Leonard v. McIntosh, 70-431

• Decision Date: 24 July 1970
• Docket Number: No. 70-431,70-431
• Citation: 237 So.2d 809
• Parties: James LEONARD, Petitioner, v. Honorable Russell H. McINTOSH, Judge of the Criminal Court of Record, Division A, Palm Beach County, Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 809

237 So.2d 809

James LEONARD, Petitioner, v. Honorable Russell H. McINTOSH, Judge of the Criminal Court of Record, Division A, Palm Beach County, Florida, Respondent.

No. 70-431.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

July 24, 1970.

Walter N. Colbath, Jr., Public Defender, and Carl V. M. Coffin, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for petitioner.

Marvin U. Mounts, Jr., County Solicitor, and Daniel T. K. Hurley, Asst. County Solicitor, West Palm Beach, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner, James Leonard, in an original proceeding seeks a Writ of Prohibition against respondent, Honorable Russell H. McIntosh, as Judge of the Criminal Court of Record, Division A, Palm Beach County, permanently prohibiting and restraining respondent from proceeding further in the trial of a criminal charge against petitioner.

An information charging petitioner with conspiracy to commit a felony and robbery was filed in the Criminal Court of Record of Palm Beach County on June 18, 1969. Petitioner made timely demands for a speedy trial at three successive terms of court; the last demand was dated January 29, 1970. Following each demand, petitioner's case was placed on the court docket, but on each trial date the congested state of the docket caused petitioner's case to be reset. On April 29, 1970, petitioner's case still had not been heard, so a petition for a writ of prohibition was filed with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit. That cause was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and a petition for a writ of prohibition was filed in this court. The petition made out a prima facie case, and we issued the Rule Nisi commanding the respondent to show cause why the petition should not be granted.

The question confronting this court is whether a crowded court docket is a 'good and sufficient reason' to toll the discharge of a prisoner pursuant to the speedy trial statute, Chapter 915.01(1), F.S.A.

The fact that petitioner complied with the procedural requirements of the statute by filing timely demands for a speedy trial is not contested by respondent. Respondent asserts only that petitioner's case could not be tried on the dates set because of a crowded docket. Respondent argues that since the delays were inevitable in view of the crowded condition of the court docket, the statute should be tolled and petitioner should not be released from custody.

In respondent's construction of Section 915.01, he relies heavily on a statement made by our supreme court in Dickey v. Circuit Court, Gadsden County, Quincy, Florida, Fla.1967, 200 So.2d 521, that since the United States Supreme Court has ruled that the sixth amendment guaranty of a right to a speedy trial was applied to the states, subsequent speedy trial issues will be measured by federal standards. Respondent then proceeds to delineate the factors considered by the federal courts in examining sixth amendment questions.

We are not disposed to consider those factors as relevant in examining F.S. Section 915.01(1), F.S.A., since we are not concerned here just with the sixth amendment of the Federal Constitution, but with a provision of our own state constitution which has been implemented and defined by the legislature. The factors used to define the broader and less definite sixth amendment right by federal courts have little relevance to our Florida statute.

We are faced here with determining under what circumstances Florida's speedy trial statute may be tolled. We recognize at least three instances. The supreme court has stated in Kelly v. State ex rel. Morgan, Fla.1951, 54 So.2d 431, that 'If there has been a mistrial or a continuance for good cause, or if for other good and sufficient...