Leonard ex rel. Meyer v. Behrens

• Decision Date: 13 October 1999
• Docket Number: No. 97-2191.,97-2191.
• Citation: 601 N.W.2d 76
• Parties: Eric J. LEONARD, by His Parent and Next Friend, Nancy MEYER, and Nancy Meyer, Individually, Appellants, v. Chad BEHRENS, Individually, by His Parent and Next Friend, Gary Behrens, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

601 N.W.2d 76

Eric J. LEONARD, by His Parent and Next Friend, Nancy MEYER, and Nancy Meyer, Individually, Appellants, v. Chad BEHRENS, Individually, by His Parent and Next Friend, Gary Behrens, Appellee.

No. 97-2191.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

October 13, 1999.

Robert J. McGee of Robert J. McGee, P.C., Clinton, for appellants.

T. Randy Current of Frey, Haufe & Current, P.L.C., Clinton, for appellee.

Considered by LARSON, P.J., and CARTER, TERNUS, CADY, and HARRIS,¹ JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiffs, Eric Leonard and his mother Nancy Meyer, appeal the judgment of the district court dismissing their case following the defendant's motion for directed verdict. Plaintiffs had claimed the defendant, Chad Behrens, was negligent in shooting Eric in the eye during a game of paintball and in failing to warn him of the tendency of the goggles Chad had supplied him to fog up. The court ruled that the "contact sports exception" to the general rule of negligence applied whereby the plaintiff was required to prove that the defendant acted recklessly and that the plaintiffs had failed to present evidence of such recklessness. We find the district court correctly applied the recklessness standard in judging the defendant's actions during the paintball game. We affirm.

I. Factual Background and Proceedings.

On March 6, 1994, a group of teenagers assembled to play a game called "paintball" on a farm. Participants Eric Leonard and Chad Behrens were both fifteen years old. Eric had never played the game before but Chad regularly participated in paintball games. The purpose of the game was to strike players on the opposing side with gelatin capsules filled with colored vegetable oil which are intended to break on contact. Once a player is struck by a ball, he or she is considered out of the game.

Each participant had a slingshot to propel the paint balls. The participants also had goggles which they were instructed to wear during the games to protect their eyes. Chad had provided Eric with goggles even though he knew they had a tendency to fog over. During game play, Eric's goggles did, in fact, fog over. Eric removed the goggles from his eyes and placed them over his head. While the goggles were up, Eric was shot in the eye with a paint ball apparently fired by Chad.

Eric and his mother brought an action against Chad seeking compensation for Eric's injuries. They relied on two theories. First, they contended Chad breached a duty to Eric in shooting him in the eye. Second, they contended Chad breached a duty when he failed to warn Eric that the goggles had a tendency to fog up.²

Because the standard of care for participants playing a game such as paintball was an issue of first impression in Iowa, Chad filed an application for adjudication of law points prior to trial. Looking to other jurisdictions for guidance, the district court adopted the majority rule known as the "contact sports exception." This exception provides that a participant in a contact sport may only bring suit for injuries received during the game for acts of another participant done to intentionally inflict injury or done in reckless disregard for the safety of the other participant. The court found that paintball is a contact sport, and the exception applied to both of the plaintiffs' theories of recovery.

At trial, Chad moved for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiffs' evidence. The court ruled that substantial evidence showed the participants discussed the rules of the game before playing, including the use of eye goggles, and there was no evidence Chad knew Eric was not wearing his goggles when he shot the paint ball. Thus, the court held as a matter of law that Chad was not reckless in failing to warn Eric the goggles had a tendency to fog up, nor was his conduct in shooting a paint ball at Eric reckless. The district court ruled the plaintiffs failed to prove Chad's conduct fell outside the protection of the contact-sports exception and entered judgment for Chad. Plaintiffs appeal.

Plaintiffs argue the district court should have adopted a general negligence standard for contact sports. They further maintain that even if the contact sports exception standard was generally applicable, paintball is not an activity which qualifies as a contact sport. Plaintiffs contend that under either standard, they presented substantial evidence to submit the case to the jury.

