Leonard v. Bartle
| Decision Date | 26 January 1927 |
| Docket Number | No. 6188.,6188. |
| Citation | 135 A. 853 |
| Parties | LEONARD v. BARTLE. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Herbert L. Carpenter, Judge.
Action by Gertrude Leonard, a minor, by her next friends, against Harry Bartle. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant brings exceptions. Remitted, with direction to enter judgment on the verdict.
John R. Higgins, of Woonsocket, for plaintiff.
Joseph T. Witherow, of Pawtucket, for defendant.
The action is trespass on the case for negligence. Plaintiff had a verdict, and the case is in this court on defendant's bill of exceptions.
Defendant is charged with recklessly operating and driving his automobile on a public highway at an excessive and improper speed, thereby causing personal injury to plaintiff, a guest and free passenger in defendant's car.
Plaintiff, who is IS years of age, and a young woman friend went to a public dance at Crescent Park on the evening of May 24, 1924. There they danced with two young men friends, Johnson and Feeley. About 11 o'clock, at the suggestion of Johnson, the girls got into defendant's automobile. Defendant was sitting in his automobile waiting for the two young men who had come with him to the dance. The girls sat on the laps of the young men, as plaintiff says by direction of defendant. The latter says that such direction was not given by him; that it was unnecessary, as they were all friends and had driven in this manner before, and this was the only way all could get into the car, which was a small, closed car with one seat. The night was dark, and it was raining bard. Defendant drove the automobile. The plan was to take the girls to Pawtucket, where they could get a train for their home in Woonsocket. At the junction of the Barrington Parkway, defendant turned into and started to drive through the parkway. The road was unlighted and rough from lack of repair. The young women testify that several times they complained to defendant that he was driving too fast; that he paid no attention to their protests, but increased the speed, which at the time of the accident was about 40 miles an hour; that soon after entering the parkway defendant lost control of the automobile, which then ran from the right side of the highway across to the left onto an enbankment outside the highway and up against a tree, where it stopped. A window glass was broken and plaintiff's hand was injured by the broken glass. Defendant denies driving too fast. He and Johnson testify that the speed was not over 25 miles an hour; that there was a front tire blowout. Owing to the crowd in the automobile, defendant says he was unable to stop until the automobile hit, the tree. Feeley was out of the state and did not appear as a witness.
The trial justice charged the jury that plaintiff was riding in defendant's automobile by his invitation; that if the accident was caused either by the overcrowding of the car or by fast driving and there was no remonstrance by plaintiff she could not recover, as by failing to object she would te held to have consented to the manner of operation; that if the defendant was driving too fast under the conditions, the question was whether the accident was caused by defendant's lack of due care; that is, was he conducting himself as a person of ordinary prudence would under similar circumstances. Plaintiff excepted to that part of the charge in regard to the crowded condition of the car and the duty to protest the rate of speed, but these questions are not now before us. Defendant took no exception to the charge as given by the justice, but did except to the refusal of his request to charge the jury that if they found that plaintiff was a guest of defendant and not a passenger for hire, she could recover damages only if the jury found that defendant was guilty of gross negligence in the operation of his car.
The only question is, was this refusal to charge erroneous? As the request to charge contained no explanation of the legal meaning of "gross negligence," a definition of that phrase must be looked for in the common law as there is no statutory definition. The situation in common law is thus summarized in 29 Cyc. p. 422 ():
"In some jurisdictions the civil law division of degrees of negligence is recognized, but in the great majority of jurisdictions, it is not."
In this state the doctrine of degrees of negligence has never been adopted. In the case of bailment of goods, the amount of care required in different kinds of bailment in some jurisdictions is made the basis for the establishment of degrees of negligence generally. But in this state the obligation of the bailee has been considered with reference to the duty rather than to the characterization of the breach of duty as slight, ordinary, or gross negligence.
In Moulton & Remington v. Phillips & Sheldon, 10 R. I. 218, 14 Am. Rep. 663, and in Nichols v. De Wolf, 1 R. I. 277, the duty of a carrier of...
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Fraioli v. Lemcke
...of negligence does not impose liability on an individual unless there is a breach of a duty owed to the plaintiff); Leonard v. Bartle, 48 R.I. 101, 135 A. 853, 854 (1927)(noting that the test for negligence is the measure of the defendant's duty in the circumstances of the particular case).......
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Labree v. Major
...policy. 3 Turning to Rhode Island law, we find that this state has never adopted the doctrine of degrees of negligence. Leonard v. Bartle, 48 R.I. 101, 135 A. 853 (1927). Thus, in Rhode Island a driver owes his guest the same duty of ordinary care that he owes to any other person. Garabedia......
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Welsh Mfg., Div. of Textron, Inc. v. Pinkerton's, Inc.
...see it as an application of the standard of due and reasonable care under the same or similar circumstances. See Leonard v. Bartle, 48 R.I. 101, 104-05, 135 A. 853, 854 (1927). Liability of the employer is premised on its failure to exercise reasonable care in selecting a person who the emp......
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Williams v. Johnson & Johnson
...never adopted the doctrine of degrees of negligence." Labree v. Major , 111 R.I. 657, 306 A.2d 808, 816 (1973) (citing Leonard v. Bartle , 48 R.I. 101, 135 A. 853 (1927) ). This Court understands that "Rhode Island does not distinguish between degrees of negligence, and therefore, does not ......