Leon v. Celaya
| Decision Date | 02 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20-cv-00899-AJB-BGS |
| Parties | Carlos LEON, Plaintiff, v. Alvaro CELAYA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF No. 32]
Carlos Leon (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Centinela State Prison (“CEN”) located in Imperial, California, is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See ECF Nos. 1, 3.) In the
Complaint Plaintiff alleged Eighth Amendment excessive force and First Amendment retaliation claims against Defendant Alvaro Celaya and Defendant James Martinson (“Defendants”). (See ECF No. 1.) Defendants moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff's Complaint contending: (1) Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust available administrative remedies before filing suit; (2) Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on the merits of Plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim; (3) Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on the merits of Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim; and (4) Defendants are also entitled to Qualified Immunity. (ECF No. 32 at 10-21.) Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment (“Opposition”) and Defendants' filed a reply in support of their motion (“Reply”). (ECF Nos 44, 47.)
This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Anthony J. Battaglia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. Based on the documents and evidence presented, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 32) be GRANTED.
On May 13, 2020, Plaintiff filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Eighth Amendment excessive force and First Amendment retaliation claims against Defendants. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff's claims arose from a cell search on January 9, 2019. (ECF Nos. 1 at 3-4; 32 at 3-8; 44 at 2-3; 44-1 at 4-14.) In his complaint, Plaintiff claimed that Defendant Celaya targeted Plaintiff's cell for a search and “decided to over tighten” Plaintiff's handcuffs while the search was conducted in retaliation for grievances that Plaintiff submitted against Defendant Celaya. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff alleged that when he complained about the handcuffs being too tight, Defendant Celaya told Plaintiff that his handcuff key was broken and left the handcuffs on Plaintiff for hours and until a mass cell search concluded. (ECF Nos. 1 at 3-4; 44 at 2-3; 44-1 at 21-25.) Plaintiff also claimed that Defendant Martinson “allowed his subordinate, [Defendant] Celaya, under his direct supervision to use excessive force while Plaintiff was cuffed.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff alleged that he complained to Defendant Martinson that his handcuffs were too tight, and that Defendant Martinson did not loosen the handcuffs. (Id.)
Plaintiff also alleged that the officers used excessive force in retaliation for grievances he filed concerning abusive and unethical conduct by some correctional staff. (ECF Nos. 1 at 3-4; 44 at 2-3; 44-1 at 18-21.) Plaintiff indicated that he had previously sought and exhausted all forms of available relief from the proper administrative officials regarding the acts alleged in the complaint. (ECF No. 1 at 6.) Plaintiff indicated that he had proceeded to all administrative levels “including Health care Head Quarters for sustained injuries.” (Id.)
Plaintiff initiated this action by filing his Complaint and IFP motion on May 13, 2020. (ECF No. 1.) The Court granted Plaintiff's IFP motion, screened the complaint, and directed the U.S. Marshall to effect service of the complaint and summons onto the named defendants, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(3). (See ECF No. 3.) On January 4, 2021, Defendant Celaya and Defendant Martinson filed their Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint. (ECF No. 6.) The Court then determined that neither an Early Neutral Evaluation Conference nor a Case Management Conference was needed in this case, pursuant to Civil Local Rule 16.1(e)(8), and issued its Scheduling Order Regulating Discovery and Other Pre-trial Proceedings. (ECF No. 7.) Among the deadlines provided in the Scheduling Order, the Court provided October 11, 2021 as the deadline for all other dispositive motions, including those addressing Daubert issues. (Id. at 4.)
Plaintiff filed his first Motion for Appointment of Counsel on January 25, 2021 and his second Motion for Appointment of Counsel on February 4, 2021, which were both denied on February 12, 2021. (ECF Nos. 9, 11, 13.) On June 3, 2021, despite finding that Plaintiff failed to show good cause and due diligence in his request, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to amend the scheduling order to extend the fact discovery deadline. (ECF Nos. 15, 17.) On June 14, 2021, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting an independent expert, which was denied on June 18, 2021. (ECF Nos. 21, 22.) On September 9, 2021, Plaintiff filed his third Motion for Appointment of Counsel, which was denied on October 26, 2021. (ECF Nos. 26, 34.) On October 15, 2021, the Court granted Defendants' Motion for Ex Parte Application to Modify Scheduling Order, which extended the dispositive motion deadline from October 11, 2021 until October 19, 2021. (ECF Nos. 29, 31.)
On October 19, 2021, Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 32.) The Court then issued its order providing notice of motion for summary judgment pursuant to Klingele v. Eikenberry and Rand v. Rowland, and setting a briefing schedule on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 33.) On December 3, 2021, the Court granted in part Plaintiff's Ex Parte Motion for Extension of Time and amended the briefing schedule. (ECF Nos. 35, 37.) This Order indicated that Plaintiff shall file an Opposition, if any, to the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on or before January 3, 2022 and that any reply by Defendants shall be filed on or before January 18, 2022. (ECF No. 37 at 2.) Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on January 5, 2022, with Defendants' Reply being filed on January 18, 2022. (ECF Nos. 44, 47.)
The Court then granted Defendants' Ex Parte Motions to Amend the Schedule and vacated the Mandatory Settlement Conference set for December 29, 2021 and Pre-trial Conference set for February 10, 2022, as well as the related pretrial deadlines, pending the Court's decision on the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 38, 45.) The Court indicated that these dates will be reset, if appropriate, following the decision on the Motion for Summary Judgment. (Id.)
Further, the Court denied Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction on January 13, 2022. (ECF Nos. 40, 42, 46.) The Court found that Plaintiff was not entitled to a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction since Plaintiff had not established a likelihood of irreparable injury if he was not afforded injunctive relief. (ECF No. 46 at 3.)
Summary judgment is appropriate where a party can show that, as to any claim or defense, “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 empowers the Court to enter summary judgment on factually unsupported claims or defenses, and thereby “secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party can satisfy this burden by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element of his or her claim on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322-23. The moving party can also satisfy this burden by showing that particular parts of materials in the record “do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(B). If the moving party fails to bear the initial burden, summary judgment must be denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving party's evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970).
If the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the burden shifts to the nonmoving party who “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S 372, 380 (2007) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)). The nonmoving party may not rely on allegations in the complaint, but “must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587 (emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted). “By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original). “An issue of material fact is genuine ‘if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'” Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting ...
To continue reading
Request your trial