Leonard v. Ozark Land Co Same v. Chatfield

• Decision Date: 23 November 1885
• Citation: 6 S.Ct. 127,115 U.S. 465,29 L.Ed. 445
• Parties: LEONARD and others v. OZARK LAND CO. 1 SAME v. CHATFIELD, Trustee. Filed
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

6 S.Ct. 127

115 U.S. 465

29 L.Ed. 445

LEONARD and others v. OZARK LAND CO.¹

SAME

v. CHATFIELD, Trustee.

Filed November 23, 1885.

This is a motion for a modification of the supersedeas, or more properly, perhaps, for a modification of the injunction contained in the decree appealed from. The bill prayed, among other things, for an injunction restraining 'the defendant, Leonard, from cutting or removing any trees, logs, or timber, or any staves manufactured from any trees or timber from any of the lands' in controversy. In the decree the defendants were 'perpetually enjoined from cutting or removing any timber from said lands.' The appeal operates as a supersedeas, it having been taken within 60 days after the disposition of the motion, which was made during the same term, to vacate the decree, and the bond being in the form required for that purpose. The decree was rendered by the judge of the district court of Arkansas, sitting as circuit judge. The same judge allowed the appeal, and, in doing so, directed that it should 'not operate to suspend or affect so much of the decree * * * as enjoins the defendants from cutting or otherwise trespassing on the lands in controversy, * * * or removing staves or timber cut thereon.' The appellant now moves this court 'to vacate so much of the decree of the court below granting an appeal and accepting appeal bond as qualifies the said appeal and prevents the same from superseding the decree rendered for the appellees, and especially so much of the said decree granting said appeal as prevents said appellant, J. W. Leonard, from removing the staves made on the land in controversy before service or entry of the decree in favor of the appellees.'

T. W. Brown, for the motion.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 466-467 intentionally omitted] Van H. Manning, J. W. C. Watson, and John R. Jones, against the motion.

WAITE, C. J.

The injunction ordered by the final decree was not vacated by the appeal. Slaughter-house Cases, 10 Wall. 297; Hovey v. McDonald, 109 U. S. 161; S. C. 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 136. It is true that in some of the Staughter-house Cases the appeal was from a decree making perpetual a preliminary injunction which had been granted at an earlier stage of the case; but the fact of the preliminary injunction had nothing to do with the decision which was 'that neither an injunction nor a decree dissolving an injunction is reversed or nullified by an appeal or writ of error before the cause is heard in this court.' This doctrine in the general language here stated was distinctly reaffirmed in Hovey v. McDonald, and it clearly refers to the...