II. Scope of Review.

Our scope of review is for correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App. P. 4; Podraza v. City of Carter Lake, 524 N.W.2d 198, 202 (Iowa 1994). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and determine whether sufficient evidence existed to warrant submission of the issues to a jury. Podraza, 524 N.W.2d at 202. This requires us to consider whether reasonable minds could differ on the issues in controversy. Id.

III. Analysis.

In this appeal we must determine whether the district court applied the proper standard of care to the plaintiffs' claim regarding the defendant's actions in shooting the plaintiff.³ There is no reported Iowa case concerning the duty of care owed by one participant in a contact sport to another participant. In Dudley v. William Penn College, 219 N.W.2d 484 (Iowa 1974), we considered a personal injury action brought by a collegiate baseball player against his coach and the college after he was struck by a foul ball. We observed:

[P]layers in athletic events accept the hazards which normally attend the sport....

What the law regards as unreasonable risk of harm to players is somewhat unique in athletic contests, since risks naturally attend such events. Hence the cases involving successful plaintiffs are not plentiful. Most injuries in athletic contests result from the rough and tumble of the game itself.

Dudley, 219 N.W.2d at 486 (citations omitted). Although the negligence of another player was not at issue in Dudley, the above language indicates we recognize a participant in an athletic event assumes certain risks normally associated with the activity.

In analyzing plaintiffs' claim regarding Chad's conduct in shooting Eric, we must balance on one side the interest in promoting vigorous athletic and sporting competition and the interest in protecting those who participate in those events on the other. The majority of jurisdictions that have considered this issue have concluded that personal injury cases arising out of an athletic event must be predicated on reckless disregard of safety. See, e.g., Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir.1979); Nabozny v. Barnhill, 31 Ill.App.3d 212, 334 N.E.2d 258 (1975); Hoke v. Cullinan, 914 S.W.2d 335 (Ky.1995); Gauvin v. Clark, 404 Mass. 450, 537 N.E.2d 94, 96-97 (1989). This principle is commonly referred to as the "contact sports exception" to the general rule of negligence.

The majority view evolved from the notion a participant's assumption of risk lowers the duty of care other participants owe that person from ordinary negligence to recklessness.⁴See Stanley L. Grazis, Annotation, Liability of Participant in Team Athletic Competition for Injury to or Death of Another Participant, 55 A.L.R.5th 529 (1998). The assumption of risk extends to dangers for which the person assuming the risk had actual knowledge and an appreciation of their character. Id. For example, a team sport participant generally assumes unintentional injuries caused by another participant; however, injuries inflicted intentionally or as the result of reckless disregard for safety are not assumed. Id.

Courts adopting the recklessness standard emphasize the standard is necessary to preserve vigorous and active participation in contact sports without fear of liability for merely negligent bodily contact. See, e.g., Jaworski v. Kiernan, 241 Conn. 399, 696 A.2d 332, 337 (1997). As the court in Jaworski explained:

If simple negligence were adopted as the standard of care, every punter with whom contact is made, every midfielder highsticked, every basketball player fouled, every batter struck by a pitch, and every hockey player tripped would have the ingredients for a lawsuit if injury resulted.

Id. at 338.

Likewise, these courts express concern over the public policy of stemming the possible flood of litigation that might result from adopting simple negligence as the standard of care to be utilized in sporting contests. See id. at 337-38. Again, the Jaworski court noted,

[w]hen the number of athletic events taking place in Connecticut over the course of a year is considered, there exists the potential for a surfeit of lawsuits when it becomes known that simple negligence, based on an inadvertent violation of a contest rule, will suffice as a ground for recovery for an athletic injury.

Id. at 338. We concur in both of these concerns.

The trial court here applied the recklessness standard as contained in the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 500 (1965) in granting a directed verdict to the defendants. This appears to be the consensus standard among jurisdictions adopting the contact sports-exception. See, e.g., Hoke, 914 S.W.2d at 338. The Restatement defines reckless disregard as:

The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500, at 587.

We have applied a similar expression of the recklessness standard in other situations. In Morris v. Leaf, 534 N.W.2d 388 (Iowa 1995), we held that in order to prove recklessness as the basis for a duty, a plaintiff must show that the actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known risk...