Leon-Ramos v. State
| Decision Date | 19 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 3007,3007 |
| Parties | BAYRON LEON-RAMOS v. STATE OF MARYLAND |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Circuit Court for Prince George's County
Case No.: CT170409A
UNREPORTED
Graeff, Arthur, Raker, Irma S. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
Opinion by Graeff, J.
*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.
Appellant, Bayron Leon-Ramos, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County of felony murder and kidnapping. The court sentenced appellant to life imprisonment, all but 60 years suspended on the murder conviction and merged the sentence for kidnapping.
On appeal, appellant presents the following questions for this Court's review:
For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgments of the circuit court.
On January 21, 2017, the body of Juan Jose Gonzalez-Mejia ("the victim"), was discovered lying in a clearing in the woods beside Mattawoman Lane in Prince George's County. An autopsy revealed that the victim sustained multiple sharp force injuries and blunt force injuries around his neck and head, including a significant long cutting wound across the front of his neck. The medical examiner, Dr. Pamela Southall, opined that the victim was alive when his throat was cut, due to the significant amount of "associated blood in that surrounding soft tissue," as well as the fact that "a person can bleed out rapidly" from this type of injury. The cause of the victim's death was due to multiple sharp and blunt force injuries, and the manner of death was determined to be homicide.
Detective Zedrick DeLeon, a member of the Prince George's County Police Department, ascertained that the victim lived in a house located at 2284 Old Washington Road, Waldorf, Maryland, along with several other individuals, including appellant.Appellant gave two statements to the police in connection with this case: one on January 22, 2017, in which he denied any involvement in the homicide; and another on January 25, 2017, where he stated that he was with Selvin Romero-Leon on the night in question, and Romero-Leon told him he assaulted the victim.
During the first interview on January 22, appellant stated that he had last seen the victim on January 17, when they were outside drinking beer with another friend, Daniel Rodriguez, a.k.a., "Beto." Appellant stated that Beto was challenging him to fight, so he left the victim and Beto, went back inside the residence, and fell asleep. Detective DeLeon asked appellant if he got along with the victim, and appellant stated that he never fought with him, but he admitted they would "jokingly . . . grab at each other" from time to time when they were drinking.
At the second interview, on January 25, appellant told the police that his cousin, Selvin Romero-Leon, a.k.a. "Lito," caused the victim's injuries. Appellant stated that he did not see Romero-Leon beat the victim, but while appellant was at Romero-Leon's residence, Romero-Leon told appellant that he had beaten and kicked the victim.
Appellant and Romero-Leon then went to appellant's residence, where the beating had occurred, and Romero-Leon "grabbed [the victim] and he just put him in the trunk." Romero-Leon told appellant that he was going to "get rid of" the victim and kill him. Appellant and Romero-Leon were alone when they took the victim away from the residence in the vehicle's trunk.
Appellant told the police that, after they arrived near the wooded area off Mattawoman Lane, he promptly left the scene. He explained that he When appellant was fleeing the scene, however, he thought Romero-Leon "struck [the victim] with the knife," but he stated that he did not see a knife that evening or see Romero-Leon beat or use a knife on the victim. Although appellant maintained that he "didn't see it," he stated that once Romero-Leon removed the victim from the trunk, Romero-Leon "had to finish it because he had already beaten him up."
Appellant explained that he was not more forthcoming at his first interview because Romero-Leon threatened to kill anyone who "would open their mouth." He stated:
The police recovered a pair of khaki shorts and other clothing, among other items, from appellant's residence at 2248 Old Washington Road. A DNA expert concluded that a bloodstain on the shorts found in appellant's bedroom belonged exclusively to appellant. A pair of black jeans tested negative for blood.
Police also searched Romero-Leon's Toyota Corolla. In the trunk, the police found a Pennzoil motor oil jug and a windshield washer fluid jug, two cell phones, and a black, microfleece hat. Blood stains belonging to the victim were found on the two jugs inside the trunk.
We shall include additional details, as necessary, in the discussion that follows.
Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for kidnapping and felony murder. He makes three separate arguments in that regard. First, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient for both convictions because the State failed to prove that he was more than merely present during the crime. Second, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the kidnapping conviction because the State failed to prove that the victim was alive when he was placed in the trunk of the car. Third, he contends that, if the Court disagrees with the first two arguments, the evidence was insufficient to support the felony murder conviction "because the death occurred after [a]ppellant left the scene and after the kidnapping."
The State disagrees. It argues that appellant's argument with respect to felony murder is partly unpreserved, and in any event, all of his arguments are without merit.
In considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we ask "whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Roes v. State, 236 Md. App. 569, 582 (2018) (quoting Grimm v. State, 447 Md. 482, 494-95 (2016)). "[W]e give great deference to the fact finder, as they have the best 'opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence and resolve conflicts in the evidence . . . .'" In re J.H., 245 Md. App. 605, 623 (2020) (quoting Neal v. State, 191 Md. App. 297, 314 (2010)). In doing so, the jury is free to "accept all, some, or none" of awitness's testimony. Correll v. State, 215 Md. App. 483, 502 (2013) (quoting Allen v. State, 158 Md. App. 194, 251 (2004)), cert. denied, 437 Md. 638 (2014).
Further, "[w]e 'must give deference to all reasonable inferences [that] the fact-finder draws, regardless of whether [the appellate court] would have chosen a different reasonable inference.'" Cox v. State, 421 Md. 630, 657 (2011) (alterations in Cox) (quoting Bible v. State, 411 Md. 138, 156 (2009)). This Court has explained that, in this undertaking, "the limited question before us is not 'whether the evidence should have or probably would have persuaded the majority of fact finders but only whether it possibly could have persuaded any rational fact finder.'" Smith v. State, 232 Md. App. 583, 594 (2017) (quoting Allen, 158 Md. App. at 249).
We address first appellant's argument that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to prove that he was more than merely present when the crime occurred. "It is a universally accepted rule of law that mere presence of a person at the scene of the crime is not of itself sufficient to prove the guilt of that person, even though it is an important element in the determination of the guilt of the accused." Fleming v. State, 373 Md. 426, 433 (2003). "[T]he mere fact that a person witnesses a crime and makes no objection to its commission, and does not notify the police, does not make him a participant in the crime." Silva v. State, 422 Md. 17, 28 (2011) (alteration in Silva) (quoting State v. Foster, 263 Md. 388, 394 (1971)).
"Instead, the person must actually participate by 'assist[ing], support[ing] or supplement[ing] the efforts of another,' or, if not actively participating, then the personmust be present and 'advise or encourage the commission of a crime' to be considered an accomplice." Id. (alterations in Silva) (quoting Foster, 263 Md. at 393). As this Court has explained, "[w]hereas principals in the first degree 'commit the deed as perpetrating actors, either by their own hand or by the hand of an innocent agent,' principals in the second degree are 'present, actually or constructively, aiding and abetting the commission of the crime, but not themselves committing it.'" Kohler v. State, 203 Md. App. 110, 119 (2012) (quoting Handy v. State, 23 Md. App. 239, 251 (1974)); see also Jones v. State, 173 Md. App. 430, 446 (2007) () (alteration in Jones) (quoting Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, 332 (1979)).
Here, although appellant originally told the police that he had last seen the victim drinking beer on the evening of January 17, he provided a different story during his second...
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