from permanent injuries": Berskis v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 273 Pa. 243.
Because the question now raised is of great importance, a further discussion of this section is advisable. It is there designed to fix a schedule of payments both as to time and amount for injuries not resulting in death. The section opens with a schedule fixing compensation for total disability. This is followed by certain subdivisions, taking into account compensation and disability, total and partial, found in paragraphs (a) and (b), then comes a separate class (c), embracing all disability for injuries to certain parts of the body. Other paragraphs are included in section 306 dealing with different phases of the compensation question, -- not material to the matters before us.
Paragraph (a) fixes a maximum period of five hundred weeks for a maximum and minimum payment for total disability; when such disability ceases, no future payments are to be made. This may be within any time less than, but not over, five hundred weeks. Paragraph (b) fixes the ratio of payment for partial disability, with the maximum time three hundred weeks, which, like (a), may be less than that period, and may be more if the partial disability lapses into total disability. Particular cases are excepted from this paragraph, which are included in the special classification established under paragraph (c).
Paragraph (c) fixes the total compensation for permanent injuries to certain parts of the body. Under it must be considered all disability "resulting from" or related to permanent injuries, and the compensation for such injuries shall be "exclusively" as therein provided. It will be noted the governing feature in this paragraph is a permanent injury, while in the former paragraphs the governing feature is a disability from an injury. In paragraph (c), the right to compensation for the consequential feature "all disability," no matter in what degree, is measured by the extent of the injury, i.e., so much money during a given period for the loss of a hand, arm, foot, leg or eye, respectively. In other words, this legislative mandate fixed the amount to be paid in such cases without considering, but including, all incapacity to labor that may be connected therewith, whether such incapacity be total, partial or no incapacity at all. This is emphasized in paragraph (b) when speaking of partial disability, where this special class of injuries is expressly excluded from being treated as partial disability; and further emphasized in paragraph (c), in dealing with total disability under (a), where the board is given authority to determine whether the loss of two members mentioned in paragraph (c) shall constitute total disability, though, by the exception of these injuries from paragraph (b) and the reference just mentioned in paragraph (c), these injuries might be considered as being in either class (a) or (b); generically they are, but the legislature, when considering the compensation to be paid on their account, has seen fit to place them in a class by themselves; in doing so, it did not intend the idea of disability or incapacity to be the moving feature; nor does their loss entitle the person injured to any other consideration, except as therein expressed. The compensation mentioned is restricted by precise language, regardless of the fact that a permanent injury might otherwise affect capacity to work. The standard thus fixed is in the nature of compensation for the damage resulting from the loss of the members there named, without regard to personal capacity to labor or loss of earning power: Kerwin v. American Express Co., 273 Pa. 134.
Appellant contends, following a line of authorities in some states, that the determining feature applicable to cases of this character is the extent to which the claimant is, in fact, incapacitated by his injury, -- the same consideration that attaches to paragraphs (a) and (b) of our act. But it will be noted, in the states where such rule exists, most, if not all, do not have the exclusive feature for compensation for permanent injuries mentioned in our acts, and the grading of compensation in many is on a different basis. It is true, provision is made for permanent disability, and disability partial in character but permanent in quality, permitting an investigation into the loss of earning power or incapacity to labor. Or it may be molded on the usefulness of a member, or the permanent impairment of any of the physical functions. But the degree of capacity to labor or earn compensation establishes the grade in which the compensation should fall; the determining feature is depleted earning power or earning power impaired, as contrasted with a normal capacity. This scheme is analogous to our paragraph (b) in considering the question of partial disability, but our acts fix a scheme of compensation for permanent injuries, under paragraph (c), different from these, and there are many states having similar legislation.
As stated, section 306 includes all disability emanating from or connected with a permanent injury to the member mentioned but it must not be understood that...
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