Leo Payne Pontiac, Inc. v. Ratliff
| Decision Date | 05 June 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. C--120,C--120 |
| Citation | 178 Colo. 361,497 P.2d 997 |
| Parties | LEO PAYNE PONTIAC, INC., Petitioner, v. Joe RATLIFF and Jean Ratliff, Respondents. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Philip E. Lowery, Thomas A. Gilliam, Denver, for petitioner.
Pehr & Newman, William Pehr, Westminster, for respondents.
We granted certiorari in this case to consider the petitioner's contention that the decision of the Court of Appeals in Leo Payne Pontiac, Inc. v. Ratliff, 29 Colo.App. 386, 486 [178 Colo. 363] P.2d 477 relating to the questions of remittitur and excessive exemplary damages is contrary to the established law of this state. The Court of Appeals ruled against the petitioner on all of his assignments of error, but held that the trial court was without jurisdiction to order a remittitur of $4,000 of the $7,500 exemplary damages awarded by the jury without first obtaining the consent of the plaintiff. As one of the grounds in a motion for a new trial, the petitioner asserted that the exemplary damage award was excessive. The Court of Appeals noted that the acceptable procedure would have been to grant the motion for a new trial, but offer the plaintiffs the option of accepting a reduced judgment in lieu of a new trial on the issue of these damages. However, instead of remanding for compliance with this procedure, the Court of Appeals ordered the reinstatement of the $7,500 exemplary damage award in the jury's verdict.
We reverse that portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals which orders the trial court to reinstate the jury's exemplary damage award.
Petitioner Leo Payne Pontiac, Inc. will be referred to as the defendant and respondents Ratliff as the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs brought this action to recover damages allegedly incurred as a result of defendant's misrepresentations that the automobile which plaintiffs purchased from defendant was 'brand' new. On August 14, 1968, the plaintiffs purchased a 1968 Pontiac from the defendant. The purchase price was $5,946.26, which price was paid in the form of plaintiffs' 1966 Pontiac as a trade-in, plus $2,600 in cash. The plaintiffs testified that they told defendant's salesman that they wanted a new car, not a demonstrator or executive car, and that the defendant's salesman assured them that the car in question was new, having only been driven from the unloading docks to the defendant's place of business. The plaintiffs testified that the odometer in the car showed 43 miles at the time of purchase.
A few days after taking delivery of the car, the plaintiffs discovered that it had apparently been involved in an accident as evidenced by body work and paint overspray on the chrome. Further inspection also disclosed a bent frame, a pitted windshield, and a tire which was severely cut around its entire circumference. When efforts were made to contact the defendant about these discoveries, the plaintiffs were at first put off. Finally, Leo Payne, president of the defendant corporation, agreed to repair the damage and replace the tire and windshield. At trial, Payne testified that he had driven the car for personal use; that it had been in a minor collision; and that it had been in a sandstorm. Plaintiffs' demand for rescission of the contract or the plaintiffs' demand for a new car was refused by the defendant.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs awarding $1,500 as compensatory damages and $7,500 as exemplary or punitive damages. The defendant made a timely motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a new trial. The trial court denied this motion, but unilaterally directed a remittitur when it ordered the amendment of the entry of judgment to show an exemplary damage award of $3,500 rather than the $7,500 award by the jury.
Addressing oursevles first to the remittitur, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial judge was without jurisdiction to order a remittitur in the manner in which it was done in this case. C.R.C.P. 59(a)(5) provides that a new trial may be granted if the jury's award of damages is either inadequate or excessive. It is also a basic rule that a trial judge may not change the substance of a jury's...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Burns v. McGraw-Hill Broadcasting Co., Inc.
...C.R.C.P. 59(a)(5), but cannot conclude that the damages were a product of bias, prejudice, or passion. See Leo Payne Pontiac, Inc. v. Ratliff, 178 Colo. 361, 497 P.2d 997 (1972); Kresse v. Bennett, 151 Colo. 549, 379 P.2d 807 The trial court in this case never made a finding that the jury's......
-
Bowden v. Caldor, Inc.
...F.2d 502, 505-507 (4th Cir.1991); McKinnon v. City of Berwyn, 750 F.2d 1383, 1391-1392 (7th Cir.1984); Leo Payne Pontiac, Inc. v. Ratliff, 178 Colo. 361, 364-365, 497 P.2d 997, 999 (1972); Kang v. Harrington, 59 Haw. 652, 664 n. 3, 587 P.2d 285, 293 n. 3 (1978); S.C. Farm Bur. Mut. Ins.Co. ......
-
Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc.
...for exemplary damages. Leo Payne Pontiac, Inc. v. Ratliff, 29 Colo.App. 386, 486 P.2d 477 (1971), rev'd on other grounds, 178 Colo. 361, 497 P.2d 997 (1972). "The factors which guide this determination, set forth by the court of appeals in Leo Payne Pontiac, supra, are expressly approved at......
-
Higgs v. District Court In and For Douglas County
...703 F.2d 1152; Holmes v. Wack, 464 F.2d 86 (10th Cir.1972); Burns, 659 P.2d 1351; Marks, 643 P.2d 741; Leo Payne Pontiac, Inc. v. Ratliff, 178 Colo. 361, 497 P.2d 997 (1972); Kresse v. Bennett, 151 Colo. 549, 379 P.2d 807 (1963). Turning to the present case, we are satisfied that the jury's......
-
RULE 59
...App. 2003). A trial judge may not change the substance of a jury's verdict upon his own motion. Leo Payne Pontiac, Inc. v. Ratliff, 178 Colo. 361, 497 P.2d 997 (1972). The granting of a new trial by the trial court should be reversed if the reasons for granting a new trial do not constitute......
-
COLORADO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
...App. 2003). A trial judge may not change the substance of a jury's verdict upon his own motion. Leo Payne Pontiac, Inc. v. Ratliff, 178 Colo. 361, 497 P.2d 997 (1972). The granting of a new trial by the trial court should be reversed if the reasons for granting a new trial do not constitute......
-
Rule 59 MOTIONS FOR POST-TRIAL RELIEF.
...App. 2003). A trial judge may not change the substance of a jury's verdict upon his own motion. Leo Payne Pontiac, Inc. v. Ratliff, 178 Colo. 361, 497 P.2d 997 (1972). The granting of a new trial by the trial court should be reversed if the reasons for granting a new trial do not constitute......
-
Rule 52 FINDINGS BY THE COURT.
...the record contains evidence to support the trial court's finding which is also in accord with law. Leo Payne Pontiac, Inc. v. Ratliff, 178 Colo. 361, 497 P.2d 997 (1972). Where the evidence is conflicting, it is the sole responsibility of the trier of the fact to resolve the factual issues......