Leogrande by Leogrande v. Glass

Decision Date10 December 1984
Citation482 N.Y.S.2d 525,106 A.D.2d 431
PartiesJoan LEOGRANDE, an infant, by her mother and natural guardian, Rose LEOGRANDE, et al., Appellants, v. Kenneth GLASS, M.D., et al., Respondents.
CourtNew York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

William J. Steinbrecher, P.C., Garden City (Thomas M. Hoey, Jr., Garden City, of counsel), for appellants.

Bower & Gardner, New York City (Howard R. Cohen, New York City, of counsel), for respondents.

Before TITONE, J.P., and BRACKEN, NIEHOFF and RUBIN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

In a medical malpractice action, plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, dated January 16, 1984, which denied their motion for an order noting defendants' default and setting the matter down for an inquest and which granted defendants' cross motion to direct plaintiffs to accept late service of defendants' verified answer to plaintiffs' amended verified complaint.

Order affirmed, with costs.

This action to recover damages for medical malpractice was commenced by service of summons and verified complaint on or about October 24, 1980. Issue was joined by service of an answer on or about December 3, 1980.

By order dated October 20, 1983, Special Term (CORSO, J.) granted a motion by plaintiffs to amend the complaint to assert an additional cause of action based on lack of informed consent. Special Term directed that the amended complaint be served within 20 days after defendants' receipt of a copy of the order. The amended verified complaint was in fact served by plaintiffs on defendants' attorneys by mail on November 1, 1983, and it was received by defendants' attorneys on November 3, 1983. However, a verified answer to the amended verified complaint was not served until December 14, 1983. By letter dated December 27, 1983, plaintiffs' attorney rejected and returned the answer as untimely.

Plaintiffs then moved for an order noting defendants' default and setting the matter down for an inquest. Defendants cross-moved for an order directing plaintiffs to accept service of their verified answer to the amended verified complaint. By order dated January 16, 1984, Special Term (CANNAVO, J.) denied plaintiffs' motion and granted defendants' cross motion, finding that "alleged default was of short duration and nonprejudicial". We affirm.

Service of an answer to an amended complaint must generally be made within 20 days after service of the amended complaint (CPLR 3025, subd. ). In the instant case, plaintiffs served their amended verified complaint by mail on November 1, 1983. Moreover, because the amended verified complaint was served by mail, defendants were entitled to an additional five days in which to serve their answer (CPLR 2103, subd. par. 2). Therefore, defendants would normally have been required to serve their answer by November 26, 1983. However, November 26, 1983 fell on a Saturday and, therefore, the answer had to be served on the next succeeding business day, which was Monday, November 28, 1983 (General Construction Law, § 25-a, subd. 1). Defendants' answer was in fact served on December 14, 1983, making it only 16 days late.

Under the present statutory standard (see CPLR 2005; CPLR 3012, subd. added L.1983, ch. 318), a defendant seeking to excuse a default in answering must establish a reasonable excuse for the delay and a meritorious defense (Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Andersen & Co., 60 N.Y.2d 693, 695, 468 N.Y.S.2d 464, 455 N.E.2d 1259; Weber v. Victory Mem. Hosp., 98 A.D.2d 719, 469 N.Y.S.2d 125).

In this case, the papers filed by defendants in support of their cross motion to compel acceptance of their untimely answer did not clearly articulate a reasonable excuse for the delay. Nevertheless, those papers do reflect that defendants had served an answer to the original complaint and had continued to defend the action during the ensuing three years until the time of their default in answering the amended verified complaint. It is therefore clear that they never intended to abandon their defense of this action. Moreover, plaintiffs' moving papers raise no claim of prejudice. Under these circumstances, and in view of the...

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19 cases
  • Hutchinson v.
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • June 25, 2014
    ...21 A.D.3d 876, 876–877, 800 N.Y.S.2d 613;Daniels v. Bovis Lend Lease, Inc., 12 A.D.3d 342, 343, 783 N.Y.S.2d 308;Leogrande v. Glass, 106 A.D.2d 431, 433, 482 N.Y.S.2d 525). ...
  • I.J. Handa, P.C. v. Imperato
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • March 5, 1990
    ...Rothman, 116 A.D.2d 652, 497 N.Y.S.2d 490; Sonju v. Continental Garage Mgt. Corp., 108 A.D.2d 671, 485 N.Y.S.2d 539; Leogrande v. Glass, 106 A.D.2d 431, 482 N.Y.S.2d 525). ...
  • 70 Green ST Multifamily LLC v. 70 Green St.
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court
    • December 14, 2021
    ...compelling Multifamily to accept their August 20, 2021 answer to the complaint is granted in this court's discretion (Leogrande v Glass, 106 A.D.2d 431, 432 [1984] [holding that order compelling plaintiff to accept answer was properly granted by the court as a matter of discretion]). (2) Mu......
  • Becker v. University Physicians of Brooklyn, Inc.
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • July 7, 2003
    ...there is no indication that the plaintiffs were prejudiced by the alleged default (see McKay v. Longman, 199 A.D.2d 941; Leogrande v. Glass, 106 A.D.2d 431; County of Nassau v. Cedric Constr. Corp., 100 A.D.2d 890). Under these circumstances, the court properly denied the plaintiffs' motion......
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