Lenz v. Yellow Transp., Inc.

• Citation: 431 F.3d 348
• Decision Date: 16 December 2005
• Docket Number: No. 05-1641.,05-1641.
• Parties: Troy J. LENZ, Appellee, v. YELLOW TRANSPORTATION, INC., Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

431 F.3d 348

Troy J. LENZ, Appellee, v. YELLOW TRANSPORTATION, INC., Appellant.

No. 05-1641.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: October 14, 2005.

Filed: December 16, 2005.

Robert W. McKinley, argued, Kansas City, MO (Bridget B. Romero, on the brief), for appellant.

Troy A. Skinner, argued, Des Moines, IA, for appellee.

Before BYE, BEAM, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Yellow Transportation, Inc., ("Yellow") appeals from the district court's order denying its motion to compel arbitration. Yellow argues that the district court erred in finding that Troy Lenz, a former Customer Service Representative for Yellow, is included in the "transportation worker" exemption of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. § 1. For the reasons discussed below, we now reverse.

I. Background

Yellow is a transportation company serving primarily as a carrier of general commodities by truck. Employment-related disagreements between Yellow and its employees are governed by a Dispute Resolution Agreement ("DRA") that requires the arbitration of all disputes. The DRA applies to "all disputes, claims, or controversies arising out of, or related to [the employee's] employment with Yellow that would otherwise require or allow resort to a court or other governmental tribunal." The DRA provides that employment claims "include, but are not limited to, claims of discrimination, harassment or retaliation or claims for benefits brought against Yellow... whether based on local, state, or federal laws or regulations, or on tort, or equitable law or otherwise." The DRA requires that all employment claims "be resolved exclusively by final and binding arbitration before a neutral arbitrator." Specifically, the DRA requires that the FAA controls; and, where the FAA is inapplicable, the DRA states that the Indiana Uniform Arbitration Act controls.

Troy Lenz signed the DRA when he began employment with Yellow as a Customer Service Representative. As a Customer Service Representative, Lenz's duties required him to "[p]rovide courteous, efficient, timely and informed service to customers calling a Yellow Freight Customer Service Center. Receiving incoming telephone calls, answer questions and investigate decisions, as necessary, following the philosophy of `what is the right thing to do.' Refer to others for answers as deemed appropriate." Lenz was also to "[d]eliver personal service to customers via telephone contact in response initiated inquiries. Ensure customer satisfaction by listening and responding to customer needs and requirements. Use CRT mainframe and personal computer programs to review and/or modify customer service information."¹

Yellow fired Lenz two months into his employment, and Lenz filed suit in Iowa state court alleging Yellow violated the Iowa Civil Rights Act. Yellow removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa and filed a motion to compel arbitration and stay action based on the DRA. The district court denied Yellow's motion to compel arbitration, ruling that despite the strong federal policy favoring arbitration, the FAA's exemption for transportation workers applied to Lenz. Finding that Yellow was in the transportation industry and that Lenz was directly engaged in interstate transportation, the district court ruled that Lenz fell within the FAA's exemption. The court further held that because Lenz fell within the FAA's exclusion, Iowa's law disfavoring arbitration in the employment context was not preempted by the FAA. Accordingly, the district court held that the DRA was unenforceable under Iowa law and that arbitration need not be compelled.

Yellow appeals, arguing that the district court erred in finding, as a matter of law that the FAA's transportation worker exemption applied to Lenz. Yellow argues that the FAA's "transportation worker" exemption under § 1 of the FAA does not apply to Lenz, a Customer Service Representative. We agree and reverse.

II. Analysis

We review a denial of a motion to compel arbitration de novo. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Guidant Corp., 143 F.3d 428, 430 (8th Cir.1998).

The FAA "compels judicial enforcement of a wide range of written arbitration agreements." Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111, 121 S.Ct. 1302, 149 L.Ed.2d 234 (2001). Congress's purpose for enacting the FAA was "to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements." Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 677, 679 (8th Cir.2001) (citation omitted). Thus, the FAA establishes a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements." Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983). It applies both in federal courts and state courts, as Congress intended the FAA to pre-empt state anti-arbitration laws to the contrary. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 122, 121 S.Ct. 1302.

While the FAA applies to employment contracts, § 1 of the FAA excludes from the Act's coverage "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (emphasis added). This exclusion provision "is limited to transportation workers, defined, [...], as those workers `actually engaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce.'" Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 112, 121 S.Ct. 1302 (quoting Cole v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1471 (D.C.Cir.1997)). This exclusion shows Congress's "concern with transportation workers and their necessary role in the free flow of goods...." Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 121, 121 S.Ct. 1302. The Court surmised that "[i]t would be rational for Congress to ensure that workers in general would be covered by the provisions of the FAA, while reserving for itself more specific legislation for those engaged in transportation." Id. "The emphasis [of the § 1 exclusion, therefore,] was on a class of workers in the transportation industry, rather than on workers who incidentally transported goods interstate as part of their job in an industry that would otherwise be unregulated." Hill v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 398 F.3d 1286, 1289 (11th Cir.2005).

The issue before us is simple— whether Lenz, a Customer Service Representative, is a "transportation worker" under § 1 of the FAA and is therefore exempt from the DRA he entered into with Yellow. Because Lenz works in the transportation industry, we must determine whether his job duties are so closely related to interstate commerce as to consider him a "transportation worker" and thus exempt from the FAA. Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 836 (8th Cir.1997) (holding that the § 1 exemption should be narrowly construed).

Indisputably, if Lenz were a truck driver, he would be considered a transportation worker under § 1 of the FAA. Harden v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 249 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir.2001); see also Am. Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 823 F.2d 466, 473 (11th Cir.1987) ("Numerous courts have limited the exclusion [in § 1 of the FAA] to `workers actually engaged in interstate commerce,' including bus drivers and truck drivers."). A more difficult question arises when an employee, like Lenz, works for a transportation company but is not a truck driver or transporter of goods. Some employees, with duties only tangentially related to movement of goods, have been determined to not be exempt. For example, the Eleventh Circuit held that a pre-departure security agent at an international airport who inspected goods and people at the airport was not "engaged in commerce" and thus was not a "transportation worker" exempt under § 1 of the FAA. Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Serv., Inc., 253 F.3d 1280, 1284 (11th Cir.2001). Likewise, the D.C. Circuit determined that a security guard at a train station was not a "transportation worker" because he was not actually involved in the "`flow'" of commerce, meaning he was not responsible for the transportation and distribution of the goods. Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1472 (D.C.Cir.1997).²

Synthesizing analytical factors used by other courts, we will apply the following non-exclusive list of factors in determining whether an employee is so closely related to interstate commerce that he or she fits within the § 1 exemption of the FAA: first, whether the employee works in the transportation industry; second, whether the employee is directly responsible for transporting the goods in interstate commerce; third, whether the employee handles goods that travel interstate; fourth, whether the employee supervises employees who are themselves transportation workers, such as truck drivers; fifth, whether, like seamen or railroad employees, the employee is within a class of employees for which special arbitration already existed when Congress enacted the FAA; sixth, whether the vehicle itself is vital to the commercial enterprise of the employer; seventh, whether a strike by the employee would disrupt interstate commerce; and eighth, the nexus that exists between the employee's job duties and the vehicle the employee uses in carrying out his duties (i.e., a truck...